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ABSTRACT

Nelson, Heather. Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2015. The Law and the Lady: Consent
and Marriage in Nineteenth-Century British Literature. Major Professor: Emily Allen.
While many scholars have written on women and marriage in nineteenth-century
British history and fiction, this dissertation, The Law and the Lady: Consent and
Marriage in Nineteenth-Century British Literature, is the first to apply consent theory to
those unions. Modern consent theory dictates that for individuals to consent, they must be
autonomous, capable, educated, mature, and volunteering, and they must express consent
with opportunities to retract those expressions. This dissertation asserts that because
nineteenth-century British women usually lacked these components, their marital consent
was partial, illegitimate, or absent. Fiction frequently equivocated about this social
problem of contemporary female marital consent. Conservative novelists trained female
readers to accept their "consent" to marital patriarchy, but progressive novelists enabled
readers to live vicariously through freer heroines, in order to provoke grassroots consent
reform. Thus, contemporary scholars in cultural and psychological studies should more
frequently question those women's behaviors and motivations.
Surface and close readings of fiction primarily inform this dissertation, aided by
feminist historicism, legal studies, political science, philosophy, nonfiction studies, and
biography. After an opening theoretical and historical chapter on women, consent, and
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marriage, three chapters and three literary case studies in the body expose laws dictating
female marital consent. When taken together in this trajectory, these chapters and literary
case studies form a meta-narrative about a heroine's consent dilemmas throughout
childhood and adulthood: 1) courtships and the social law of female modesty in Charlotte
Brontë's Shirley, 2) engagements, the social law of female acquiescence, actions for
breach of promise of marriage, and marriage settlements in Jane Austen's Pride and
Prejudice, Elizabeth Gaskell's Wives and Daughters, and Wilkie Collins's The Woman in
White, 3) weddings, Lord Hardwicke's Act, and the Marriage Act 1823 in Susannah
Frances Reynolds's Gretna Green, 4) marriages and William Blackstone, Matthew Bacon,
and Matthew Hales' legal theories of coverture and abuse in George Eliot's "Janet's
Repentance" and Daniel Deronda, George Egerton's "Virgin Soil," and John
Galsworthy's The Man of Property and In Chancery, 5) separations and restitution of
conjugal rights in Anthony Trollope's Phineas Finn and Phineas Redux, and 6) divorces
and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 in Ellen Price Wood's East Lynne, George
Moore's A Mummer's Wife, and Thomas Hardy's Jude the Obscure.

1

CHAPTER 1. WOMEN, CONSENT, AND MARRIAGE IN NINETEENTHCENTURY BRITISH LITERATURE AND HISTORY

The opening paragraph of William Wilkie Collins's novel The Law and the Lady
(1875) quotes the Marriage Service of the Church of England requiring that wives
consent to be "in subjection unto their own husbands" (L.L. 7). Besides beginning rather
than ending his novel with a wedding, Collins subverts the marriage plot by featuring a
wife who does not consent to be "subject…to [her] husband." Valeria Brinton
"Woodville" Macallan learns that her new husband was tried for the murder of his first
wife, and she begins voraciously researching the case and the law. Then she notifies him
of this by letter: "I have been learning, my dear: the Law and the Lady have begun by
understanding one another" (L.L. 116). Taking a cue from Valeria, this dissertation will
also begin to understand the law and the lady—vis-à-vis marriage.
Most nineteenth-century British fiction reflects the condition of England—
specifically, the condition of English women. Middle- and upper-class women were the
main writers, characters, and readers of novels,1 especially when written in the veins of
realism, psychological fiction, and domestic fiction. Marriage was the primary concern of
the social issues grouped under the umbrella term "The Woman Question," and marriage
was also the primary concern for most women. Naturally, then, marriage was the primary

1

As a result, they are this dissertation's focus, although the lower classes comprised the
majority of the population.

2
concern of women's literature. The importance of these intersections of marriage, middleand upper-class women, literature, and socio-legal history cannot be understated. They
helped drive the century, and this dissertation focuses on them.
Joan Perkin and Mary Lyndon Shanley produced two pole stars on the era's
women and marriage.2 Perkin's Victorian Women (1993) is the most exciting look at
these topics from history, and Shanley's Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian
England (1989) is its equally engaging twin from political science. Specifically, Perkin
presents the most comprehensive birth-to-twilight survey of women in the long
nineteenth century, and Shanley provides the most thorough report of Victorian protofeminists somewhat successfully reforming marital laws. Understandably, neither deals
much with literature. In fact, no study of the era's women and marriage in literature sets
literary studies on fire to the degree that Victorian Women and Feminism, Marriage, and
the Law do in their respective fields. This dissertation aims to follow Perkin and
Shanleys' examples and serve as a companion to them on the literary side of things. To do
so, though, this dissertation will utilize a new lens—consent—that Perkin and Shanley
did not mention, presumably partially because modern consent theory arose concurrently
to their scholarship.
Modern consent theory from political science, philosophy, and law dictates that
for individuals to consent, they must be autonomous, capable, educated, and mature, and
they must express consent voluntarily with opportunities to retract that consent.

2

In addition to Perkin and Shanley, for other major histories of women and marriage in
nineteenth-century England, see Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Carol Dyhouse,
Pat Jalland, Jane Lewis, Jennifer Phegley, Susie L. Steinbach, Dorothy M. Stetson, and
Martha Vicinus.
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Nineteenth-century British women usually lacked these components, particularly with
regard to marriage. This dissertation is the first to apply gendered consent theory to
nineteenth-century British literature and history, and it asserts that in and out of fiction,
women's consent was usually compromised in marital scenarios. Most women were
constrained throughout their lives by a cruel paradox: They could be oppressed physically,
emotionally, sexually, socially, legally, and financially by marrying, yet they had no
social or financial choice but to "consent." Even worse, "yes" came with problems, but
"no" came with more. Primarily, social laws governed single women until the moment
when they accepted proposals, and then actual laws took over. Together, both types of
laws comprised the main force dictating women's marital consent.
Literature waffled about women's marital consent. Conservative novelists
seemingly tried to train female readers to accept the status quo by directing them to
consent to marital patriarchy. Conversely, progressive novelists ostensibly attempted to
enable readers to live vicariously through comparatively freer heroines in the hope that
readers would alter the status quo through grassroots consent reform. Regardless of
political view, though, novelists asked their readers to assess issues surrounding gendered
marital consent when their peers in nonfiction rarely touched the subject.
This dissertation asks that contemporary scholars more frequently question
women's behaviors and motivations in the century's literature and history. Without
consent, marital actions can rarely be verified as desired, and this view can help expand
cultural and psychological studies. Ultimately, this assessment of consent provides a new
understanding of middle- and upper-class heterosexual relationships in nineteenthcentury England. As literature and history reveal, many of the issues termed "The
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Woman Question" revolved around consent, so consent issues helped drive gender
politics on the national scale.
This chapter will present a historical review of women and marriage in
nineteenth-century England, followed by a specific review of the century's marital laws.
Theorists from law, philosophy, and political science will elucidate modern
understandings of general consent, with feminist theorists then attending to women and
consent in intimate heterosexual relationships, including marriages. Next, this chapter
will introduce a theory of women and marital consent in nineteenth-century British
history, followed most importantly by an application of that theory to the era's fiction.
This chapter will conclude with the dissertation's methodology and summaries of its
remaining three chapters and three literary case studies.
Women and Marriage in Nineteenth-Century England
Young single women were almost constantly steered toward marriage.3 Since
girls were usually superficially educated (particularly in the accomplishments, like music,
art, languages, etc.), the doors of most colleges and universities remained closed to them
throughout the century. Consequently, women lacked skills for most employment, and
the available but limited employment options—like governess or shop employee—
carried social stigmas. As a result, few single women were employed in the public sphere.
For example, 1861 saw fewer than 200,000 female employees in the middle-class
occupations of education, health care, shops, etc. Instead, the Cult of Domesticity easily
maintained its power throughout the century. Marriage was the "career" for which women
3

For important scholars covering the history detailed in the sections "Women and
Marriage in Nineteenth-Century England" and "Women, Marriage, and the Law in
Nineteenth-Century England," please see footnote #2.
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trained and in which they spent their lives "working" in their separate but not equal
private sphere. Girls typically came out at 17 to enter the marriage market,4 culminating
with a Court presentation if appropriately rich and/or landed. Upper-class girls pinned
their hopes on The Season in London, and they had about three seasons for marital
opportunities to pan out. Watched and chaperoned from birth and forbidden from flirting,
young women usually had not been in the company of men enough to know what they
were getting into during courtship. The press acted as an aid here: Newspapers and
magazines ran marital ads, and matrimonial agencies helped match singletons.
Engagements could be tricky to navigate. Families expected most men to bow to
pressure and announce their intentions after seeing women just a handful of times, too
short of a period for men to get to know women and vice versa. Families also pressured
young women to marry—and quickly and eagerly. Further, young women did not just
consent to engagements; they usually consented to their fathers' prior consent to
engagements. Moreover, the social law of female modesty required that women wait for
suitors and prevent themselves from falling in love, never declaring romantic feelings to
men until they proposed; then women were magically to switch on their love for men.
Because society required that women not have sexual impulses, women were ordered

4

In "The Social Position of Women in the Present Age" (1869) lawyer and Member of
Parliament John Boyd Kinnear uses arresting financial rhetoric while advising his male
reader:
to frequent the fashionable London drive at the fashionable hour, and there
he will see the richest and most shameful woman-market in the world.
Men stand by the rails, criticising with perfect impartiality and equal
freedom, while women drive slowly past, some for hire, some for sale—in
marriage—these last with their careful mothers at their side, to reckon the
value of the biddings and prevent the lots from going off below the
reserved price. (354)
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against physical explorations of their emotions for men. For example, usually women
could not try first kisses to ascertain if they were emotionally and/or physically
compatible with their partners. First kisses happened after engagements when it was
difficult to break unions. Additionally, women could only write to men after they were
engaged, so that important, private mode of communication was off-limits as a way to get
to know men before agreeing to marriage. If women developed concerns about their
engagements, they were often encouraged to put them aside and go through with
marriages rather than be deemed coquettes or jilts. Once settled, the average middle- or
upper-class engagement lasted between six months and two years, although some were
only for a month.5 The longer the couple had known each other, the less time they were
supposed to remain engaged.
Compulsory marriage ruled the day. Companionate marriage based on romantic
love was considered the best type of union throughout the century. About 170,000
weddings occurred annually, and from 1851 until the end of the century nearly 90% of
the total population was or had been married.6 Marriage occurred early for women, too.
By 1840 across the social classes, 52% of women wed at 20-25, 18% at 25-30, and 7% at

5

Due to their greater difficulty of securing financial stability, couples in the lower classes
courted for an average of nine months before engagements, and their engagements lasted
an average of three years (Frost Promises 61-62).
6
In particular, in the 1851 census 70% of 100 women aged 20 or older were or had been
married (Registrar General 36, 39), and in the 1871 census nearly 90% of 45- to 49-yearold women were or had been married.
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30-35. Overall, the average woman first married at 23 in the beginning of the century and
26 by its end, whereas the average man first married aged 25-31.7
Women experienced pros and cons as wives. The Angel in the House, the 1854
poem by Coventry Patmore about his wife, crystallized existing desires for ideal wives.
Wives were placed on pedestals and encouraged to perform as angels in the house at all
times: beautiful; infantile; modest to the point of asexual; moral; self-sacrificing for
children, husbands, homes, and society; subservient; unambitious; unintellectual—in
short, impossibly perfect by Victorian standards. Angels in the house had to look the part,
too: ideally blond, blue-eyed, petite, and pale with modest (yet corseted) dress. In reality,
"angelic" wives could be plagued by submitting to husbands and by overseeing families,
servants, and residences, all of which their husbands could dictate. Wives had to abandon
most intellectual and employment goals as their dowries, which they had not even earned,
served as their economic contributions to their families.
Motherhood was a particular concern. For most of the century, childbirth was
anesthesia-free and a leading cause of death for women, with one in 200 dying (Perkin
Victorian 65). Largely because of next-to-no birth control, survivors endured a repeated
pregnancy/childbirth/breastfeeding cycle about every two years, bearing an average of six
children at mid-century. Throughout the Victorian period, about one in four babies died,
so a vast swath of wives lost at least one child without the benefit of talk therapy.
Death figured heavily in nineteenth-century marriage. Marriages only lasted an
average of 14 and rarely more than 20 years. In fact, in the 1850s one in five marriages
7

Most marriage literature, like marriage manuals, suggested that women marry aged 2025 with men about 3-7 years their senior, although the literature paradoxically advised
men to marry between 23-28.
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did not last a decade. The 1851 census revealed that 13% of women 20 or older were
widowed (Registrar General 39), again without therapy for emotional health.
Because marriage was a trade-off (particularly of power from a father to a
husband), some women would or could not marry. After all, women could not propose to
men; instead, they were taught to wait passively for proposals that might never come. The
1851 census exposed 30% of women aged 20 or older as unmarried (Registrar General
40), and that figure climbed to 40% by the turn of the century. Partly due to military
conflicts and differing lifespans, girls and women outnumbered boys and men by
500,0008 in the 1851 census (Registrar General 4) and 1,000,000 at the end of the century.
In "Why Are Women Redundant?" (1862), essayist William Rathbone Greg encouraged
single women to emigrate to Australia for its reverse male-to-female ratio and improved
marriage prospects. Otherwise, unmarried women remaining in England had few
employment options.9 A woman wishing to educate herself for a trade before marriage
often shot herself in the foot. Women could attend colleges (generally for the teaching
profession) by the middle of the century and Oxbridge near its end, but "bluestockings"
(the derogatory eighteenth-century term still somewhat in use in the nineteenth century)
had less chance of marrying. By 27-30, unmarried women were probably doomed to
spinsterhood and would remain their families' social embarrassments and financial drains.
Even worse for most of those women, in the second half of the century marriage rates

8

This amounted to 6% of the population.
Of course, the world's oldest profession—or "The Great Social Evil"—flourished
throughout England. In 1857, for example, 9,000 prostitutes—almost all unmarried and
lower-class—worked in London.
9
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began permanently declining. At mid-century, 17 people of 1,000 married annually, but
at the end of the century, that figure dropped to 15.
Women, Marriage, and the Law in Nineteenth-Century England
Conservative legal practices and legal theories concerning marriage dominated
England. Regardless of age, unmarried daughters (whether girls or "spinsters") were their
fathers' legal wards; conversely, at 21, their brothers became adults, regardless of marital
status. Upon engagement, fiancées could not dispose of property without their fiancés'
consent. Unless they were minors, women who broke engagements, which were legal
contracts, risked actions for breach of promise of marriage, by which their ex-fiancés
could sue for financial damages. Press coverage and social stigma usually accompanied
such suits, although men filed suits in small numbers. With engagements that survived,
male family members and lawyers arranged and sometimes haggled over fiancées'
marriage settlements, which included dowries, to the point that those men would sign
those legal documents just days prior to weddings. Under twelfth-century canon law, girls
could marry at 12 and boys at 14 with the consent of (usually male) parents or guardians,
although this rarely happened. Lacking such consent, unwidowed young women had to
wait to reach their majority (21 years) to marry, due to An Act for the Better Preventing
of Clandestine Marriages from 1753 (also known as Lord Hardwicke's Act or the
Clandestine Marriages Act) and its primary successor, the Marriage Act 1823. Girls and
young women lacking their majority and legal consent could take matters into their own
hands by crossing the Scottish border, where marital consent was deemed an individual
choice. In particular, hundreds and sometimes thousands of couples did so in the border
town of Gretna Green each year in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, An
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Act for Marriages in England reduced this necessity by introducing civil marriage in
1836, and An Act for amending the Law of Marriage in Scotland (also known as the
Marriage [Scotland] Act 1856 or Lord Brougham's Act) instituted a Scottish residency
requirement, all but eliminating clandestine border weddings.
Regardless of where British women married, they became civilly dead under
coverture. Because professor, lawyer, and judge William Blackstone laid out wives'
transformations from femes sole to femes covert in Commentaries on the Laws of
England (1765), for most of the nineteenth century husbands legally absorbed their
wives' rights, responsibilities, etc. at the altar. In short, wives had no legal existence.
However, common law granted one curious perk from coverture: Wives were deemed
guiltless of almost all crimes committed in their husbands' presences.
Because wives' bodies belonged to and were considered part of their husbands,
abuse was legal and prevalent. After lawyer Matthew Bacon established legal physical
marital abuse in A New Abridgment of the Law (1736), nineteenth-century law only
recognized extreme physical marital abuse (causing major physical harm or affecting
long-term physical health) as legal cruelty that was punishable. The Matrimonial Causes
Act 1878 improved upon this by declaring that if husbands committed aggravated
assaults to harm their wives seriously, the latter could receive judicial separations and
economic maintenance orders while the former could serve six-month sentences of hard
labor. With Kelly v. Kelly (1869) emotional abuse also became legal cruelty if it caused
physical side effects. However, since lawyer, judge, and Member of Parliament Matthew
Hale established the marital rape exemption in The History of the Pleas of the Crown
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(1736), nineteenth-century law never recognized sexual marital abuse (except sodomy) as
legal cruelty.
Under coverture, husbands controlled their wives' finances for most of the century
so that wives could neither own property or money nor make wills. This enabled a
lucrative business for fortune-hunters, and only about 10% of wives had marriage
settlements to try to prevent such swindling. Additionally, for most of the century, wives
could not make contracts, could neither sue nor be sued, and could only accrue debts in
their husbands' names. However, the Married Women's Property Acts, particularly of
1870 and 1882, chipped away at coverture so that wives gained control of some of their
money and property and became parties in suits.
"Father" was usually interpreted as "legal guardian." When wives gave birth,10 the
law automatically deemed their husbands the biological fathers of newborns, regardless
of extenuating circumstances. Mothers could almost never consent for nor otherwise
serve as legal guardians of their minor children. In separations and divorces, fathers
almost always received custody of minor children, although the Custody of Infants Act
1839, Infant Custody Act 1873, and Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 gradually enabled
wives to seek both custody of young children and access to older ones. If husbands did
not legally declare that after their deaths, their wives should become the legal guardians
of their minor children, the latter could become wards of the court.
Wives rarely retracted marital consent. Judicial separations were the first legal
option for unhappy couples, with the Maintenance of Wives (Desertion) Act 1886

10

Throughout the century, women delivered children in large numbers, given the
illegality of abortions and some birth control.
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stipulating that deserted wives could get maintenance orders of £2 per week. However,
because of Bacon's A New Abridgment of the Law and Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England, if wives deserted their homes, husbands (albeit in small numbers) could
sue for restitution of conjugal rights to force their return, regardless of extenuating
circumstances. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1884 provided spouses with immediate
judicial separations—not jail time—if they deserted and were subject to restitution suits,
and Regina v. Jackson (also known as "the Clitheroe Case") ended restitution suits in
1891. After the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895, faithful wives
alleging legal cruelty could flee their homes and not face desertion charges and
corresponding losses of court protection but could instead receive judicial separations and
economic maintenance orders from their husbands.11
Alternatively, unhappy couples could retract consent via divorce. For the first half
of the century Britons relied upon divorce law that dated to the Reformation and provided
two options. Specifically, couples could receive a mensa et thoro ("divorce from bed and
board"), technically providing economic separations and allowing wives to become femes
sole but preventing the parties from remarrying others and wives from controlling their
finances and obtaining custody of children. Alternatively, divorce a vinculo matrimonii
("divorce from the bonds of marriage") required three steps: a mensa et thoro, a criminal
conversation (commonly called crim. con.) suit, and an Act of Parliament. Divorce a
vinculo matrimonii could make children illegitimate with wives unable to access children
or money. From 1800-1857 England only saw 200 such divorces, four of which were

11

Additionally, wife sales (separations predominantly utilized by lower-class, rural
Britons in the early part of the century) were illegal.
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instigated by wives. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 granted the populace its first
widespread access to divorce but maintained a sexual double standard. Husbands could
file based on adultery, but wives could only file based on adultery and at least one other
offense: bestiality, bigamy, cruelty, incest, rape of a third party, sodomy, or two-year
desertion. Husbands could no longer automatically receive custody of children, and wives
could ask that their finances and property be kept from deserting husbands. Largely
because divorces were expensive, were reported in the press, and took away social status
(all as before), wives filed fewer than half of the divorce suits throughout the rest of the
Victorian period.
Widows struggled with property ownership. Wives who had purchased and
accumulated possessions during marriage could become widows and find those
possessions legally transferred to the heirs (and wives) of their late husbands' estates.
Also, for the first third of the nineteenth century husbands could not legally interfere with
their wives' dowers: Widows who had not committed adultery (barring reconciliation)
automatically received dowers, one-third of their husbands' estates during the remainder
of their lives. However, the Dower Act 1833 allowed husbands to control their wives
from the grave. Husbands could bar their widows from dowers or establish stipulations in
their wills for their widows' access to dowers. For example, widows who remarried could
lose their previous husbands' settlements, so some widows resorted to secret remarriages.
The Dower Act 1833 remained law throughout the rest of the Victorian period, although
the Married Women's Property Act 1882 somewhat evened the score by allowing wives
to will away property from their husbands.

14
Consent Theory
Besides a legal change to the age of sexual consent, nineteenth-century Britons
largely avoided consent talk. Regarding marital consent specifically, the women's rights
movement attacked the subordinate position of wives primarily on legal, social, and
economic grounds, ignoring consent. Neither conservative nor progressive nonfiction
writers directly commented about women's marital consent.
Recently, scholars12 from law, philosophy, and political science have created a
modern understanding of general consent. John Kleinig is probably the most prominent
and relevant theorist of general consent, due to "The Ethics of Consent" (1982) and "The
Nature of Consent" (2010). Kleinig asserts that individuals on the verge of consent must
have reached a certain age ("Nature" 13) and must have the capacity ("Nature" 13-14)
and maturity ("Nature" 5) to function fully according to that age. Kleining writes that
those individuals must understand scenarios requiring consent ("Nature" 16)13 and must
consent voluntarily, without coercion or threats ("Nature" 14-15).14 Kleinig also asserts
that consent must be communicated or demonstrated in some way ("Nature" 10)—unlike
Larry Alexander, who argues in "The Ontology of Consent" (2014) that consent is a
mental state and not an expression or a combination of the two (102). For Kleinig,
consent as a state of mind is secondary ("Nature" 11),15 and finally, individuals must be
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Most consent theorists write about political consent ("the consent of the governed");
sexual consent, particularly concerning rape; and medical consent.
13
Kleinig notes, though, that some people refuse to be informed about certain issues or
scenarios and consent anyway ("Nature" 16).
14
Amongst theorists of general consent, only Albert Weale believes that coerced consent
is legitimate (70).
15
Most contemporary theorists agree that tacit consent is illegitimate and that consent has
to be acted in some way, usually verbally.
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able to retract consent ("Nature" 9). Tom L. Beauchamp, the other prominent theorist on
general consent, shares some ground with Kleinig. Building from A History and Theory
of Informed Consent (1986) with Ruth R. Faden, Beauchamp writes in "Autonomy and
Consent" (2010) that for individuals to consent, they must be autonomous, volunteering,
noncontrolled, and educated about the scenarios requiring consent (55). Similarly, Tom
Dougherty agrees in "Fickle Consent" (2014) that individuals must be autonomous (30)
and able to retract consent (26). James Konow concurs in "Coercion and Consent" (2014)
that individuals must have competence, knowledge, and options (55-56), and their
consent must be voluntary, devoid of coercion (53).
General consent theory has importantly intersected with feminist theory a handful
of times. After Lenore Coltheart's "Desire, Consent and Liberal Theory" (1987), Carole
Pateman released The Sexual Contract (1988) and The Disorder of Women: Democracy,
Feminism and Political Theory (1989).16 In the latter Pateman issues a battle cry: "Only if
women are seen as 'free and equal individuals' is their consent relevant at all" (Disorder
74). Because women are not seen as such, then, their dealings with male lovers cannot be
egalitarian:
Consent must always be given to something; in the relationship between
the sexes, it is always women who are held to consent to men. The
"naturally" superior, active and sexually aggressive male makes an
initiative, or offers a contract, to which a "naturally" subordinate, passive
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After The Sexual Contract made Pateman famous, in part, for consent theory, she
pointed out in subsequent publications that she writes about contract, with a
comparatively small amount on consent.
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woman "consents." An egalitarian sexual relationship cannot rest on this
basis; it cannot be grounded in "consent." (Disorder 84)
Pateman offers a solution: "Unless refusal of consent or withdrawal of consent are real
possibilities, we can no longer speak of 'consent' in any genuine sense" (Disorder 72).
Until then, for her, every heterosexual relationship will remain nonconsensual at some
level.
Pateman and Coltheart generate some of their assessments of women and marital
consent from British history. Pateman questions a historic paradox concerning marriage
and women's socio-legal inequalities: "How can beings who lack the capacities to make
contracts nevertheless be supposed always to enter into this contract?" (Contract 6) She
answers later, "Women are property, but also persons; women are held both to possess
and to lack the capacities required for contract—and contract demands that their
womanhood be both denied and affirmed" (Contract 60). Coltheart hits the bulls-eye on
women and marital consent in British history: "The difficulty of identifying consent in
the absence of choice has been avoided by assuming consent, by ignoring non-consent or
reinterpreting non-consent as consent" (111).17 Rather than "assuming," "ignoring," or
"reinterpreting," this dissertation exposes the socio-legal factors that rendered female
marital consent partial, illegitimate, or absent in nineteenth-century British literature and
history.
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Pateman similarly states, "women have been presented as always consenting, and their
explicit non-consent has been treated as irrelevant or has been reinterpreted as 'consent'"
(Disorder 72).
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Women and Marital Consent in Nineteenth-Century England
This dissertation studies nineteenth-century England specifically vis-à-vis
gendered consent theory. What was consent like for girls and women throughout
courtships, engagements, weddings, marriages, separations, and divorces? Since most
decisions about those marital situations were usually left to men, consent was usually left
to men. Girls and women often lacked the aforementioned requisite components for
consent:
1)

Equality. Girls and women were never equal to boys and men. British
marital law was notoriously gender-biased, and only girls and women
were socially viewed as "naturally" destined for marriage and parenthood.

2)

Autonomy. Girls and women were almost never autonomous. Fathers or
(male) guardians almost always legally covered girls, and husbands
covered wives. As a result, men could consent for girls or women in their
stead, from proposal acceptances to marital finances and beyond.

3)

Maturity. Girls almost always entered the marriage market as minors.
Paradoxically, society encouraged them to do what they legally could
not—to marry and give away their property as minors without legal
consent. Circumventing the law often required fleeing the country.

4)

Capacity. Girls and women who consented but then lost their capacity
almost always had to maintain marital consent, whether aware of it or not.
For example, if capable women married but then became, say, chemically
dependent, comatose, or insane, their consent would almost always remain
intact.
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5)

Education. Girls and young women were usually not educated about men
and marital issues, so they had to consent to the unknown. The
accomplishments did not provide skills in motherhood or household
management, and female education remained mute on sexuality. Primarily
kept sheltered and chaperoned in the private sphere, girls could not, say,
acquire readings or experiences to compensate for their lack of practical
education and social experience.

6)

Coercion. Girls and women always endured pressure to marry and remain
married. Marital advisers did not always put first the best interests of girls
and women, particularly in the face of economic concerns like destitution,
upward mobility, or asset protection. Family members and friends could
advise, say, to marry for money, bear male heirs, and then remain in
marriages, no matter what. Husbands frequently coerced wives into
unwanted sexual acts, unwanted motherhood, unwanted relocations, etc.

7)

Expression. Girls and women were forbidden from expressing romantic
feelings for men through flirtation or proposals. The male sex possessed
the social power to seek consent while the female anxiously waited to
consent (if attracted) or awkwardly endured the scenario (if uninterested).
Further, parents and guardians usually expressed their consent before girls
and young women did. In certain marital situations over-confident suitors,
sometimes in league with parents and guardians, presumed female consent
(even in the absence of a verbal "yes" from girls and women) if the match
were advantageous or if no other suitors were predicted. Additionally,
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brides' wedding-day consent enabled a lifetime of consent to some
physical and emotional abuse and almost all sexual acts. Also, bridal
consent almost always guaranteed that upon becoming mothers, women
could not consent for minor children.
8)

Retraction. Girls and women could not easily retract marital consent. To
break engagements or separate, they faced legal, financial, and social
repercussions. If they qualified for the law's gender-discriminatory divorce
requirements, they faced the same repercussions. Separation and divorce
also came with concerns about parting from children and other family
members.

While not precluding consent outright, additional factors made consent more difficult for
girls and women:
1)

Choice. Girls and women often did not have more than one marital option
to which to consent. They were often pressured to marry their first suitors
rather than risk the possibility of no future men, a Hobson's choice. Girls
and women almost always lacked equally fulfilling ways to spend their
lives outside marriage in, say, careers, volunteerism, or travel.

2)

Models. Girls and women lacked models of positive female consent. They
were surrounded by other girls and women with marital consent problems
stemming from frustrations with equality, autonomy, maturity, education,
coercion, expression, and/or retraction. Girls and women likely followed
their mothers' marital examples, unable to turn to much fiction or history
for models of different choices, consent, or dissent.
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3)

Analysis. Girls and women often could not significantly deliberate about
their suitors or consent. According to modern cognitive science, girls
entered the marriage market too young to have complete brain
development. Girls and women were often not afforded opportunities to
enhance critical thinking skills by, say, reading advanced texts, consulting
with female associates, or traveling to see other worldviews. Also, girls
and women could not romantically experiment through trial and error with
multiple males to gain insight into their feelings and behaviors. If women
received proposals, their consent could be desired quickly, and if they
began to entertain second thoughts about engagements or marriages, they
were almost always told to squash them rather than face socio-legal
consequences.

The collision of gender and class created consent difficulties. The further down
the economic ladder, the more financial strains compromised consent. Middle‐class
women were less able than their "betters" to provide legitimate consent. Perhaps this was
seen most frequently in literature and history when beautiful middle-class women faced
marrying for money, not love, with upper-class men. With no personal moneymaking
opportunities and with families encouraging them to do their (fiscal) duties to themselves
and England, women's consent was jeopardized. Particularly in England, class has almost
always trumped gender, including in marital consent scenarios.
This dissertation does not discount third-wave feminism by discrediting female
marital agency and power, but instead, it assesses the era's marriages with a raised
eyebrow. With a powerful legal, social, familial, educational, and occupational system
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working against women's choice in the nineteenth century, scholars should question and
then question again girls and women's behaviors. Specifically, these exposed consent
problems have psychological and performative implications for girls and women's marital
actions—or at least their motivations. Without legitimate consent, little can be verified as
legitimately desired. Unfortunately, since girls and women knew that even their letters
and diaries could be read against them, it is very difficult for modern scholars to ascertain
whether and when sweethearts, fiancées, wives, and divorcées wholeheartedly wanted to
be sweethearts, fiancées, wives, and divorcées.
Women and Marital Consent in Nineteenth-Century British Literature
Literary scholars have written on women and marriage in nineteenth-century
British fiction for decades,18 but this dissertation's inclusion of consent expands that
scholarship. Fiction frequently dealt with and equivocated about the social problem of
women's marital consent. Depending on the issue, fiction could be its society's
conservative tool, training its middle- and upper-class female readership not to be too
headstrong or independent but to consent to existing marital hierarchy and male
superiority. Alternatively, because most of the era's novels revolve around female
18

See Rachel Ablow, Kathleen Blake, Jenni Calder, Monica F. Cohen, Randall Craig,
Shirley Foster, Jean E. Kennard, Elizabeth Langland, Tara MacDonald, Mary Poovey,
and Ruth Bernard Yeazell. Only Wendy S. Jones, who otherwise focuses on the transition
from arranged marriages to love matches in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history
and literature, alludes to women and marital consent:
If men and women entered marriage voluntarily out of mutual regard, this
implied that a woman should not be subordinate to her husband, or
considered his inferior, for if she were capable of choosing her spouse, she
was presumably capable of other important choices and of taking
responsibility for her life…Since women as well as men were independent
agents in this important transaction, wives were entitled to the same
protections and liberties that civil society theoretically accorded to their
husbands. (5)
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characters' marital choices, novelists enabled female readers to experience vicariously the
legitimate consent that they lacked in their lives. Recognizing that women's inability to
consent contributed to the perpetuation of systematic patriarchy, activist authors pushed
female readers to advocate for consent in their own lives, and their literature helped bring
about some of the century's reforms.
To re-use Collins's title, literature shows that the main force precluding marital
consent stemmed from the junction of the law and the lady. As exposed by this
dissertation's body, laws—like actions for breach of promise of marriage, marriage
settlements, Lord Hardwicke's Act and the subsequent Marriage Act 1823, coverture's
physical and emotional "corrections" and the marital rape exemption, restitution of
conjugal rights, and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, respectively—prohibited women
from enjoying full consent and dissent from engagements to divorces. To a lesser but still
important degree, social laws like female modesty and acquiescence also prevented
women from consenting on their own terms before engagements. Although these sociolegal consent problems somewhat decreased as the Victorian period advanced, a woman
was still subject to a host of gender-biased marital laws throughout her entire life, and
there was little getting around them. Regardless of the education, wealth, or power of a
woman living under the law, at the end of the day, she was usually just that: a woman.
Nonfiction and fiction sometimes battled about women and marital consent.
While nonfiction writers (even progressives from the women's rights movement) did not
directly write about women and general marital consent, their counterparts in fiction
based the majority of their literature on that issue. As this dissertation's body will reveal,
battles between nonfiction and fiction continued at the micro level, too. Nonfiction
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writers usually either abstained from or delicately commented about women's consent
vis-à-vis courtships, engagements, weddings, marriages, separations, and divorces.
Fiction writers, though, tackled each of these issues stridently, presenting their thoughts
to a larger reading audience in the process. By the end of the century, then, there had
been no real contest. Fiction, the century's most powerful force in print, had carried its
point on consent.
Methodology
Following the emerging trend of "surface reading" while relying upon the
tradition of close reading to a lesser extent, this dissertation is primarily informed by
analyses of British fiction from the long nineteenth century. The included texts span the
gamut of current scholarly attention, from overlooked (Gretna Green; Or, All for Love, A
Mummer's Wife, and "Virgin Soil") to middling (East Lynne, In Chancery, "Janet's
Repentance," The Man of Property, Phineas Finn: The Irish Member, and Phineas Redux)
to canonical (Daniel Deronda, Jude the Obscure, Pride and Prejudice, Shirley: A Tale,
Wives and Daughters: An Every-Day Story, and The Woman in White). The texts'
publication dates sweep the long nineteenth century: 1813, 1848, 1849, 1858, 1860, 1861,
1866, 1869, 1873, 1876, 1884, 1894, 1895, 1906, and 1920. Their settings enhance that
sweep: 1811-1812 (for two texts), 1822-1830, 1827-the early 1830s, 1833 or earlier,
1849-1852, the 1850s-1860s, 1860-1870, 1863-1867, 1864-1866, 1869-1871, 1882-1886,
1886-1887, presumably the 1890s (on or before 1894), and 1899-1901. Additionally, the
texts appear in a variety of forms: one short story, one novella, one incomplete novel,
eight novels, and two novel series. Realism (including high realism, naturalism, and neoVictorianism) is the most heavily represented genre, followed by sensation and the
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penny-dreadful. Authors of both genders are considered, with seven women (Jane Austen,
Elizabeth Gaskell, Susannah Frances Reynolds, Ellen Price Wood, and three who
published under male pseudonyms: Currer Bell [Charlotte Brontë], George Egerton
[Mary Chavelita Dunne Bright], and George Eliot [Mary Anne Evans]) and five men
(John Galsworthy, Thomas Hardy, George Moore, Anthony Trollope, and Wilkie
Collins). Scholarly attention to these authors also spans the gamut from overlooked
(Reynolds) to middling (Egerton, Galsworthy, Moore, and Wood) to canonical (Austen,
Brontë, Eliot, Gaskell, Hardy, Trollope, and Collins).
This dissertation utilizes an interdisciplinary approach to this fiction. Feminist
historicism best exposes problems with female marital consent in a patriarchal century
and country. Via the law-and-literature movement, studies of famous and forgotten laws
and social laws contextualize gendered consent restrictions within and without fiction,
and some theory from political science and philosophy guides those studies. Analyses of
famous and forgotten nonfiction inform the century's mood about women and marriage,
and finally, periodic authorial biography explicates personal views of marital issues.
Both chapters and literary case studies form the dissertation's body. This
combination provides a blend between traditional and innovative models—chapters and
literary case studies, respectively. At approximately 35-40 pages, the chapters have
normal lengths, while the literary case studies are more digestible at 12-15 pages. Since
each literary case study appears between two chapters, the dissertation moves quicker,
and the reader can more easily maintain his/her attention rather than getting bogged down
in a series of long chapters. This format also provides both breadth and depth to the
dissertation. Each chapter surveys a consent issue playing out across decades in three or
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five texts, while each literary case study shows how one author treats a consent issue in
one heroine's life. Further, each literary case study mimics legal case studies of the period
by detailing how a law negatively affects a woman's life.
Three chapters and three literary case studies address different marital consent
scenarios for girls and women. Each of the chapters and literary case studies corresponds
to a phase in heroines' lives—from courtship to engagement to wedding to marriage to
separation to divorce. When these chapters and literary case studies are taken together in
this trajectory, they form a meta-narrative about a heroine's consent dilemmas throughout
her childhood and adulthood. These chapters and literary case studies also cut a swath
through the upper half of the class system by looking at a nearly even socio-economic
variety of female figures: Elizabeth "Lizzy" Bennet, Susanna "Sue" Bridehead, Janet
Dempster, Kate Ede, Caroline Helstone, and Hyacinth "Cynthia" Kirkpatrick in the
middle classes and Laura Fairlie, Florence "Flo" (surname unknown), Irene Forsyte,
Gwendolen Harleth, Lady Laura Kennedy, Lady Arabella Montagu, and Lady Isabel
Vane in the upper classes. Analyses of both the fictional and historical female figures in
these chapters and literary case studies open a larger discussion about women and choice
in the century. These chapters and literary case studies show that female consent
restrictions crossed all class lines, coalescing as a problem blanketing the entire nation.
By its conclusion, this dissertation demonstrates that gender oppression was smoothly
accomplished regardless of—indeed, often in the face of—women's "consent."
The first literary case study, "Literary Case Study of Caroline Helstone's
Courtship: Charlotte Brontë and Female Modesty," originates from the social law of
female modesty, which dictated that women spontaneously develop love only after men
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declared their love and proposed. Thus, women who felt love before engagements could
not express that emotion, often forced to act cold and unnatural instead. As a result, this
literary case study exposes the illogical, painful stresses in courtship and consent that
women endured. Despite the companionate marriage ideal featuring romantic love,
women could not pursue or propose to their beloveds and therefore could not be equal
companions. Further, if beloved men never sought female consent via proposals, women
had to remain silent and pine indeterminately, so modesty caused emotional suppression
throughout England. Many critics have provided treatments of modesty, romantic love,
and courtship in fiction, and now this literary case study includes consent analysis.
Novels frequently feature a loving woman who is denied consent—a woman who cannot
propose and who must suppress love. Interestingly, then, nineteenth-century novels
frequently feature figures who were not supposed to exist in reality. Yet novelists—
indeed, mainly female novelists more familiar with this consent denial—repudiate these
figures with long periods of emotional pain that often turn into physical symptoms and
even near-death. Of these novels, Brontë creates the most pitiful period of suffering for
her heroine Caroline in Shirley (1849). In so doing, Brontë backs modesty in courtship
and advises female readers to obey consent law throughout the Victorian period or
possibly suffer the ultimate consequence.
The second chapter, "Fiancées and Engagements: 'You Must Give Me Leave to
Judge for Myself,'" assesses consent and ill-considered engagements, alleging that plenty
of women just had an illusion of more marital choice in the nineteenth century compared
with earlier centuries. Building from scholarship from Randall Craig and Robert A.
Ferguson on proposals and engagements in the century's literature, this chapter asserts
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that novels' usage of the courtship and marriage plot intensified this illusion. First, under
the social law of female acquiescence, women were often required to trade one station
(their fathers' control) for another (their husbands' control) without question or other
options, and their "consent" to the better of the two selections should not have been
perceived as a moot point. Publishing her novel Pride and Prejudice in 1813, Austen
could not offer more options for Lizzy besides singledom and marriage, but she manages
to ridicule the nineteenth-century belief of women's engagement consent as a foregone
conclusion. Those engagements were legal contracts throughout the century, so if women
became uncertain in their engagements, they usually stayed engaged until marrying.
Revoking consent resulted in "jilt" labels and actions for breach of promise of marriage
for financial damages. However, law and literature did not reconcile on broken
engagements, with novelists slightly supporting female jilting but disallowing male
plaintiffs of actions for breach of promise. Gaskell's novel Wives and Daughters (1866)
hovers between jilt literature and breach of promise literature. Ultimately, Gaskell
decides that jilts should receive censure from language, not the law. British fiancé(e)s
dealt with this breach of promise threat, however, until England abolished the suits in
1970. Finally, most middle- and upper-class male family members and lawyers created
marriage settlements to dictate how future husbands could or could not control their
future wives' property. Since those women usually did not help create their settlements,
they could not consent to them. To show an egregious example of this lack of consent in
his novel The Woman in White (1860), Collins writes the affianced Laura as a minor
unaware of outside settlement proceedings, although her fiancée desires to marry her just
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for her property and settlement. Fiancées like Laura faced consent difficulties through
marriage settlements until the documents went out of style in the early twentieth century.
The second literary case study, "Literary Case Study of Lady Arabella Montagu's
Wedding: Susannah Frances Reynolds and Clandestine Marriage," begins from Lord
Hardwicke's Act and the Marriage Act 1823, which required plenty of grooms to gain the
consent of prospective fathers-in-law before marrying their minor daughters under 21
years. This literary case study shows that if young women wanted to consent
independently of parents or guardians, they could flee the country for "clandestine
weddings" in Gretna Green, Scotland. By marrying men of their choice on their own
terms in their chosen location, though, such brides were frequently viewed as un-English
and unfeminine. Besides Lisa O'Connell, critics have overlooked novels of Scottish
clandestine marriages, yet this literary case study reveals literature almost always
supporting the patriarchal English way of life against independent female marital consent.
Interestingly, all novelists of Scottish clandestine marriage were female, but nearly all
backed Lord Hardwicke's Act and the Marriage Act, thus aiding a national infantilization
of young women. Indeed, with her novel Gretna Green (1848), Reynolds writes the most
conservatively and didactically of these novelists. Since Lady Arabella cares little about
her father's marital consent, Reynolds banishes her with her fiancé into a Gretna Green
wedding and then embitters their marriage with estrangement, poverty, and death. In fact,
as a warning to female readers, Reynolds eventually transforms Lady Arabella's support
of independent marital consent into remorse for her choice. Minor British women had to
pay heed to such warnings about independent thought and allow male consent control
over their weddings until 1925.

29
The third chapter, "Wives and Marital Abuse: 'Nothing That She Could Allege
Against Him in Judicious or Judicial Ears,'" expands scholarship by Kate Lawson and
Lynn Shakinovsky, Lisa Surridge, and Marlene Tromp on marital abuse in nineteenthcentury British fiction. Specifically, due to Blackstone's theory of coverture in
Commentaries on the Laws of England, this chapter reveals how wives allegedly
consented on their wedding days to future abuse. In particular, Bacon's A New
Abridgment of the Law legalized physical (and, by extension, emotional) marital abuse,
and Hale established the marital rape exemption in The History of the Pleas of the Crown.
Unfortunately, the public, including nonfiction writers, asserted that marital abuse existed
almost entirely in the lower classes, while it actually existed to the same degree in the
middle and upper classes. Only fiction writers countered the myth by using their writing
to show "consensual" abuse in middle- and upper-class marriages—with the end goal of
educating and activizing readers. Eliot first used fiction to illuminate these socio-legal
outrages. With middle-class physical and emotional marital abuse in her novella "Janet's
Repentance" from her collection Scenes of Clerical Life (1858) and upper-class sexual
marital abuse in her novel Daniel Deronda (1876), Eliot shows all marital abuse as
nonconsensual. In so doing, she helped enable more overt late-Victorian and Edwardian
fictional condemnations of "consensual" sexual marital abuse in the upper classes. First,
Egerton became the Victorian woman to state bluntly what Eliot could not, which the
short-story author accomplished with "Virgin Soil" from her collection Discords (1894).
Then Galsworthy's two novels from The Forsyte Saga—The Man of Property (1906) and
In Chancery (1920)—reveal a national shift about upper-class sexual marital abuse:
Fictional wives became more assertive, husbands less firm, and authors more explicit.
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Still, though, these authors' efforts affected little change, and England only abolished the
marital rape exemption in 1991.
The third literary case study, "Literary Case Study of Lady Laura Kennedy's
Separation: Anthony Trollope and Restitution of Conjugal Rights," shows how Bacon's A
New Abridgment of the Law and Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
enabled restitution of conjugal rights, which forced deserting spouses to reenter their
homes. If husbands had legally abused their wives and wives had no other option but to
flee, the men's subsequent suits almost always indicated their resolve to resume abuse. In
returning abused wives to their homes, then, the law made women "consent" to the
renewal of abuse. This literary case study reveals Trollope as the only nineteenth-century
British author who plotted restitution, accomplished in his novels Phineas Finn (1869)
and Phineas Redux (1873). After Lady Laura tries to retract her marital consent by
deserting her home, her abusive husband considers a restitution suit to return her. More
fearful, Lady Laura flees England and its consent law for Europe, provoking her
husband's smear campaign of her in their native country. Trollope suggests that since
Lady Laura did not foresee Kennedy's marital abuse to which she allegedly consented as
a bride, her consent should be withdrawn as a wife. Since consent and restitution ruin the
heroine by the end of the Phineas novels, Trollope advises his female readers to pause
before consenting to marriage. The novelist argues that outrageously, "consenting" wives
were abused by their husbands in their homes and abused by the law outside their homes.
Victorian wives after Lady Laura suffered in this position until England ceased restitution
in 1891.
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The fourth chapter, "Femes Sole and Divorce: 'If You Don't Want to Live With
Him Any More You Have a Right to Leave Him,'" focuses on the Matrimonial Causes
Act 1857, which enabled more divorces than prior legislation in British history. Only
Anne Humpherys has evaluated the era's fictional depictions of divorcées, and now with
consent analysis, this chapter reveals three post-1857 novels featuring main female
characters consenting in marriage before retracting that consent with the Matrimonial
Causes Act. Specifically, this chapter gauges Wood's East Lynne (1861, sensation),
Moore's A Mummer's Wife (1884, naturalism), and Hardy's Jude the Obscure (1895, high
realism). These novels build from the same skeletal plot: Rather than live independently,
wives retract marital consent to consent adulterously to lovers, so fiction reveals the near
hopelessness for women to obtain divorces on their terms. Genre helped diversify these
depictions, though. The sensation novel had to take the first shot at presenting a divorcée,
and then the naturalist novel had to depict her to enable her later admittance into high
realism. Ideology also played a role: Wood handled her divorcée conservatively, and
Moore tried to lack bias before Hardy could sympathize with her. Finally, timing was a
factor. After 1857, divorce was too new for any literature but 1860s sensation. The 1880s
naturalist novelist's treatment indicates more Victorians familiarizing themselves with
divorce, and then because enough time had passed, a divorcée arrived in 1890s high
realism. Genre, ideology, and timing worked inversely to success, however. Wood's early,
conservative sensational novel was a jackpot; readers largely ignored Moore's middle,
neutral naturalist text; and Hardy's final, progressive high realist novel killed his career in
the genre. In the final analysis, however, despite Victorian criticism, high realism
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accurately served as a harbinger of gendered marital consent reform in the British
twentieth century.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERARY CASE STUDY OF CAROLINE HELSTONE'S
COURTSHIP: CHARLOTTE BRONTË AND FEMALE MODESTY

In the street ballad "The Queen's Marriage" (1871), Victorians link proposing to a
partner with controlling that partner in marriage. Conversely, the partner who accepts a
proposal will be "obe[dient]" in marriage. The power to "speak first" always went to men,
save one exception. Queen Victoria was the only nineteenth-century British woman who
got away with proposing to and then governing a man in marriage, and balladeers were
nervous that she would start a trend:
Since the Queen did herself for a husband "propose,"
The ladies will all do the same, I suppose;
Their days of subserviency now will be past,
For all will "speak first" as they always did last!
Since the Queen has no equal, "obey" none she need,
So, of course, at the altar from such vow she's freed;
And the women will all follow suit, so they say—
"Love, honour," they'll promise, but never—"obey."
Our cups to the dregs in a health let us drain,
And wish them a long and prosperous reign;
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Like good loyal subjects in loud chorus sing
Victoria's wedding, with Albert her King! (Hindley 58)19
Thus, the ballad concludes by forcing the contemporary conservative gender hierarchy on
this scenario by making Albert king over Queen Victoria. He was not.
As Pat Jalland and Jennifer Phegley reveal through their histories of romantic love
and courtship in nineteenth-century England,20 women had to wait passively through
courtships for proposals that would require their passivity as socio-legally oppressed
wives. The social law of female modesty in the marriage market required that women not
feel love until men declared their love and proposed, after which women were to develop
feelings magically. Because of the paradoxical juxtaposition of modesty laws and
compulsory marriage, women had to appear relatively indifferent to all suitors while
subtly luring at least one into a proposal, often as quickly and lucratively as possible.21 If
women harbored secret love for men, the former had to act indifferent, even cold, to the
latter.
This literary case study argues that England made illogical demands of its women
regarding courtship and consent. Since women were meant to consent on the spot without
entertaining romantic feelings for their suitors or assessing their prospective engagements
19

Actually, like other nineteenth-century brides, Queen Victoria promised "to obey"
Albert, Prince Consort, in her 1840 wedding vows.
20
Jalland presents a history of nineteenth-century courtship and love through case studies
of political families. Phegley reports on everything from advertisements to matchmaking
clubs to the Season.
21
However, to avoid defamation as coquettes, women were not to go so far as flirting.
Sarah Stickney Ellis criticizes flirting in The Daughters of England, Their Position in
Society, Character & Responsibilities (1842). Ellis claims of the British woman that "one
hinderance to her improvement still remains—one barrier against her progress in the path
of wisdom and of truth" (Daughters 307)—i.e., flirting, instead of, say, political,
educational, or financial inequality.
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beforehand, women could not make wise decisions to enter into marriages, which were
paradoxically deemed the most important decisions of their lives. Companionate
marriage—featuring romantic love as a key component—was considered the best type of
union, but women could not be equal companions because they could not pursue their
beloveds in courtship—much less propose to them. Because of modesty laws, women
could only wait for men to present opportunities to consent. If women had romantic
feelings that they did not know were shared, they could do nothing, lacking the agency to
request consent or even embolden their beloveds' to request consent. If men never sought
consent, women had to remain silent forever, perhaps pining indefinitely. This modesty
created nationwide emotional suppression.
A handful of literary critics have provided insightful treatments of modesty,
romantic love, and courtship in fiction,22 and now this literary case study factors in
consent. In a frequent scenario in novels, a female character loves, but due to modesty
laws, she cannot make a man propose and so must suppress her love. For transgressing
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See Randall Craig, Katherine Sobba Green, Wendy S. Jones, Susan Ostrov Weisser,
and Ruth Bernard Yeazell.
In particular, Green sees courtship plots from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
female novelists as a mixed bag. "[D]istrust[ing] the sacrifices of autonomy and
individual achievement that 'domestic bliss' has entailed for women" (161), she views the
monomaniacal focus on marriage as antifeminist. However, Green reads a growing
encouragement of female marital choice: "Writing at a time when the decorums of
marriage were shifting, with emphasis increasingly falling on the affective relationship of
wife and husband, courtship novelists quietly championed women's rights to choose
marriage partners for personal, relational reasons rather than for familial, economic ones"
(161).
Weisser coined another term for modesty: "One of the mythic paradigms of
women's sexuality in nineteenth-century British literature is one I call Moral Femininity,
in which a heroine is empowered and achieves self-definition by restraining her own
strong desires…to repress female sexual desire is to forfeit some essential measure of
female selfhood and autonomy" (12).
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against courtship's consent policy, novels, mostly aligning with their predominantly
conservative society on the issue of modesty, chastise those women with long periods of
suffering. In her novel Shirley: A Tale (1849) Charlotte Brontë writes the longest and
thereby the most pitiful period of suffering for her heroine Caroline Helstone to
encourage her readers' obedience to modesty.
Female Modesty In Print
Nonfiction almost entirely avoided the topic of female consent in courtship. The
anonymous author of "Falling in Love" (1861) presents the party line about modesty to a
female audience that he presumes "do[es]n't object": "Don't fall in love. Be very cautious,
and keep your heart, till a very worthy fellow…offers to you his heart, his hand, his home;
and then set your heart upon him, and love him with all your soul. You don't object to
that arrangement…You must really, and steadfastly, be very passive, and keep your heart
all disengaged for that sweet expected whisper and embarrassed declaration of love"
("Falling" 45). In an unexpected turn, however, the writer issues a contradiction: "you
will truly be the first to love! Were the secret of man's heart known, it would be found
that he really cannot love, in the full sense of that sacred word, till he is loved. Woman
never ought to love till she at least thinks she is loved" ("Falling" 45). For this author,
courtship is a series of deceptions. A woman is to refrain from love until a man loves her
and proposes, at which time she can begin to love; however, he lies and will only love her
after she loves him—or at least believes that he loves her. It was hard enough for women
to navigate the social law of the first scenario. It was nearly impossible to succeed in the
second. Modesty set up women—and men—to fail.
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The Home and Colonial Matrimonial Agency's How to Get a Husband and How
to Get a Wife (1888) contains the century's longest exposition against female modesty.
The agency argues that the male privilege of choosing partners creates "victims of false
modesty…who would disdain to practise deception on any other subject whatever," and
interestingly, men want the custom abolished:
yet on this particular and most vital question, on which in many cases the
happiness and contentment of a lifetime depend, truth and honesty are
discarded, while dissimulation and pretended indifference…are made to
take rank with some of the highest virtues. The dread of being thought
what is miscalled "unmaidenly" is made the excuse…
Many of the males themselves are by no means proud of the
prerogative they enjoy, and would be glad to share the responsibility with
their willing sisters if, by that means, they could more easily penetrate the
disguise and reserve behind which it is fashionable for the ladies to hide
themselves, and by which the means of approach to a mutual
understanding is so often effectually barred. That advances can be made
with tact and discretion without compromising womanly dignity or respect
is perfectly possible, and ought more frequently to be done…A free,
natural, graceful, honest line of conduct is one that is most likely to
captivate, and is infinitely more honourable and commendable. (4-5)
Continuing to call for an end to female modesty, the Home and Colonial Matrimonial
Agency shows how female modesty is counterintuitive to women's need to marry in the
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nineteenth century. With poetic rhetoric, the agency exposes the "business" of marriage,
which casts women as "goods" for insane "merchants" to sell:
they go about the subject in the most unbusinesslike way possible—in a
way, in fact, that they would never dream of applying to any other kind of
business whatever. What does a merchant who has a certain class of goods
to dispose of do in order to effect a clearance? Does he pretend that he is
not willing to part with them—does he try to convey the impression that
he is quite independent and indifferent as to whether they are disposed of
or not…? Does he act as if nothing but pique would induce
patronage?…Assuredly not; such conduct would not only prove the man
to be unfit to be a merchant, but would bring him perilously near to, if not
actually within the compass of, a strait-jacket and a lunatic asylum. Yet
thoughtlessly, because it is customary and reputed, dignified and
respectable, our females in all positions of life mutilate and distort their
matrimonial prospects in much the same way as their Chinese sisters do
their feet, who are trained to believe with equal absurdity that their mimic
hoofs and stilted waddle form the very perfection of cultivated nature and
elegant human gait. (5-6)
Common rhetoric in the nineteenth century congratulated England for its comparably
advanced women's rights and statuses, but the Home and Colonial Matrimonial Agency
levels East and West on perceived female attractions for marriageability. Here female
modesty is akin to (Eastern) physical torture, much like biting a stone and holding a
stinging scorpion in Shirley. The Home and Colonial Matrimonial Agency later self-
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promotionally proposes that instead of behaving modestly and masochistically, single
women should act in the marriage market by enrolling in its own matchmaking service.
Maud Wheeler is heartbreaking about consent in Whom to Marry, Or All About
Love and Matrimony (1894). For her, violating modesty is the worst offense in the Cult
of "[T]rue [W]oman[hood]": "Some women unconsciously betray their love even before
it has been sought…There is nothing a true woman dreads more than the shame which
she feels would attach to an unrequited affection on her part, and therefore a woman's
manner is usually no index to her feeling. She is generally an adept at concealing her real
sentiments, and will carry about a heavy heart under a smiling countenance" (58-59). By
identifying women who cannot match their emotions to their behaviors, Wheeler recalls
tragic fictional figures like Caroline, who will soon be shown thinking shamefacedly, "I
have more than once regretted bitterly, overflowing, superfluous words, and feared I had
said more than he expected me to say, and that he would disapprove what he might deem
my indiscretion" (Brontë Shirley 85). Consent strictures caused these gender-based lies
nationwide.
This literary case study reveals that in novels, especially psychological fiction,
when immodest women love unrequitedly, they are denied consent. Unable to generate a
proposal, they can only acknowledge and analyze their love within the confines of the
novel. Just the narrators and readers can know. The alternative—that women love
publicly and seek their beloveds' marital consent—would upturn England's millennia-old
institution of marriage, the foundation of its political, economic, and social patriarchy.
Perhaps to prevent that alternative, authors reprimand women with long emotional torture
that can manifest as physical ailments, sometimes nearly death. England's consent custom,
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then, enables the novel to create a medical and social epidemic. Besides Anthony
Trollope (Orley Farm's Madeline Staveley), female novelists—more acutely aware of
emotional suppression and consent denial—spread the virus: Jane Austen (Mansfield
Park's Fanny Price and Sense and Sensibility's Elinor and Marianne Dashwood), Anne
Brontë (Agnes Grey's titular character), Charlotte Brontë (Jane Eyre: An Autobiography's
titular character and Shirley's Caroline, this literary case study's focus), Dinah Mulock
Craik (Olive's Olive Rothesay), George Eliot (Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life's
Dorothea Casaubon), and Elizabeth Gaskell (Wives and Daughters: An Every-Day Story's
Mary "Molly" Gibson). Ultimately, this survey reveals discord between society and
fiction. Unrequited female love was not supposed to exist in society, but it is all over the
novel.
Shirley and Female Modesty
In her letters Brontë first shared her views of female modesty. In 1840 she pitied
the general woman suffering from unrequited love: "God help her, if she is left to love
passionately and alone" (Letters 1: 218). In another 1840 letter to a female friend Brontë
reviewed a peer's experience and advised modesty:
no young lady should fall in love till the offer has been made, accepted—
the marriage ceremony performed and the first half year of wedded life
has passed away…Did I not once tell you of an instance of a Relative of
mine who cared for a young lady till he began to suspect that she cared
more for him and then instantly conceived a sort of contempt for
her?…Mary is my study—for the contempt, the remorse—the
misconstruction which follow the development of feelings in themselves
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noble, warm—generous—devoted and profound—but which being too
freely revealed—too frankly bestowed—are not estimated at their real
value. (Letters 1: 234)
This view would flow into Brontë's modesty plot in Shirley.
Brontë strengthened her view of modesty after her inability to court and propose
to her beloved. While in Brussels from 1842-1843, she fell in love with Constantin
Georges Romain Heger. Seven years her senior, Heger was initially Brontë's teacher, then
the spouse of her new employer, and later her student. Apparently, Brontë was unable to
hide her emotions modestly because Heger's wife grew to dislike her. After Brontë
returned to England, never to see Heger again, she miserably wrote letters to him,
including this from 1845:
I have tried to forget you, for the memory of a person one…greatly
respects, torments the mind exceedingly and when one has suffered this
kind of anxiety for one or two years, one is ready to do anything to regain
peace of mind. I have done everything, I have sought occupations, I have
absolutely forbidden myself the pleasure of speaking about you—even to
Emily [Brontë], but I have not been able to overcome either my regrets or
my impatience—and that is truly humiliating—not to know how to get the
mastery over one's own thoughts, to be the slave of a regret, a memory, the
slave of a dominant and fixed idea which has become a tyrant over one's
mind. Why cannot I have for you exactly as much friendship as you have
for me—neither more nor less? (Letters 1: 436)
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Brontë would soon use this emotion in Shirley when her narrator reports, "[Caroline's]
memory kept harping on the name of Robert Moore: an elegy over the past still rung
constantly in her ear" (Shirley 158). Heger relayed his history with Brontë to a friend, Mr.
Westwood, and showed him Brontë's letters. In an 1870 letter to an unknown recipient,
Westwood confirmed the unrequited love: "He made much of her, & drew her out, &
petted her, & won her love…that was his practise with all his wife's most intellectual
pupils, & let me hasten to add, there was no illicit affection on his part either.—He was a
worshipper of intellect & he worshipped Charlotte Brontë thus far & no further" (Barker
493). Westwood indicated that Heger remained platonic in the present, only
"remember[ing] her with affection" (Barker 1068). With her immodesty, inability to court
and seek consent, and two-year unrequited love, Brontë partially based Caroline on
herself23 to warn similarly inclined female readers.24
In Shirley (set in the West Riding, Yorkshire, from 1811-1812 and published by
"Currer Bell"25) Caroline, 18, harbors a secret love for two years for her 30-year-old
cousin and mill owner, Robert Gérard Moore. Because of modesty laws, Caroline cannot
bring about courtship or consent with Moore, and Brontë gives her depression and then
fever. Most Shirley theorists focus on gender, religion, and manufacturing, although
23

She also used her sister Anne Brontë and friend Ellen Nussey for Caroline's character.
While writing Shirley, Brontë criticized the boredom-inducing marriage market in this
1849 letter:
Whenever I have seen, not merely in humble, but in affluent homes—
families of daughters sitting waiting to be married, I have pitied them from
my heart. It is doubtless well—very well—if Fate decrees them a happy
marriage—but if otherwise—give their existence some object—their time
some occupation—or the peevishness of disappointment and the
listlessness of idleness will infallibly degrade their nature. (Letters 2: 226)
25
Despite the male pseudonym, Brontë's identity was publically revealed before Shirley's
publication.
24
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Judith Mitchell attends to Caroline's pain from modesty.26 Now considering consent, this
literary case study demonstrates that of the aforementioned novels with unrequited love
and suffering, Brontë takes this plot as her novel's central focus, making Caroline suffer
the longest to exalt modesty.
In Shirley the narrator supports modesty and admonishes Caroline's transgression
against it. Caroline admits her desire for marital consent, unrequited love, and immodest
exhibition, in that order: "When people love, the next step is they marry…I love
Robert…I have more than once regretted bitterly, overflowing, superfluous words, and
feared I had said more than he expected me to say, and that he would disapprove what he
might deem my indiscretion" (Shirley 84-85). Moore soon crushes her by not proposing.
The narrator foreshadows that because Caroline is "disappointed," she will "[n]atur[ally]"
receive "torture":
a lover feminine can say nothing: if she did the result would be shame and
anguish, inward remorse for self-treachery. Nature would brand such
demonstration as a rebellion against her instincts, and would vindictively
repay it afterwards by the thunderbolt of self-contempt smiting suddenly
in secret. Take the matter as you find it: ask no questions, utter no
remonstrances: it is your best wisdom. You expected bread, and you have
got a stone; break your teeth on it, and don't shriek because the nerves are
martyrized…You held out your hand for an egg, and fate put into it a
scorpion. Show no consternation: close your fingers firmly upon the gift;
26

Indeed, Mitchell believes that the moral of Shirley is "that love is painful (you can die
from it, in fact), that marriage is difficult but the alternative is terrible, that women can
only wait passively for love to come to them" (59-60).
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let it sting through your palm. Never mind: in time, after your hand and
arm have swelled and quivered long with torture, the squeezed scorpion
will die, and you will have learned the great lesson how to endure without
a sob. For the whole remnant of your life, if you survive the test—some, it
is said, die under it—you will be stronger, wiser, less sensitive. (Shirley
89-90)
The narrator exhibits some pity about England's gender bias on courtship, modesty, love,
and consent—and is even aware that some women die from unrequited love—but
ultimately advises women to follow a social law that they cannot overturn. Oddly, the
narrator desires a heroine in psychological fiction to be "less sensitive" in the process.
Soon the narrator repeats that Caroline will undergo "misery" for (illogically) not "being
asked to love": "Robert had done her no wrong: he had told her no lie; it was she that was
to blame, if any one was: what bitterness her mind distilled should and would be poured
on her own head. She had loved without being asked to love,—a natural, sometimes an
inevitable chance, but big with misery" (Shirley 91). Contradicting the social construction
of modesty, the narrator acknowledges that the "natural" human condition allows women
to love before men, but the narrator still denounces such perceived immodesty.
The narrator begins Caroline's trial with prolonged emotional pain. Moore
attempts to marry the rich Shirley Keeldar, and Caroline's uncle and legal guardian,
Matthewson Helstone, forbids her from seeing the Moores. For the rest of her life,
Caroline believes that modesty will prevent her from making her own destiny by courting
her beloved and securing his consent, which she ponders to herself because she cannot
commiserate with anyone else: "half a century of existence may lie before me. How am I
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to occupy it? What am I to do to fill the interval of time which spreads between me and
the grave?…What was I created for, I wonder?" (Shirley 149) Caroline does sneak in an
attack on modesty—"Does virtue lie in abnegation of self? I do not believe it" (Shirley
149)—but that little registers when she is in the narrator's hands.
This emotional retribution becomes physical retribution—indeed, nearly death.
Using "pining and palsying faculties," the narrator links Caroline's socially unacceptable
love with her illness:
efforts brought her neither health of body nor continued peace of mind:
with them all, she wasted, grew more joyless and more wan; with them all,
her memory kept harping on the name of Robert Moore: an elegy over the
past still rung constantly in her ear; a funereal inward cry haunted and
harassed her: the heaviness of a broken spirit, and of pining and palsying
faculties, settled slow on her buoyant youth. Winter seemed conquering
her spring: the mind's soil and its treasures were freezing gradually to
barren stagnation. (Shirley 158)
Death runs through this passage—"neither health of body," "wasted," "wan," "elegy,"
"funereal…cry," "haunted," "broken spirit," "[w]inter," "freezing," and "barren
stagnation"—because without a husband and family, a young Victorian woman allegedly
had little purpose for which to live. After Caroline becomes sick with fever in the chapter
ominously titled "The Valley of the Shadow of Death" (Shirley 351), the narrator further
connects immodesty with retribution. Like Alfred, Lord Tennyson's doomed Lady of
Shalott, Caroline sits at a window every day to see Moore pass before she returns in tears
to her sickbed. She also cannot hide a locket of his hair while asleep in her sickbed, and
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she hallucinates about seeing him before she dies. Fortunately for Caroline and the reader,
both worn out from this castigation, Moore eventually sees the error of his ways. His
proposal (in the third person) is the final link between Caroline's immodesty and her
"suffer[ing]," "pain," and "sickness": "will she pardon all I have made her suffer—all that
long pain I have wickedly caused her—all that sickness of body and mind she owed to
me?" (Shirley 537) Though Caroline accepts Moore's proposal to bring about a happy
ending, the narrator should beg her "pardon [for] all I have made her suffer." By
supporting modesty in courtship and reproving unrequited love to the point of taking
Caroline to the edge of the grave, the narrator—and, by extension, Brontë—warns female
readers to obey England's consent law throughout the rest of the Victorian period or face
its consequence—literal lovesickness.
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CHAPTER 3. FIANCÉES AND ENGAGEMENTS: "YOU MUST GIVE ME LEAVE
TO JUDGE FOR MYSELF"

Wistful about England's past, the Daily Telegraph in 1868 mourned, "Time was
when the rule ran, that if two young people loved each other, they went forth into the
world hand-in-hand, trusting to God, to their love, and the manliness of the husband"
("[The Coneys...]" 7). For the Daily Telegraph, then, the three factors for a successful
engagement are a deity, an emotion, and a man. The newspaper does not consider a
woman's thoughts and behaviors in marital situations. Instead, romanticizing the weak,
submissive Miltonic Eve venturing "forth into the world hand-in-hand" with Adam, the
Daily Telegraph believes that an ideal woman should do nothing but "trust" these three
forces dictating her engagement and, by extension, her future.
Building from Pat Jalland's exploration of proposals and engagements in
nineteenth-century British history,27 this chapter assesses consent, particularly women's
nonexistent or changing consent, in those scenarios. For nineteenth-century Britons,
female consent sometimes mattered less at wedding altars than during the time between
men's marriage proposals and women arriving at those altars. Per social and actual laws
concerning engagements, people could assume women's marital acceptances before
women gave them, women could not retract those acceptances without criminal activity,

27

Jalland presents a history of nineteenth-century proposals and engagements through
case studies of political families.
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and women did not consent to their marriage settlements. In short, whether women
remained silent or said "no," people could perceive them saying "yes." Thus, women's
consent did not matter enough in the time when it was supposed to matter most. Due to
socio-legal rules, plenty of women only had an illusion of freer marital choice and
consent in the nineteenth century than in previous centuries.
Randall Craig and Robert A. Ferguson have written significantly about proposals
and engagements in the century's literature,28 and this chapter considers consent to argue
that novels' reliance upon courtship and marriage plots exacerbated this illusion of choice.
Novels, largely written by women about women for women, understandably took
women's issues as their foci, so most plots feature the chief consent question in women's
lives—the decision to marry. Readers and critics should not presume, however, that
novelists used their abundance of fictional proposals and engagements to assert that
women had broad domestic choices. Save for a minority of authors wholly content with
women's lot, most of the era's marriage plots (perhaps unwittingly) expose the marriage
market as a farce of equality and happiness. In this chapter each female character in
question—Elizabeth "Lizzy" Bennet (in Jane Austen's 1813 novel, Pride and Prejudice),
Hyacinth "Cynthia" Kirkpatrick (in Elizabeth Cleghorn Stevenson Gaskell's Wives and
Daughters: An Every-Day Story, published as an incomplete novel missing a few
chapters in 1866), and Laura Fairlie (in William Wilkie Collins's 1860 novel, The Woman
in White)—struggles or suffers from her misperceived "yes" in engagement scenarios.
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Craig writes about promising—particularly the conditions of promising—in history and
literature. Ferguson notes that while authors rarely fully portray successful proposals,
they almost always portray unsuccessful ones; professional men often offer the latter
proposals, afterward failing to learn from their rejections and improve their characters.
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Through this plotting, Austen, Gaskell, and Collins generated contemporary readers'
sympathy—or even empathy from marriageable and married female readers. No readers
wanted Lizzy to marry the officious William Collins, Cynthia to marry the possessive
Robert Preston, or Laura to marry the mercenary Sir Percival Glyde. Through sympathy
and empathy, these novelists induced readers to question, if only momentarily,
contemporary socio-legal practices governing consent and engagements.
First, utilizing the social law of female acquiescence, families and friends often
encouraged women to accept their first suitors, regardless of character or compatibility,
rather than risk spinsterhood. Indeed, young women usually did not simply consent to
engagements; they consented to their fathers' prior consent to engagements. While
outsiders believed that women would jump at the chance to improve their station in life
by marrying, women were often just asked to change one unfortunate station (their
fathers' dominions) for another (their husbands' dominions) without a more attractive
third option. Usually, this was not socially viewed as picking the lesser of two evils, nor
were young women, in particular, viewed as rational adults capable of questioning this
system. This chapter argues that most nineteenth-century Britons ignored these issues of
choice and consent, failing to see that when women were denied a variety of free,
desirable choices in singlehood and marriage, their "consent" to the better of two
undesirable options should not have been a moot point.
In that vein, most domestic fiction uses varieties of the same model: Single
women encounter and then receive proposals from their first serious male suitors before
ultimately marrying them, perhaps after combating hiccups along the way. Novelists
rarely depict a world in which women have, say, three viable options—singlehood and
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two serious, desirable male suitors. This chapter argues that while unable to do more for
her beloved Lizzy than provide the choice between singledom and marriage in Pride and
Prejudice, Austen at least skewers the contemporary view of women's engagement
consent as immaterial—indeed, as a foregone conclusion.
Additionally, because women could not gain critical knowledge about their
suitors through physical relationships (hand-holding, kisses, etc.) and private
communications (letters) until after they became engaged, women who consented quickly
without thoroughly knowing themselves or their suitors sometimes needed to exit
undesirable engagements. However, engagements were reciprocal contracts in
nineteenth-century England, so breaking engagements meant breaking contracts. This
chapter asserts that fiancées could not easily fix their consent mistakes by ending
engagements. Instead, once women became engaged and experienced misgivings, they
usually remained engaged until their wedding day because of socio-legal pressures to
consent once and forever. To do the opposite and revoke engagement consent usually
resulted in a "jilt" label and a liminal social status (for good or ill). Worse, revoking
engagement consent could result in actions for breach of promise of marriage, wherein
rejected fiancé(e)s sued ex-partners for financial damages.
This chapter reveals that law and literature did not agree about broken
engagements. After male characters end engagements to women, novelists chastise those
perceived ungentlemanly figures with successful breach of promise suits. Yet novelists
do not depict the reverse, instead granting female characters the prerogative to change
their minds. When female characters renege on engagement consent, novels go to a
point—chastising the women with jilt language and providing some social
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repercussions—but then stop. Jilting plots collectively assert that women were wrong to
get into undesirable engagements, but their fiancés' negative qualities outweigh the need
for severe narratorial reprimands. Since some novelists primarily advocate that young
women get away from the men in question, these novelists surprisingly—albeit tepidly—
support jilting. However, the next step—putting allegedly delicate women in unpleasant
courtrooms so that men could take their money—was too much for even conservative
novelists who supported contemporary law. When female characters revoke engagement
consent and their former fiancés want to punish them, the men cannot initiate breach of
promise suits. Indeed, nineteenth-century British literature lacks male-generated breach
of promise suits, so literature remained silent about a small legal phenomenon. In that
way, novels veered from their society: They remain conservative (after all, they call
women jilts) but not quite as much as their society, which occasionally sanctioned taking
women's money. This chapter shows Gaskell's Wives and Daughters: An Every-Day
Story straddling the line between jilt literature and breach of promise literature.
Specifically, Gaskell utilizes jilt language and comes closest to a male-generated breach
of promise suit against a female character in nineteenth-century British literature, yet
ultimately in her novel it is enough to chastise that young woman with language and
merely suggest that her ex-fiancé wants (financial) recompense.
Whether fiancées experienced fulfilling or undesirable engagements, they faced
the same common law for their marriages. For most of the nineteenth century husbands
owned wives' personal property (money, jewelry, etc.) and managed their real property
(land, etc.) via coverture. Yet the separate but equal law of equity provided a way around
coverture: Fathers and their male lawyers could create marriage settlements, usually
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establishing trusts for fiancées to prevent husbands impoverishing them in the future.
Standard marriage settlements dictated fiancées' dowries, pin-money, jointures, etc.,
which male trustees controlled. Although prospective sons-in-law and their male lawyers
could negotiate marriage settlements, fiancées usually did not consent to them. This
chapter argues, then, that marriage settlements simultaneously made women independent
and dependent. On the one hand, wives benefitted from marriage settlements because
they provided some financial freedom during and after marriages. However, families
often primarily created marriage settlements to pass estates intact from male tenants to
male heirs; men married heiresses to acquire property conveyed through marriage
settlements; and male trustees controlled wives' properties, counter-intuitively to prevent
husbands doing the same.
Marriage settlements, particularly in relation to female consent, barely appear in
nineteenth-century nonfiction or fiction, and this chapter suggests that a characteristic
British reserve caused this absence from fiction. While most corporeal middle- and
upper-class male family members and lawyers discussed and argued about marriage
settlements in private spheres like parlors and law offices, authors perhaps deemed
financial arrangements of marriage settlements too delicate and personal to spy on and
then report to the public sphere, especially to female readers. Further, novelists kept
female characters from such proceedings for fear that the latter would possibly seem too
aggressive, materialistic, and/or smart. Thus, in The Woman in White Laura remains
ignorant that a handful of men negotiate and dispute her marriage settlement for days
throughout London and the countryside. Collins also keeps Laura out of the loop to
underscore that she lacks legal, informed consent. As a female minor, Laura—like plenty

53
of nineteenth-century women, particularly rich ones—cannot consent to her marriage
settlement, rendering her later wedding-day consent ill-advised and almost meaningless.
Her marriage settlement—not her signed wedding registry or the ownership of her
person—is the purpose of her marriage. Simply, the marriage settlement has been the
criminally avaricious Sir Percival's object from his first day of courtship because it
conveys Laura's fortune to him. As a result, The Woman in White, edited by Laura's
beloved, Walter Hartright,29 distrusts the combination of marriage settlements and female
consent issues.
After a review of nonfiction on female consent, proposals, and engagements, this
chapter will assess ill-considered engagements in literature. First, in Pride and Prejudice
Austen mocks the contemporary view of women's engagement consent as a foregone
conclusion while she remains aware of the grave ramifications of a society that does not
take seriously women's thoughts and comments. Then this chapter will provide a
historical review of jilts and actions for breach of promise of marriage in nineteenthcentury history, nonfiction, and literature, followed by a demonstration that Gaskell
waffles in Wives and Daughters but ultimately begrudgingly supports young women who
revoke engagement consent. Finally, this chapter will explicate marriage settlements in
history, nonfiction, and fiction and show that in The Woman in White Collins exposes
nonconsensual marriage settlements as the real purpose behind some upper-class
engagements and marriages. Together, Austen, Gaskell, and Collins use their novels to
bemoan the fact that women's consent was socio-legally perceived as just that: women's
consent. To contest this while surrounded by compulsory marriage in reality and the
29

Hartright created pseudonyms for everyone in his manuscript.

54
marriage plot in realism, the novelists encourage female readers to accept or reject
proposals on their own terms, to continue or end engagements for their own well being,
and to gain power and equality through engagement consent reform. Importantly, while
these novelists' female characters struggle with consent strictures and undesirable male
suitors, they emerge single and happier. Lizzy does not marry Collins, Cynthia does not
marry Preston, and Laura is widowed early in her marriage to Sir Percival. Although
corporeal women were often less fortunate, Pride and Prejudice, Wives and Daughters,
and The Woman in White at least present the tantalizing possibility to their female readers
that they could consent or dissent and (eventually) arise victorious, contemporary law and
society be damned.
Consent and Proposals in Nonfiction
In nonfiction, conduct-literature writer Sarah Stickney Ellis first protested
problems with engagement consent. In The Wives of England, Their Relative Duties,
Domestic Influence, and Social Obligations (1843) Ellis bemoans superficial courtships
that result in binding engagements:
It is one of the greatest misfortunes to which women are liable, that they
cannot, consistently with female delicacy, cultivate, before an engagement
is made, an acquaintance sufficiently intimate to lead to the discovery of
certain facts which would at once decide the point, whether it was prudent
to proceed further towards taking that step, which is universally
acknowledged to be the most important in a woman's life. (Wives 12)30

30

Ellis echoes this in The Daughters of England, Their Position in Society, Character &
Responsibilities (1842):
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For Ellis, England is hypocritical: Pushing female modesty, the nation does not provide
women with the tools for sufficient investigation, but it tells women that their
engagement consent is a personal zenith and a legal bind.
The anonymous author of The Etiquette of Courtship and Matrimony: With a
Complete Guide to the Forms of a Wedding (1852) believes that female consent to
proposals should be mostly sedate. The writer permits that in the seconds after a man's
proposal, both lovers can let "loose," but then while the man continues experiencing his
emotions honestly, the woman should restrict hers:
the happy moment of opportunity arrives, in sweet suddenness, when the
flood-gates of feeling are loosened, and the full tide of mutual affection
gushes forth uncontrolled. It is, however, at this peculiar moment of
"shilly shally," of mutual caution, that a lady should be careful lest any
spirit of retaliation on her part lose her, for ever, the loved object of her
choice. For true love is always timid…A lover needs very few words to
assure him of the devotion of the loved one—a glance, a single pressure of
the hand, confirm his hopes. (Etiquette 30-31)
In fact, for this writer, men run for the nearest door if women honestly show their happy
emotions in what is paradoxically supposed to be the most exciting moment of their lives

it is deeply to be regretted, that so few opportunities are afforded to
women in the present state of society, of becoming acquainted with the
natural dispositions and general habits of those to whom they intrust their
happiness, until the position of both is fixed, and fixed for life. The short
acquaintance which takes place under ordinary circumstances, between
two individuals about to be thus united, for better for worse, until death do
them part, is anything but a mutual development of real character.
(Daughters 329-330)
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to date. Instead, for the writer, female consent to engagements troublingly requires "very
few words" because "true love"—that is, female "true love"—"is always timid" and
largely nonresponsive.
Feminist Frances Power Cobbe presents a bold claim and utopic vision in "What
Shall We Do with Our Old Maids?" (1863). Cobbe philosophizes, "it is only on the
standing-ground of a happy and independent celibacy that a woman can really make a
free choice in marriage" ("Maids" 67-68), an unexpected theory for most Victorians.
With uplifting rhetoric, Cobbe calls for a new world order to eliminate problems with
consent and proposals:
Instead of leaving single women as helpless as possible, and their labour
as ill-rewarded—instead of dinning into their ears from childhood that
marriage is their one vocation and concern in life, and securing afterwards
if they miss it that they shall find no other vocation or concern;—instead
of all this, we shall act exactly on the reverse principle. We shall make
single life so free and happy that they shall have not one temptation to
change it save the only temptation which ought to determine them—
namely, love. Instead of making marriage a case of "Hobson's choice" for
a woman, we shall endeavour to give her such independence of all
interested considerations that she may make it a choice, not indeed "cold
and philosophic," but warm from the heart, and guided by heart and
conscience only. ("Maids" 64)
Cobbe's counter-proposal to compulsory marriage is genius because a loving marriage
should be a "temptation" to add delicious icing to an already delicious cake. Despite
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Cobbe's fervor and foresight, though, most traditional Victorians did not bite. Because
marriage placed myriad physical, emotional, sexual, social, legal, and financial strictures
on wives, conservative Victorians could not chance allowing women to choose anything
but marriage as the focal point of their lives. For the former, the status quo had to be
maintained to continue the country.
Cobbe's fellow feminist, Josephine Butler, criticizes the current state of affairs in
her introduction to Woman's Work and Woman's Culture: A Series of Essays (1869).
Butler uses poetic rhetoric:
What dignity can there be in the attitude of women in general, and toward
men in particular, when marriage is held (and often necessarily so, being
the sole means of maintenance) to be the one end of a woman's life, when
it is degraded to the level of a feminine profession, when those who are
soliciting a place in this profession resemble those flaccid Brazilian
creepers which cannot exist without support, and which sprawl out their
limp tendrils in every direction to find something—no matter what—to
hang upon; when the insipidity or the material necessities of so many
women's lives make them ready to accept almost any man who may offer
himself? (xxxi)
For Butler, compulsory marriage renders women so "[un]digni[fied]" that it dehumanizes
them to plants, specifically "Brazilian creepers." Like Austen, Butler shows how
engagement consent is nearly rendered a foregone conclusion because a woman must
"find something—no matter what—to hang upon," so pathetically and tragically, she will
"accept almost any man."
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In 1892 Reverend Edward John Hardy became the century's only man to speak in
nonfiction about female consent and proposals. Yet in "On the Choice of a Husband" he
represented almost the entire country, save for perhaps a fringe outlier or two, in stripping
marital selection from women: "Choice in matrimony, then (except in rare cases in Leap
Year), does not come from the female side. A refined girl will not take the initiative, and
has only the negative but very responsible duty of refusing those who are ineligible"
(10).31 Since Hardy's appropriate girls do not "take the initiative" to select fiancés and
since they only reject ineligible suitors, Hardy implies that girls should consent to any
eligible men, regardless of compatibility or desire. In short, Hardy—and his nation—
advocated against legitimate consent.
Pride and Prejudice and Female Acquiescence
Before she created Lizzy in Pride and Prejudice, Austen also played the role of a
young woman with unwanted suitors. In 1802 she accepted a proposal from Harris BiggWither, an awkward man five years her junior but heir to a country house and acreage
worth £20,000. Knowing that she did not love him, Austen revoked consent and fled his
family's home the next day.32 In the next decade, imbued with more experience in
proposals and consent, she began revising First Impressions into Pride and Prejudice.
The funniest and most frustrating scene of Pride and Prejudice (set from 18111812 and published "By the Author of 'Sense and Sensibility'") occurs when Collins, 25,
a rector, cousin, and heir to the Bennet family's entailed home, proposes to Lizzy, 20,
31

As with every other year, women did not propose during leap years in the nineteenth
century, despite Hardy's reference to the old custom.
32
Possibly three years later, Austen received another proposal, this time from Brook
Edward Bridges, a clergyman and baronet's son three years her junior. Austen rejected
him, as well.
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about a week after their introduction. While most Pride and Prejudice scholarship
focuses on gender, marriage, and class, Charles H. Hinnant and Bruce Stovel have briefly
written that Collins attempts to stifle Lizzy's choice in that scene.33 Building from them,
this chapter assesses Pride and Prejudice through the lens of consent, demonstrating that
Austen's handling of this scene reveals her view of women's engagement consent.
Normally, Austen downplays or omits successful proposals between loving couples,
disallowing heroines from speaking sometimes and using narration to convey offstage
proposals. However, by principally using dialogue to convey the plot and providing Lizzy
with her fair share of speech, Austen makes Collins's proposal the longest and most
detailed in her oeuvre. She depicts this unsuccessful proposal scene fully to ridicule
Collins's presumption of consent. Indeed, Lizzy and Collins's consent debate became the
most famously misguided proposal in nineteenth-century British novels and helped
Austen become the century's most famous novelist of courtship and marriage. Despite
writing this scene with her usual wit and irony, Austen attacks a serious problem—the
perceived insignificance or absence of women's consent. Lizzy handles this episode with
her characteristic humor, but Austen's plot reminds the reader of the tragedy that could
befall Lizzy and similar female contemporaries. A world that does not take women's
thoughts and behaviors seriously infuriates; a world that renders women choiceless and
voiceless terrifies.

33

Hinnant suggests that Austen uses Collins to "point to something deeply problematic in
the language of courtship," showing her "awareness of darker possibilities" (303) in the
marriage market. Stovel more directly states that Collins "is telling Elizabeth, not asking
her" (31), observing that even the narrator refers to Collins's speech as a "declaration"
(P.P. 204), not a proposal.
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Before and during his proposal, Collins conceitedly takes Lizzy's silence to mean
"yes." After Collins requests Mrs. Bennet's permission to speak privately with Lizzy, the
narrator reports: "Before Elizabeth had time for any thing but a blush of surprise, Mrs.
Bennet instantly answered, 'Oh dear!—Yes—certainly.—I am sure Lizzy will be very
happy—I am sure she can have no objection'" (P.P. 204). By the time Lizzy voices her
"objection" to Collins's impending speech, Mrs. Bennet is hustling herself and another
daughter out of the room to strand Lizzy with him. Curiously, Lizzy chooses to continue
silently during the proposal, "a moment's consideration making her also sensible that it
would be wisest to get it over as soon and as quietly as possible" (P.P. 204). After Collins
begins his monologue, Lizzy's attempt to control herself from laughing also prolongs her
silence. Soon Collins interprets Lizzy's silence as tacit consent, which modern consent
theory declares an oxymoron. Indeed, Collins reacts disturbingly to Lizzy's silence: "You
would have been less amiable in my eyes had there not been this little unwillingness"
(P.P. 206). Thus, Collins wants to get engaged to a young woman who does not fully
want to get engaged to him. Non-responsiveness, or tacit consent, heightens his desire.34
Consequently, Collins presumptuously lists seven reasons why Lizzy will accede to
him,35 notoriously ignoring romantic love and Lizzy's thoughts and feelings.

34

This scenario also occurs in The Beth Book: Being a Study from the Life of Elizabeth
Caldwell Maclure, a Woman of Genius (1897) by Sarah Grand (Frances Elizabeth
Bellenden Clarke McFall). Although "Beth" never verbally consents to marriage, her
suitor interprets her silence as acceptance, and mystifyingly, the two become engaged.
Beth later discusses not wanting to consent but having to because silence sometimes
meant "yes" in nineteenth-century England.
35
Specifically, Collins has obtained Mrs. Bennet's consent; Collins is socio-financially
secure; Lizzy will want aristocrat Lady Catherine De Bourgh to visit her; a union with
Collins will lessen Lizzy's sadness about Mr. Bennet's impending death; Collins will not

61
Then Collins presumptuously uses the future tense to speak of his marriage to the
silent and thereby nonconsenting Lizzy. Of Lady Catherine, Collins assures his presumed
fiancée that in their future together, "You will find her manners beyond any thing I can
describe; and your wit and vivacity I think must be acceptable to her, especially when
tempered with the silence and respect which her rank will inevitably excite" (P.P. 208).
Here again Collins values "silence" for all the wrong (in this case, classist) reasons. Of
Lizzy's comparative poverty, Collins soothes that in their future, "you may assure
yourself that no ungenerous reproach shall ever pass my lips when we are married" (P.P.
208). For Collins, Lizzy's silence matters now in the first moments of their engagement,
but during their impending marriage, he will repay her silence on this important topic
with his own silence on a different important topic.
Lizzy's shock at Collins's presumption finally induces her to state her rejection,
which Collins still hears as consent. Lizzy is plain: "You are too hasty…You forget that I
have made no answer. Let me do it…I am very sensible of the honour of your proposals,
but it is impossible for me to do otherwise than decline them'" (P.P. 208). Because
women's engagement consent was often viewed as a foregone conclusion in nineteenthcentury England, though, "no" means "yes" for Collins here: "it is usual with young
ladies to reject the addresses of the man whom they secretly mean to accept, when he first
applies for their favour…I am therefore by no means discouraged by what you have just

insult Lizzy about her small dowry; Collins is a worthy partner; and another man may not
propose to Lizzy.
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said, and shall hope to lead you to the altar ere long" (P.P. 208).36 Although Lizzy begs to
be viewed "as a rational creature speaking the truth from her heart," none of her
subsequently "plain" words alters Collins's presumption: "I am perfectly serious in my
refusal…You must give me leave to judge for myself, and pay me the compliment of
believing what I say…I know not how to express my refusal in such a way as may
convince you of its being one…I would rather be paid the compliment of being believed
sincere…to accept [your proposal] is absolutely impossible" (P.P. 210-212). He protests,
"your refusal of my addresses are merely words…you are not serious in your rejection of
me" (P.P. 212), because Lizzy's current, "mere…words" cannot counteract her initial
silence, or "consent."
At the end of this proposal scene and during its aftermath, the narrator shows the
extent to which age and gender negate Lizzy's dissent. As the scene terminates, Collins
gets the last word by cheering the power of age, specifically the power of older adults
who pressure younger women into "consenting": "I am persuaded that when sanctioned
by the express authority of both your excellent parents, my proposals will not fail of
being acceptable" (P.P. 212). Aware that her gender also contributes to the problem,
Lizzy leaves and resolves to "apply to her father, whose negative might be uttered in such
a manner as must be decisive, and whose behaviour at least could not be mistaken for the
affection and coquetry of an elegant female" (P.P. 212). Yet parental pressure mounts
when the middle-aged Mrs. Bennet, perceiving Lizzy as too young to know her own mind,
aims to force her daughter's consent. Unwittingly hearkening to Lizzy's desire to be
36

In Anne Brontë's The Tenant of Wildfell Hall (1848) "no" also means "yes" during
Ralph Hattersley's proposal to the submissive Milicent Hargrave, and bafflingly, the two
become engaged.
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viewed as "a rational creature," Mrs. Bennet pronounces, "Lizzy shall be brought to
reason. I will speak to her about it myself directly. She is a very headstrong foolish girl,
and does not know her own interest; but I will make her know it" (P.P. 214). Trying to
wrangle her equally middle-aged husband, Mr. Bennet, to force Lizzy's hand, Mrs.
Bennet pleads, "You must come and make Lizzy marry Mr. Collins, for she vows she
will not have him" (P.P. 216). The narrator plays with words here. Lizzy "vows" not to
recite marriage "vows" before Collins, but only the latter's "vows" matter to Mrs. Bennet,
Collins himself, and a segment of their society, who are all hypocritically obsessed with
marriage. Yet age and gender do not convert Lizzy's dissent to consent, and Collins gives
up his plan to marry a Bennet daughter. Thus, through Lizzy (with assistance by Mr.
Bennet), Austen momentarily bests a culture that does not always believe young women's
words about marriage, and the author achieves a greater triumph later in her novel when
Lizzy happily consents to marry her beloved, the rich landowner Fitzwilliam Darcy.37
Jilts
While broken engagements were frowned upon across the board, women who
mistakenly accepted undesirable suitors like Collins had slightly more social leeway than
men to revoke consent. Changing one's mind was considered more of a lady's right and
prerogative, so only women were not required to provide reasons for jilting. While no
prior, full-length study exists of jilts in nineteenth-century British history and literature,
this chapter shows that jilts existed in liminal spaces for good and ill—assertive and
independent but scorned and tainted.
37

In a letter one year after publishing Pride and Prejudice, Austen advises her niece
about entering the marriage market: "Anything is to be preferred or endured rather than
marrying without Affection" (Letters 280).

64
Of course, "jilt" was a pejorative term. People (probably rightfully) predominantly
criticized jilts because in most scenarios, they caused emotional damage to their exfiancés, plus family members and friends. Further, jilts wasted time and money on plans
for weddings, honeymoons, marriages, and homes. However, patriarchal views enhanced
criticism of jilts. First, for conservative Britons, jilts did not embrace their prescribed role
within compulsory marriage. By ending engagements, jilts refused to marry as young and
early as possible with men to whom fathers or guardians had likely provided consent.
Jilts did not set marriage as their immediate, all-encompassing goal; indeed, they risked
not marrying over marrying wrongly. Jilts also did not sacrifice themselves (particularly
their happiness) to gain cultural capital as fiancées and eventually brides and wives.
Further, jilts did not conform to The Angel in the House ideal, refusing to enter men's
homes as their angelic wives. Whether understandably or cruelly ending engagements,
jilts usually made up their own minds as adults, advocating for their needs and wants.
Instead of being shy, retiring, and horrified by sexual scandals, jilts drew (wanted or
unwanted) social attention to themselves.
With The Wives of England, Ellis surprisingly became the century's only
nonfiction writer to advocate for jilting. Ellis "request[s] the weaker, and consequently
the more easily deluded party, to pause and think again" about remaining in unwanted
engagements: "of two evils, it is, in this case, especially desirable to choose the least; and
to prefer inflicting a temporary pain, and enduring an inevitable disgrace, to being the
means of destroying the happiness of a lifetime, with the self-imposed accompaniment of
endless remorse" (Wives 5). No other activist presented the benefits of revoking consent
like this to women.
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Compared with nonfiction, the century's fiction features more jilts. Novelists
recognized that jilts upset—and thereby enliven—the conventional, happy marriage plot
of boy meets girl/boy proposes to girl/boy marries girl. Novelists feature two types of
women who break engagements and are declared jilts by narrators and/or characters. The
first are semi-acceptable jilts, usually young women who correct mistaken engagements,
like Mary Forrester in Emily Eden's The Semi-Attached Couple (1860) and Rachel
Verinder in William Wilkie Collins's The Moonstone: A Romance (1868). The alternative
is heartless jilts, usually coquettes who climb the social ladder by acquiring beaux, like
Lucy Steele in Jane Austen's Sense and Sensibility (1811), Melicent Luttrell, a doublejilter in Harriet Maria Gordon Smythies's The Jilt (1844), and Lizzie Vane in Jessie
Fothergill's Kith and Kin (1881). Statistically, Anthony Trollope was the century's
premiere novelist on jilts. Can You Forgive Her? (1864-1865) features two semiacceptable jilts: Lady Glencora MacCluskie, who breaks her engagement to Burgo
Fitzgerald, and Alice Vavasor, who becomes engaged to and ends the engagement with
George Vavasor, becomes engaged to and ends the engagement with John Grey, becomes
re-engaged to and ends the engagement with Vavasor, and becomes re-engaged to and
marries Grey. Also, Trollope's Kept in the Dark (1882), primarily concerned with the
social repercussions of jilting, features one semi-acceptable and one heartless jilt: Cecilia
Holt and the offstage Mary Tremenhere, respectively. By choosing to create her own jilt,
then, Gaskell joined a small but esteemed company.
Actions for Breach of Promise of Marriage
Despite dating to the sixteenth century, actions for breach of promise of marriage
in the nineteenth century remain under-discussed, save for historians Ginger S. Frost,
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Saskia Lettmaier, Susie L. Steinbach, and Lawrence Stone.38 A case required three steps:
A plaintiff demonstrated that an engagement (a contract) had existed with the defendant,
with the plaintiff preparing to marry the defendant; that the defendant had exited the
engagement; and that the plaintiff had suffered accordingly.39 Parents and guardians did
not become legally involved to sue on behalf of an ex-fiancé(e) unless the jilted party
were a minor. However, if minors jilted fiancé(e)s, minors could not be sued.
Unfortunately, until 1869, neither plaintiffs nor defendants could testify in breach of
promise trials. Thus, when girls were jilted, male lawyers spoke for them while likely
representing male parents or guardians against male ex-fiancés.
Requirements existed for success in breach of promise cases. Particularly in the
beginning of the century, a defendant could utilize the following defenses for jilting for
the likelihood of future happiness: 1) The plaintiff exhibited a problematic character40

38

In "'I Shall Not Sit Down and Crie': Women, Class and Breach of Promise of Marriage
Plaintiffs in England, 1850-1900," Frost argues that while middle-class women were
often befuddled by and torn about breach of promise suits, lower-class women needed
this admittedly patriarchal remedy to avenge their courtship and marriage troubles, and
they did so in proto-feminist ways. In Promises Broken: Courtship, Class, and Gender in
Victorian England, Frost similarly shows that contrary to the depiction of breach of
promise suits in nineteenth-century literature, contemporary society used the suits to
correct tragedies, particularly for (usually successful) lower-middle and upper-workingclass female plaintiffs. Lettmaier argues that the rise of the Cult of True Womanhood
caused the nineteenth century to have the highest number of breach of promise suits in
British history. Steinbach shows how an actress used melodrama to overcome immodesty
to win her breach of promise case. In his review of hundreds of years worth of breach of
promise suits, Stone's cases involving nineteenth-century male plaintiffs particularly
apply to this chapter.
39
With these loose requirements, an ex-fiancé(e) could sue against a deceased person to
recover damages from his/her estate.
40
Usually, male defendants used this defense to allege female plaintiffs' immodesty. Men
could sue for breach of promise even if ex-fiancées were raped.
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and/or behavior41 that the defendant did not know before the engagement; 2) The plaintiff
significantly lied about his/her history and/or monetary possessions; or 3) The female
plaintiff maneuvered her money and/or property against the male defendant's wishes.
Beginning in the 1850s, these allowable reasons tightened.42 Also, since the courts did
not deem "he said/she said" sufficient, plaintiffs had to provide material evidence
(usually letters) corroborating their testimony that engagements had existed and had been
broken. Once victorious, plaintiffs received financial damages for emotional injury,
wedding expenses, etc.43 Plaintiffs also took comfort knowing that because newspapers
reported breach of promise cases, convicted defendants lost some respectability and
suitors.
By the late-nineteenth century, breach of promise suits were increasingly
criticized as distasteful, cases were harder to win, and awarded damages declined.
Simultaneously, lawyers tried more suits in court, and newspapers reported more cases.
Granted, somewhere in the 90th percentile of suits had been filed on behalf of women
against men, with male plaintiffs rarer in the late-Victorian period than earlier. Often
unsympathetic to male plaintiffs, judges and juries failed to find for them and awarded
zero or insignificant44 damages. Still, male plaintiffs made their point, existing in double
figures throughout the century.

41

This stipulation could not include slight physical or mental health problems. Insanity
could only serve as defensible fraud if plaintiffs were insane during engagement and/or
break-ups.
42
For example, after 1859, ex-fiancé(e)s' poor health was no longer a valid excuse for
jilting.
43
However, after trial, some defendants refused to pay.
44
For example, they could receive one shilling.
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Just as nonfiction writers avoided breach of promise suits, almost all novelists
avoided the suits in their literature. As Randall Craig has partially discussed in his
treatment of breach of promise suits in nineteenth-century British literature,45 only two
novelists, Charles Dickens and Smythies, feature successful breach of promise cases
between contemporary characters. Specifically, Dickens published The Posthumous
Papers of the Pickwick Club: Containing a Faithful Record of the Perambulations, Perils,
Travels, Adventures, and Sporting Transactions of the Corresponding Members in 1837,
and Smythies published The Breach of Promise in 1845. Gaskell chose not to join this
duo.
Wives and Daughters, Jilts, and Actions for Breach of Promise of Marriage
Before writing Wives and Daughters, the Gaskell family experienced jilting. After
meeting the 40-year-old Captain Charles Hill in 1857, Gaskell's 20-year-old daughter,
Margaret Emily "Meta" Gaskell, ended her engagement one year later because of Hill's
dishonesty.46 In an 1859 letter the strained, protective mother referred to Meta's
engagement and its aftermath as "a time we all forget as fast as we can" (Letters 594).
Within a handful of years, though, Gaskell chose to remember the broken engagement
while writing Wives and Daughters.
Wives and Daughters (set from 1822-1830 in Hollingford and Hamley and
serialized from 1864-1866) contains a total of three engagements broken by two jilts.

45

In "Breach of Promise Trials in Victorian Law and Literature," Craig shows that breach
of promise fiction includes what he calls "promissory supplementarity" ("Trials" 92), in
which suits beget alternate relationships. In Promising Language: Betrothal in Victorian
Law and Fiction, Craig notes that breach of promise suits in history and literature offered
the only way for Victorians to challenge romantic dishonor via juries.
46
The subject of his dishonesty remains a mystery.
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Most importantly for this chapter, the novel presents the backstory of the impoverished,
deserted 16-year-old Cynthia, who became a coquette during her education in France.
While there, she also borrowed £20 from Preston, an approximately 27-year-old landagent, and in return, she reports that he "made me give [him] a promise of marriage"
(W.D. 486) for a secret wedding following her 20th birthday. After returning to England,
Cynthia attempts to extricate herself from that secret engagement.
While most Wives and Daughters scholarship focuses on gender, family, and
science, Lacy L. Lynch and Susan E. Colón and then Hilary M. Schor discuss Cynthia as
a coquette and jilt.47 If one changes "coquetry" and "coquette" for "jilting" and "jilt,"
respectively, Sandro Jung aligns closer to this chapter's argument about the strengths and
weaknesses of jilts: "In her persistent use of coquetry and its associated emotional vacuity,
Cynthia represents a negative role model of Victorian femininity that will not fulfill its
social function of marriage, childrearing, and the proper instruction of housewifely
femininity…The coquette…treads a fine line between liminality and acceptability" (5455). However, Jung argues that coquetry has "hardened her into a static figure, unable to
change" (65), but by definition, as a coquette and jilt, Cynthia "change[s]" suitors and
engagements throughout the novel. Indeed, this chapter shows that Gaskell uses Cynthia's
plot to unite contemporary jilt and breach of promise literature. Because Cynthia
eventually breaks this and another ill-considered engagement, she is labeled a jilt, and of
all nineteenth-century British novels, Wives and Daughters comes closest to depicting a

47

Lynch and Colón believe that since Cynthia is neither arrogant nor manipulative, she is
not a standard, awful coquette and jilt, so Gaskell does not use her to chastise corporeal
coquettes and jilts. Schor sees Cynthia "trying to write her own marriage plot, choosing
and jilting men" (190).
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man suing a woman for breach of promise. Although the narrator and characters vacillate
about Cynthia's cavalier treatment of consent, they ultimately support her double jilting.
In particular, they do not want to see Preston legally, financially, and socially punish
Cynthia, which would have been uncouth in a nineteenth-century novel.
Because Cynthia initially consented to an engagement with Preston, she struggles
years later to break that contract. Indeed, Cynthia remembers, "as soon as I felt pledged
to him I began to hate him" (W.D. 495), but consent once given could not be easily
revoked. In the early days of their engagement she sent Preston seven letters, parts of
which confirmed their verbal engagement, and after Cynthia's majority, Preston could use
those letters as material evidence to win a breach of promise suit. Cynthia reports that
although Preston recognizes her antipathy for him, he knows that he has the upper hand
and does not feel compelled to release her: "he's not a man to be easily thrown off…I
must be civil to him; it's not from liking, and he knows it is not, for I've told him so"
(W.D. 429). As a result, Cynthia struggles like a caged bird: "I suppose there's no
escaping one's doom…I don't mean to have [a doom], though. I think that, though I am an
arrant coward at heart, I can show fight" (W.D. 344-345). Her marital consent given as a
minor carries legal weight to impact her whole adulthood.
Partially because Cynthia becomes engaged to Roger Hamley, a squire's son,
during her engagement to Preston, the latter vows to obtain Cynthia in marriage or punish
her in some way akin to a breach of promise suit. Preston's determination hinges upon
consent: "She did 'like' me once, and made promises which she will find it requires the
consent of two people to break" (W.D. 505). Although this is an appalling, seemingly
illogical statement, Preston is right according to his century. Unless an engagement ended
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as consensually as it began, the jilted party could retaliate legally, financially, and
socially. Thus, Preston swears, "Cynthia has cajoled me with promises…I don't mean to
let her go unpunished" (W.D. 506-507). By hobby, the man has gambled for money,
which is partly why Miss Gregson, Preston's first, offstage fiancée, jilted him. Currently,
he looks to gamble for more than his £20 back, as Cynthia cries: "I have saved and
scrimped to repay it, and he won't take it now; I thought if I could but repay it, it would
set me free" (W.D. 487). As a result, Cynthia views Preston as an animal, not a gentleman,
"cruel in his very soul—tigerish, with his beautiful striped skin and relentless heart" (W.D.
497). At times, this animal seems poised for victory. Contemplating waving a white flag
and following through on her promise to marry Preston, Cynthia asks her stepsister Mary
"Molly" Gibson, "Have you never heard of strong wills mesmerizing weaker ones into
submission?" (W.D. 429) Determined to fight in other moments, though, Cynthia swears
to Preston that she will endure the socio-legal ramifications of revoked consent before
enduring the emotional ramifications of unwanted marital consent: "I tell you once for all
(as I have told you before, till I am sick of the very words), that nothing shall ever make
me marry you. Nothing. I see there's no chance of escaping exposure and, I dare say,
losing my character, and I know losing all the few friends I have" (W.D. 486). In either
scenario Preston would win, the victor in a socio-legal war or the new husband of a
beautiful, spirited young woman.
Ultimately, Cynthia escapes most punishment in the novel because more than
chiding her, the narrator wants to chide the scorning of jilts, the use of actions for breach
of promise of marriage, and similar attacks on women's revoked consent. Partly because
of Molly's intervention, Preston returns Cynthia's letters (that would have been his case's

72
material evidence), and Cynthia reimburses Preston £23 and some shillings (a 5% interest
substituting what could have been an award for damages). After fixing this first
engagement consent error, Cynthia soon realizes that she does not love Roger. Although
her stepfather Bob Gibson speaks sternly about her consent like Preston had—"Nonsense.
An engagement like yours cannot be broken off, except by mutual consent" (W.D. 577)—
Cynthia adopts an Ellis-like view of jilting as ultimately compassionate. She breaks this
second engagement even more unscathed. Granted, the narrator peppers jilt language
throughout the text because this capricious woman's romantic history would please no
nineteenth-century British narrator. Specifically, the narrator describes Cynthia "as fickle
as the wind" (W.D. 533) and "not constant" (W.D. 513, 643), and the town's reigning
aristocrat chides her to her embarrassed mother: "when I was young there was a girl
called Jilting Jessy. You'll have to watch over your young lady, or she will get some such
name…I know what is becoming in a young woman, and jilting is not" (W.D. 567).
Compared with what could have been, though, Cynthia escapes the snares of both
unwanted engagements pretty easily.
Indeed, because jilts shake up otherwise staid marriage plots, the narrator utilizes
jilting for the greater good in the novel. Cynthia's jilting of Roger enables the narrator to
separate the wheat from the chaff—Molly from Cynthia, the treasure from the tease.
Cynthia must break Roger's heart enough that he opens his eyes about Cynthia and then
opens his eyes to Molly, the heroine with unrequited love who deserves a hero and the
exciting life that Roger can provide as a famous scientist and professor. Unexpectedly in
a Victorian novel, then, jilting (the illegal break of an engagement) enables the
conclusion of a marriage plot (the lovely beginning of an engagement).
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Overall, Gaskell sides with Ellis about women inflicting short-term pain for longterm happiness in nineteenth-century England. In fact, Cynthia accepts and marries the
wealthy, attractive barrister Walter Henderson and flees country gossip to live in exciting
London. With Gaskell's prophesy that the Hendersons will be happy and relatively stable
there, the novelist provides concluding, begrudging support for women's free consent and
dissent. Of course, Gaskell could not steer national legal policy past her 1866 publication.
Throughout the rest of the Victorian period, if any of Cynthia's hypothetical daughters,
granddaughters, or great-granddaughters revoked engagement consent, they also would
have been labeled jilts and could have been sued for breach of promise. England did not
abolish actions for breach of promise of marriage until 1970 with the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.
Marriage Settlements
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, when fiancées chose to complete their
engagements and marry their fiancés, those grooms suddenly owned their wives' personal
property and managed their real property under common law, which created a need for
marriage settlements in equity law. As Barbara English and John Saville, Lee Holcombe,
and Susan Staves have shown in their histories of the century's marriage settlements,48
usually three sections dictated: a wife's pin-money, which was her annual allowance for
personal effects, like clothes;49 her jointure, which was her payment after her husband's

48

English and Saville present marriage settlements in relation to Strict (Restricted)
Settlements, which made estates untouchable usually until eldest sons turned 21 to
inherit. Holcombe discusses marriage settlements while tracing efforts throughout the
century to pass the Married Women's Property Acts. Staves assesses marriage settlements
vis-à-vis pin-money, jointure, and dower in the first third of the century.
49
Prior to 1870, settlements required trustees to oversee pin-money.
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death;50 and each child's payment, or "portion," after the father's death,51 with provisions
about the estate devolving to its heir in a Strict Settlement. Throughout the century, the
equity court required all wards to have settlements, and most middle- and upper-class
fiancées, especially landed gentry and aristocracy, used settlements.52 As a result, about
10% of couples married with settlements.53
Usually, fiancées' marriage settlements depended on their fathers and then male
trustees. Fiancées almost always remained apart from marriage settlement negotiations,
and Staves correctly warns that not all fathers (or male legal guardians, as in Laura's case)
prioritized fiancées' best interests:
Although some women upon entering marriage were as capable of
bargaining on their own behalf as some men, certainly many women were
ill-equipped to bargain on their own behalf through a combination of
ignorance and social, religious, and moral sanctions against their asserting
their own material interests…[M]any who would concede that
most…first-time brides were not very capable of bargaining on their own
behalf, would nevertheless insist that the fathers of brides were at least
50

Often this was annual interest (averaging 10%) of her dowry.
This included each daughter's marriage portion.
52
Factoring in the lower classes, who comprised the majority of the population, Albert
Venn Dicey criticizes the disparity between equity and common law, or rich women with
marriage settlements and poor women without them: "There came…to be not in theory
but in fact one law for the rich and another for the poor. The daughters of the rich
enjoyed, for the most part, the considerate protection of equity, the daughters of the poor
suffered under the severity and injustice of the common law" (273).
53
Within that 10%, most young women had settlements, in addition to adult women.
While in the first half of the century women who had married as minors could turn 21
and request resettlements, the Infants' Settlement Act 1855 enabled minors' estates to be
settled. After that, girls aged 17-20 could have marriage settlements created on their
behalf.
51
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equal matches for grooms and the fathers of grooms in the bargaining
process…Some fathers were incompetent or indifferent. Moreover, in the
negotiations over marriage settlements…the interests of brides and the
interests of their fathers were not always, or perhaps even ordinarily,
identical…
Fathers, in fact, could have needs or desires at odds with the
interests of their daughters. Fathers and other male relatives supposedly
negotiating on the bride's behalf sometimes wished to advance their own
visions of dynastic or familial interests in ways that could be very weakly
connected to any individual interests the daughter might have. (116-117)
Protective fathers, however, usually established trusts to will property to their daughters
to avoid future sons-in-law from squandering estates and imperiling wives and children.
To do so, though, fathers almost always named male trustees to govern their daughters'
property for life. Thus, fiancées traded the prospect of their future husbands governing
their property under common law for male trustees governing it under equity law.54 Even
worse, sometimes marriage settlements listed husbands as their wives' trustees, which
defeated the alleged purpose of settlements and allowed husbands free reign under both
54

Dicey similarly casts this struggle not as wives versus husbands or women versus men
but as fathers versus husbands and men versus men, ignoring women (and their consent
to marriage settlements):
Let it, however, be noted, that the aim of the Court of Chancery [that saw
equity cases] had throughout been not so much to increase the property
rights of married women generally, as to enable a person (e.g. a father)
who gave to, or settled property on a woman, to ensure that she, even
though married, should possess it as her own, and be able to deal with it
separately from, and independently of, her husband, who, be it added, was,
in the view of equity lawyers, the "enemy" against whose exorbitant
common-law rights the Court of Chancery waged constant war. (267-268)
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common and equity law. If settlements lacked trustees, courts occasionally appointed
husbands, too.
Given the emotions and finances involved, marriage settlements created stress.
Male representatives of families and male lawyers arranged and sometimes argued about
marriage settlements days before weddings until signing them in the 11th hour. The
average fee for creating settlements was over £100. In most cases the government taxed
five shillings for each £100 in marriage settlements. Finally, lawyers could create
postnuptial marriage settlements on behalf of their married clients. In particular, if a
prospective father-in-law promised his would-be son-in-law that he planned to create a
marriage settlement for his daughter but failed to do so before the wedding, the son-inlaw could sue for its creation—and probably nearer to his terms.
Marriage Settlements in Print
Nineteenth-century Britons almost universally saw marriage settlements as
helpful for fiancées, so they did not write much in nonfiction about the documents'
weaknesses, particularly vis-à-vis female consent. Only lawyer Charles Edmund Baker
discussed in 1882 marriage settlements and consent strictures in Husband and Wife, and
the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. For Baker, even adult daughters "need" fathers
as "protectors" to provide engagement consent:
But why is it that the father-in-law has to be faced? Why, if marriage has
been instituted for the benefit and blessing of men and women, may not a
man and woman, if they be of proper age, enter into this solemn
engagement with each other without any other person's consent?
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For this reason, that…in matters of love a woman's head is nearly
always subservient to her heart, so that she needs a protector to look after
her interests…
Besides this, the lady's father nearly always agrees to make a
settlement of part of his property upon her…and, therefore, if his consent
were not obtained, he would probably not make such a settlement. (46-47)
Baker suggests that consent and money intertwine as equally important. Men must obtain
the consent of prospective fathers-in-law not to unite families emotionally but baldfacedly to obtain eventual money.
Like nonfiction's near silence, nineteenth-century British novels usually avoid
discussing marriage settlements.55 Modern scholars have not asked why novels sidestep
marriage settlements while those documents drove marriages in the real world. In 1863
the unknown author of "Marriage Settlements" pondered this "avoid[ance]," though:
Of the many differences between French and English novels one of the
most striking is to be found in the fulness with which French novelists
enter into the business arrangements between their characters…To an
English novelist, even if he is a novelist of a high class, all such matters
are an unknown land. They are passed over in general terms, and every
device is used for the purpose of avoiding details…[W]hen a lady is to be
married, [Honoré de Balzac] appears to think quite as much of the clauses

55

As a result, Alexander James Beresford Beresford Hope's Strictly Tied Up (1880)
stands out because it somewhat centers around marriage settlements. A young woman
does not understand her settlement but marries anyway, causing a subsequent financial
shock to her daughter, a presumed heiress.
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of the marriage contract as of the marriage itself…One effect of this is that
much more is to be learnt from novels about France than about England.
("Settlements" 666)
Though the unknown writer does not say so, while Balzac differed from British novelists,
he had something in common with (mercenary) British laymen like Sir Percival, who also
equally prioritized marriage settlements with marriages. Though the writer also does not
delve into this, most contemporary British novels were domestic fiction written by
middle- and upper-class novelists about middle- and upper-class marriages, but those
novelists eschewed marriage settlements, a hallmark of actual middle- and upper-class
marriages. Further, those novels—often written by, about, and for women—ignore
middle- and upper-class female characters' feelings and actions concerning marriage
settlements.56 This chapter posits that this disparity stemmed from stereotypical middleand upper-class class British reserve—namely, the reticence to be perceived as vulgar by
discussing money and financial negotiations. Discoursing about middle- and upper-class
class women's money and privilege could be particularly vulgar. Worse, portraying
middle- and upper-class class women negotiating about their money with groups of men
could cast those characters as unladylike. According to novels, better to keep marriage
settlements—and the ladies in question—delicately offstage.
The Woman in White and Marriage Settlements
Collins began at Lincoln's Inn as a law student in 1846 and was admitted to the
Bar in 1851, but instead of practicing law, he chose to write fiction about it. Eight years
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Anthony Trollope's Doctor Thorne (1858) stands out because a fiancée directs part of
her marriage settlement.
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later, he produced one of England's first detective novels and its first important sensation
novel, The Woman in White (set from 1849-1852 principally in Cumberland and
Hampshire and serialized weekly from 1859-1860). The novel presents the 20-year-old
orphaned Laura obeying the wish of her late father, Philip Fairlie, by remaining in a
loveless engagement (like that of Cynthia) to Sir Percival, a 45-year-old baronet. Her lazy,
uninterested uncle, Frederick Fairlie, barely serves as her legal guardian, doing little more
for Laura than hiring Walter as a drawing-master for her and her half-sister, Marian
Halcombe. Though Laura and Walter fall in love without overtly acknowledging it to
each other, Laura feels compelled by honor to move forward with her wedding.
Importantly, she is an heiress: Per her father's will, when she turns 21, she will gain
£20,000 and a life interest in £10,000. Under coverture, Laura's groom will own both
properties, although after Laura's death, her aunt Countess Eleanor Fosco will receive the
£10,000. Secondly, after Mr. Fairlie dies, Laura will acquire an approximately £3,000per-year life interest in the entailed Limmeridge House and estate. Laura's husband will
also manage this property under coverture. With Sir Percival pushing to wed before
Laura's 21st birthday, Vincent Gilmore, the Fairlie family lawyer, and Mr. Merriman, Sir
Percival's lawyer, begin negotiating the marriage settlement. Then for chapters—more
than any other nineteenth-century British novel—The Woman in White deals with this
marriage settlement, particularly showing how Laura suffers its repercussions. As
epistolary fiction, The Woman in White is primed for law-and-literature studies because it
is constructed by pseudolegal documents. Through these, 12 characters serve as
narrators,57 with some writing firsthand accounts as if testifying in court.58 In fact, Walter
57

In order of first submission, they are: Walter, Gilmore, Jane Anne Catherick, Marian,
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sighs that if this case did not pit the powerful and rich against the marginalized and poor,
these injustices—and presumably these documents—would have be submitted in court as
evidence in a legal suit.59
Most scholars of The Woman in White focus on issues surrounding detective
fiction, gender, law, and sensation, and no full-length treatment exists of Laura as a
character, although she is partially titular. However, Esther Godfrey, Sidia Fiorato, and
Dougald B. Maceachen have attended to Laura's marriage settlement.60 Godfrey claims,

William Kyrle, Anne Catherick, Count Isidor Ottavio Baldassare Fosco, Mr. Fairlie, Eliza
Michelson, Hester Pinhorn, Dr. Alfred Goodricke, and Jane Gould.
58
Around 1856, Collins got this idea while attending a trial and inspecting observers'
growing attention to the witnesses' testimonies. In his "Preface" he asserts, "An
experiment is attempted in this novel, which has not (so far as I know) been hitherto tried
in fiction" (W.W. 644).
59
In other connections between law and literature, Collins based Laura's
institutionalization plot on a real eighteenth-century French legal case. Also, according to
John Sutherland, Collins may have based the plot on the 1858 case of Rosina Doyle
Wheeler Bulwer Lytton and her estranged husband, Edward George Earle Lytton BulwerLytton. Presumably after gathering information about legal cases of institutionalization
from Bryan Waller Procter, Collins dedicated his novel to that Commissioner in Lunacy.
Finally, in Collins's "Preface to the Present Edition" (1861) the novelist assures the reader
that a lawyer verified the legal parts of his plot before publication.
60
Godfrey correctly declares: "In its evasion of common law and coverture through
equity, The Woman in White engages contemporary calls for reform by giving Laura her
separate estate…the novel thus explores the anxiety and even dangers that women's
economic independence and men's economic dependence might engender" (170).
While providing background on nineteenth-century marriage law in the novel,
Fiorato reveals that in the marriage settlement process, Gilmore advocated for women's
rights:
Mr Gilmore actually managed to provide for Laura in the best possible
way. When Count Fosco questions Sir Percival about his economic
conditions, the only source of money mentioned by the latter are the
interests on Laura’s twenty thousand pounds…It is interesting to notice
that Mr Gilmore does not insist on equity but on the right of making a will
for a woman…[A will] rendered people legal subjects and bestowed upon
them an individual identity because it provided evidence of the testator’s
possessions…The will presupposes a civil right of ownership…Therefore,
the implications of Mr Gilmore’s provision are revolutionary for the
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"Laura remains passive throughout the settlement process, but her lack of savvy here is
indicative more of her youth than of her gender" (166). Instead, this chapter asserts that
Laura resembles most nineteenth-century middle- and upper-class fiancées of all ages,
"passive throughout the settlement process" because male family members and lawyers
control those documents. Indeed, under Sir Percival's direction, the marriage settlement is
the reason for the Glyde marriage. Sir Percival only wants Laura's money, which he can
only obtain through her marriage settlement. Like legions of contemporary fiancées,
though, Laura cannot consent to her marriage settlement, throwing into question her
entire marital consent. Thus, Collins exposes the oppressive, nonsensical combination of
marriage settlements and minor, female "consent."
Rather than present the nineteenth-century party line about marriage settlements'
benefits for fiancées, the editing Walter has The Woman in White exhibit a consistently
negative view of Laura's settlement. Both Walter and the reader hear "marriagesettlement" for the first time together (from Marian's lips). Since Walter has been the only
narrator for nearly the first three months of the plot, the reader identifies and sympathizes
with him, so the reader adopts his view of the legal document: "The marriage-settlement!
The mere hearing of those two words stung me with a jealous despair that was poison"
(W.W. 81). Additionally, Gilmore impresses upon the "reader" the "serious[ness]" of
Laura's marriage settlement to her "story" (the novel): "The matter is of the utmost
importance. I warn all readers of these lines that Miss Fairlie's inheritance is a very
period in that they imply the institution and acknowledgement of the legal
personality of a married woman. (39-40)
While largely concentrating on legal issues throughout Collins's oeuvre,
Maceachen briefly observes that The Woman in White's plot entirely hinges upon this
marriage settlement (plus a will).
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serious part of Miss Fairlie's story; and that Mr Gilmore's experience, in this particular,
must be their experience also, if they wish to understand the narratives which are yet to
come" (W.W. 149). By mandating that his "experience…must be the [reader's] experience
also," Gilmore commands the reader to view the marriage settlement as harmful as he
does. Since Gilmore most reveals his fury with his vow that "no daughter of mine should
be married to any man alive under such a settlement" (W.W. 162), the reader becomes
equally incensed.
Men—Gilmore, representing Mr. Fairlie, and Mr. Merriman, representing Sir
Percival—begin arranging Laura's marriage settlement, and as a female minor, she cannot
consent to it. Further, Laura's representatives fail to work thoroughly on her behalf.
Laura's uncle just wants to "limit his share in the business, as guardian, to saying, Yes, at
the right moment" (W.W. 130). Additionally, Gilmore generally believes that before
creating marriage settlements, lawyers and fiancé(e)s should meet in person for
"questions which ought always to be discussed on both sides by word of mouth" (W.W.
142), but after just over half an hour, Gilmore ends his meeting with Laura: "we will
consider the subject as done with, for the present…we can settle details at another
opportunity" (W.W. 146). He does not follow through on that proposed schedule and, in
fact, never sees her again in the novel.
Shockingly, during the marriage settlement process, no one warns Laura that Sir
Percival is a possible heiress-hunter. Gilmore wants the marriage settlement to dictate
that after Laura's death, Sir Percival would receive the income of £20,000 for life, and
after his death, the principal would go their children or, barring children, benefactors of
Laura's choosing. However, under Sir Percival's instruction, Mr. Merriman protests that
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the principal go to the husband, if no issue.61 Knowing that Sir Percival has deep debts
and little income, the "disgusted" (W.W. 163) Gilmore describes the fiancé's interest as
"selfish" (W.W. 153) and "mercenary" (W.W. 153, 161), and as the novel's most respected
legal authority, Gilmore provides a "warning" (W.W. 162) to Mr. Fairlie about the
"discreditable" (W.W. 162) settlement. However, Gilmore only talks to Mr. Fairlie—not
Laura. Wanting to avoid conflict with Sir Percival and Mr. Merriman, Mr. Fairlie
characterizes this disagreement over £20,000 as "a trifle" (W.W. 153), and in retort,
Gilmore accuses Laura's legal guardian of "abandon[ing] the just rights of [his] niece"
(W.W. 153)—specifically, her consent "rights."62 Although Gilmore previously decided
that he would "cheerfully do anything to promote the interests of Sir Percival Glyde—
anything in the world, except drawing the marriage-settlement of his wife" (W.W. 147148) and although Gilmore asserts that "[any lawyer] would inform [Mr. Fairlie] that it is
against all rule to abandon the lady's money…[and] would decline, on grounds of
common legal caution, to give the husband, under any circumstance whatever, an interest

61

Mr. Merriman does not quibble over the other aspect of the marriage settlement: After
Laura's death, Sir Percival would receive a life interest in Limmeridge House before their
possible son would inherit the property.
62
In a deleted passage of Collins's manuscript Gilmore tries to rouse Marian to educate
Laura about Sir Percival's fortune-hunting, but Marian also fails to report this
information:
I wrote to Miss Halcombe…explaining the circumstances to her; stating
what had passed between Mr Fairlie and myself; and asking her to tell me
privately if she thought any pretence could be found for deferring the
marriage until after Miss Fairlie came of age. If this could be done, I might
manage to delay drawing the settlement until the same period. She might
then decide the disposition of the money for herself, and we shall have the
satisfaction of setting Mr Fairlie at defiance. I begged Miss Halcombe, as
time was of importance, to send me an answer, Yes or No, by telegraph.
The answer arrived on Tuesday. It deprived me of my last resource in
these six words "I am sorry to say No." (W.W. 676)
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of twenty thousand pounds in his wife's death" (W.W. 162), Gilmore revises the marriage
settlement according to Sir Percival's wishes, still (and presumably forever) unknown to
Laura. Indeed, while justifying, Gilmore contradicts himself: "I had no choice. Another
lawyer would have drawn up the deed if I had refused to undertake it" (W.W. 163).63 On
consent, Gilmore misspeaks here. As a man and lawyer in Victorian England, Gilmore
has "choice[s]" in this scenario, but he fails to tell his client's comparatively
"choice[less]" niece critical information that impacts her engagement and marital consent.
After chapters about this marriage settlement, The Woman in White does not
present the Glyde wedding, particularly avoiding showing Laura consenting to sign the
marriage registry (despite elsewhere focusing on a Glyde marriage registry). Indeed,
Laura does not write or sign anything in this novel comprised of personal documents
about her marriage. Every other main or secondary female character signs or writes
something onstage or off, but Laura instead refuses to sign a document, the deed for a
presumed loan of her trust money. This absence of writing or signing reinforces Laura's
exclusion as a woman, minor, and layperson from her marriage settlement. This
imbalance underscores the true purpose of this wedding—Laura's property via her
unsigned yet "consensual" marriage settlement, not her person via her "consensually"
signed marriage registry.
Ultimately, The Woman in White uses Laura's nonconsensual marriage settlement
to foreshadow the terrors of her marriage. Since Sir Percival married for the settlement,
which grants him a financial windfall after Laura's death, several characters suggest the
63

Earlier, Walter learned that "the key to her whole character" is her trust of other people
(W.W. 52), so since Gilmore and Mr. Fairlie secretly consent to Sir Percival's greed,
Laura will not see her fiancé's true colors on her own.
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plot could take that lethal turn. Getting wise to Sir Percival, Marian worries, "Laura's life
itself, might depend on my quick ears, and my faithful memory" (W.W. 324). Soon
enough, Marian overhears Fosco speculating to Sir Percival: "Let us say your wife dies
before the summer is out…In that case you would gain twenty thousand pounds" (W.W.
334). Slightly warming to the idea, Sir Percival responds, "my wife's death would be ten
thousand pounds in your wife's pocket" (W.W. 334).64 Looking back later, Fosco
confirms, "With my vast resources in chemistry, I might have taken Lady Glyde's life"
(W.W. 628). After Laura's faked but legally confirmed death, her estate does irreversibly
pay Sir Percival and Eleanor Fosco. Yet while Laura actually survives her consent trauma
and eventually gets engaged to Walter, The Woman in White does not mention their
marriage settlement. Because Laura and Walter enjoy a happy, consensual love match
and are neither rich nor recognized as members of the upper classes, the editor and
novelist do not need to employ a marriage settlement. Specifically, they do not need an
omen to warn against this wedding because Laura will grow, not die, as Mrs. Hartright.65
Although fiancées like Lizzy, Cynthia, and Laura did not immediately benefit,
later Victorian women fought and eventually won a series of struggles to decrease the
financial drawbacks of consent for fiancées and wives. First, the Married Women's
64

At this point, Laura is 21, and since Collins set the novel before the Infants' Settlement
Act 1855, Laura could request a resettlement of her marriage settlement. However, she
does not, despite now knowing that Sir Percival married her for her settlement. Perhaps
Collins avoided this plot development to underscore Laura's passivity about her marriage
settlement, both before and after its creation.
65
The editors of Collins's correspondence surmise that after The Woman in White,
Collins served as a trustee for a deceased man's will, particularly helping to arrange his
daughter's marriage settlement (Letters 51). Additionally, Collins's own will, which was
read in 1889, stipulated that unlike Laura, his daughters and granddaughters receive
inheritances through trusts for their "sole and separate use free and independent of any
husband" (Lycett 413).
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Property Act 1870 allowed wives married after August 9, 1870, to own and control two
types of money—their earnings (wages, investments, etc.) and inheritances—as separate
property, albeit with qualifications. Importantly for this chapter, the Act negated the need
for trustees of marriage settlements to oversee wives' pin-money. The more sweeping
Married Women's Property Act 1882 repealed the former law so that wives married after
December 31, 1882, owned and controlled all types of their property separately, with
minor qualifications. In particular, marriage settlements no longer protected property
from debt recovery. Overall, Holcombe pronounces, "In effect, the act of 1882 bestowed
an equitable marriage settlement upon every married woman who did not have one" (202).
This began the death knell for nineteenth-century-style marriage settlements, and those
documents gradually faded out of use in the early twentieth century as women
increasingly entered engagements founded on love, not money.
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CHAPTER 4. LITERARY CASE STUDY OF LADY ARABELLA MONTAGU'S
WEDDING: SUSANNAH FRANCES REYNOLDS AND CLANDESTINE
MARRIAGE

Progressive nineteenth-century Member of Parliament James Mackintosh worked
to repeal An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages (1753), also known
as Lord Hardwicke's Act (LHA) or the Clandestine Marriages Act, by poetically arguing
that it had become law "for the purpose of protecting patrimony against matrimony"
(Royal Commission on the Laws of Marriage 64). For plenty of young women under 21
years, LHA and its successor, the Marriage Act 1823 (MA), required paternal consent
before weddings. Unless young women were widowed, England did not allow
independent marital consent within its borders. Unwidowed minor women who wanted to
consent on their own volition could choose to flee the country, often marrying
clandestinely in Gretna Green, Scotland, as historians have discussed.66 Mackintosh
alluded to England valuing money and estates over marriage, but he did not specify that
through LHA, money and estates overrode marital choice and consent. Predictably, this
overvaluation impacted women more than men. Taking a cue from Mackintosh, this
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See Anne Ashley, Eve Tavor Bannet, Holly Brewer, Claverhouse (Meliora C. Smith),
Brian Dempsey, John R. Gillis, Erica Harth, Reginald Haw, Warren Henry, James
Johnston, Christopher Lasch, David Lemmings, Lochinvar (Richard P. MacDougall),
Lisa O'Connell, R. B. Outhwaite, Stephen Parker, Jennifer Phegley, Rebecca Probert,
Olga Sinclair, T. C. Smout, Lawrence Stone, and J. Neville Turner.
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chapter argues that the protection of male (patri) power against female (matri) rights
often stifled young women's independent marital consent.
This chapter also exposes literature supporting the English way of life about
young women's independent marital consent. With the exception of Lisa O'Connell,
critics have overlooked novels featuring Scottish clandestine marriage.67 This chapter
suggests that partially because in nonfiction feminist activists ignored this issue of
independent marital consent, novelists more easily pushed to their young female readers
the conservative party line about patriarchal marriage and women's civil rights. Indeed,
novelists across the political spectrum almost always castigate young women deciding to
marry abroad without older male authority.68 Jane Austen's Mansfield Park (1814) and
Susan Edmonstone Ferrier's Marriage (1818) disapprove of lovers with weddings across
the Scottish border. More novels criticize weddings specifically in Gretna Green: Sarah
Green's Gretna Green Marriages; Or, The Nieces (1823);69 Susannah Frances Reynolds's
Gretna Green; Or, All for Love (1848), this chapter's focus; Emma Robinson's
Mauleverer's Divorce: A Story of Woman's Wrongs (1858); and Ellen Price Wood's East
Lynne (1861).
Notably, these are all female novelists criticizing other women. This phenomenon
can partly be explained because women primarily produced domestic fiction focusing on
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In "Dislocating Literature: The Novel and the Gretna Green Romance, 1770-1850,"
O'Connell attends to both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century publications featuring
Gretna Green weddings. Of nineteenth-century fiction specifically, she claims that Gretna
Green serves as a "point of reference for rivalries between…realism and romance within
the novel" ("Literature" 6).
68
Only Hannah Maria Jones supports the two Gretna Green marriages in Gretna Green;
Or, The Elopement of Miss D—— with a Gallant Son of Mars (1821).
69
Green condemns both of her novel's Gretna Green marriages.
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weddings. However, this clean sweep also shows the extent to which Britons—even
British women oppressed by LHA/MA—almost uniformly supported the law. Unlike
with other socio-legal gender and consent issues, female novelists did not question the
illegality of independent marital consent or encourage clandestine marriage, which
enabled LHA/MA's continued infantilization of young women. In particular, Reynolds's
Gretna Green deserves attention for its uniquely Victorian content: The novelist shames
her headstrong fiancée into a sober wife who regrets her Gretna Green consent to support
the MA and warn young female readers.
Clandestine Marriage
In the late eighteenth century Philip Yorke, earl of Hardwicke, unnecessarily
regulated marital consent. Stone surveys eighteenth-century couples marrying
clandestinely—such as minors fleeing disapproving parents, servants avoiding firing,
widows relying upon deceased husbands' settlements, and parents-to-be avoiding
illegitimacy—and corrects the eighteenth-century (and modern) view: "a sizeable number
of couples from all walks of life and economic levels…had their own perfectly legitimate
reasons for seeking secret marriages. A minority, however, had evil intentions, and it was
this minority that gave clandestine marriage such a bad name" (99). Ignoring his
contemporary reality, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke used his bill to tackle two perceived
problems by nullifying contract marriages70 and marriages by banns of minor spouses
without parental or guardian consent. Lasch calls parliamentary debates about the bill
"another chapter in the struggle for individual rights—in this case, the right of free choice

70

Contract marriages began with verbal or written contracts instead of wedding services.
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in marriage" (99-100), but LHA passed, ending marriages outside the rule of church and
state.71
LHA provided two options, banns and licenses, for valid marriages. Regarding the
former, a couple had to notify a clergyman of their intention to marry a minimum of
seven days before he published their banns, with fiancé(e)s in separate parishes requiring
banns in both. Those banns needed to be published for three prior Sundays before the
wedding. Unless a legal guardian publically refused consent for an underage betrothed,
an ordained Anglican clergyman performed the Anglican wedding service in an Anglican
church in a betrothed's parish between the canonical hours of 8:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
Alternatively, a couple could buy a more expensive license, which cost several pounds. A
fiancé(e) had to live in his or her parish for four weeks before the wedding,72 unless the
archbishop of Canterbury eliminated the waiting period by granting an immediate license.
Either way, marriages had to be entered in parish registries with the signatures of brides,
grooms, two witnesses, and clergy.73
LHA haunted the nineteenth century. Technically, the Marriage Act 1822
repealed LHA; however, Parliament quickly repealed that 1822 legislation with the
Marriage Act 1823, putting the majority of LHA's rules back in place. Parliament
included a key change on consent, though: England no longer voided marriages by
license if minors had not acquired parental or guardian consent. Regardless, nineteenth71

However, LHA's consent rules did not apply to royals, Jews wishing to marry Jews,
and Quakers wishing to marry Quakers.
72
Thus, LHA impacted the consent of poor Britons because it made marriage more
expensive and nomadic Britons because it required a prolonged residence in one place.
73
Clergy who lacked banns or licenses, botched or destroyed licenses, or held weddings
outside designated churches could receive up to a 14-year transportation to America.
People who falsified marriage registries could receive the death penalty.
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century Britons referred to LHA dictating their consent strictures, although the rules
technically came from the MA, which helps explain why the latter remains understudied.
Usually in the nineteenth century LHA/MA necessitated male parents or
guardians' consent for minors' marriages.74 Mothers could only provide consent in the
absence of male adults.75 Because law and custom allowed women to marry younger than
men, LHA/MA affected female more than male consent. If unwidowed minors falsified
consent for licenses, their marriages would be void. Otherwise, minors could consent to
clandestine marriages, legal in civil but not canon law.76 Because LHA had ended Fleet
weddings,77 Britons lacked options for clandestine weddings, which were sometimes held
at night and unlisted in marriage registries. Couples sometimes lied about their residences
in cities, where clergy could not verify addresses for all banns.
Other couples chose Scotland,78 where 12-year-old girls and 14-year-old boys
could marry without third-party consent. For a marriage to be legal in Scotland (and
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However, parents who were unmarried, Jewish, or Quaker could not provide or refuse
consent for minor children.
75
If a minor's father lived, only he provided legal consent. If the father were missing and
presumed dead, the mother gave consent, but if the father miraculously returned, he could
have the minor's marriage annulled. If the mother lived but the father appointed the
minor's legal guardian before dying, that man provided consent. The mother only
provided consent if neither father nor guardian existed. However, if she remarried, she
lost that power, and a court determined consent. A minor could not overrule a father who
refused to provide consent, but that minor could turn to the court to contest a mother or
guardian's decision.
76
Still, grooms and their accomplices could be sentenced to multiple years in jail, and
Parliament could annul marriages.
77
Fleet weddings were England's most (in)famous and popular clandestine weddings,
occurring at London's Fleet Prison.
78
It went the other way in the seventeenth century. Scots who could not marry in their
home country fled across the border to wed in England. Parliament ended that practice in
1641, declaring a marriage clandestine if two Scottish parties married in England without
publishing banns in Scotland.
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therefore England), parties only had to consent before two witnesses and an officiant,
sometimes a law clerk (or the like) instead of an ordained clergyman.79 Small towns and
tollbooths immediately across the border became more popular than the original
destination of Edinburgh. While An Act for Marriages in England introduced civil
marriage in 183680 and reduced the necessity for border weddings, perhaps 2,000 still
occurred as late as 1855. Couples made Gretna Green, the first town less than a mile over
the border on the road from southern England, the hotspot.81 Those couples could marry
mere minutes after arrival. Gretna Green citizens offered packages featuring wedding
services and room and board, and officiants charged according to supply and demand and
the fiancé(e)s' apparent class. Thus, payment for services rendered varied from a glass of
whisky to £100. As late as 1850-1855, Gretna Green saw an average of 750 annual
weddings, although after returning home, plenty of new spouses underwent additional
weddings in the Church of England for extra validity. When it came to a Gretna Green
wedding, the British public did not quite know how to handle a British marriage that was
not a British marriage.
Since weddings usually transferred power from fathers to husbands, some young
women "audaciously" believed that they should at least get to choose their new masters in
Gretna Green. Yet Gretna Green brides were sometimes perceived as un-English and
unfeminine. They were viewed as the former because they violated English law, and
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Despite the myth, blacksmiths did not officiate Scottish weddings.
Among other changes, couples could marry in non-Anglican services, couples could
marry one week after obtaining licenses or three weeks after obtaining certificates, and
Jewish and Quaker parents could control minor children's wedding consent.
81
Most parties in Gretna Green weddings were poor Britons who lived close to the
border.
80
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England was nothing if not built on duty to Crown and country. They were viewed as the
latter because they were not angels in the house, the century's only wifely ideal. By
marrying men of their choice on their terms in their chosen location, they acted adult
instead of infantile, assertive instead of passive, controlling instead of controlled,
disobedient instead of obedient, independent instead of chaperoned, self-interested
instead of selfless, and sexual instead of asexual—all undesirable characteristics for
nineteenth-century British women.
Gretna Green and Clandestine Marriage
Neither Reynolds nor Gretna Green has received full-length treatments in
scholarship,82 yet Gretna Green addresses the controversial issue of Gretna Green
weddings more than any other novel in the century, doing so the most conservatively and
didactically in the process. Indeed, this chapter demonstrates that Reynolds's support of
the MA and use of the penny-dreadful genre enables her devastation of her four Gretna
Green marriages. The novel (set in Berkshire from 1827-early 1830s and serialized
weekly from 1847-1848) introduces Lady Arabella Faulkner, 17, who cannot obtain
consent from her father, Lord George Faulkner, an earl and Minister of the Crown, to
marry her beloved Theodore Montagu, the 20-year-old son of Colonel Montagu.83
Though in 1835 the 17-year-old Susannah Pierson married her beloved George William
MacArthur Reynolds abroad on his 21st birthday, the disapproving novelist banishes Lady
Arabella and Theodore to Gretna Green. The narrator calls the town "so fascinating to the
82

Reynolds has only been the subject of a few blink-and-you-miss-it references as the
wife of George, the century's bestselling novelist, who has also largely been forgotten.
83
Theodore also needs his father's consent, but Gretna Green never addresses this
problem because novels about Scottish clandestine marriage usually only took issue with
young women's marital consent.
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hopes of young hearts, but at the same time so demoralizing to the sanctity of the
matrimonial vow" (224), and for hundreds of pages the didactic narrator shows those
"young hearts" how they have erred in their "vow."
Though Lord Faulkner raised Lady Arabella neglectfully and unaffectionately, the
narrator tries to generate sympathy for him because he legally controls his daughter's
consent. With Lord Faulkner's response to Lady Arabella's Gretna Green flight, the
narrator crafts the novel's most emotional scene to date as "instructive" to the (female)
reader:
Be assured, reader, that there is no condition of life,—no passage of every
day experience,—that does not present to the eye of the minute observer
points fit for instructive handling, be it of pencil or of pen…
Ah! Lady Arabella, would it not have been as well that you had
sate by the side of your dignified father at the moment that tears blinded
his sight, to soothe and encourage him? It is a sad thing to think of an old
man weeping, especially when over the stray steps of a child, and that
child the first-born daughter…No sophistry of reasoning shall ever get the
better of the moral and social laws of our existence; no extent and
uniformity of what are deemed good resolutions can ever change the
aspect or the attitude of the wrong into the right. (30)
The narrator plots the couple's violation of English "moral and social law" in Scotland as
the cause of the earl's stroke, which gains more sympathy for him from British readers
and further incriminates Lady Arabella and Theodore. Worse, as Lady Arabella and
Theodore near their Scottish destination, they forget Lord Faulkner's "English home":
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"Not a thought at the time travelled towards an English home; nor was the venerable
father,—whose yearning heart must have been most painfully kept on the stretch for the
few last days and nights, as they could not but be well aware,—no—nothing of all this
was remembered as they drove up to the nuptial temple" (39). This support of the MA
and rebuke of independent female marital consent reveals the narrator's nationalism.
Colonel Montagu beefs up the novel's anti-Gretna Green faction.84 Wishing that
he had died rather than learn of the clandestine Montagu marriage, the colonel warns
Lady Arabella and Theodore, "you are bound, beyond any married pair that I ever knew,
to exhibit lives of remarkable prudence in order that you may show yourselves to be
worthy of imitation, not in consequence, but in spite of the unseemly course you adopted
at the commencement of your wedded career" (101-102). To demonstrate that Gretna
Green weddings were primarily viewed as young women's crimes, the narrator makes the
perceived guiltiest party—Lady Arabella, the only person present who is not in the
colonel's nuclear family—respond first in the room: "Long may you be spared to us, dear
colonel, to remind us of our truant course, and of the claims upon us as members of the
community to make all the reparation possible" (102). Lady Arabella soon adds that she
wants "opportunities to manifest to the world, that we have made some atonement to
society for the irregularity which marked the commencement of our married career"
84

The narrator even puts Gretna Green citizens in this faction. One resident reports,
"between three and four hundred couples are annually united in this way—so far as it can
be called a legitimate union—at Gretna-Green" (39). Another waxes poetically about
older male authority: "Prudence and forbearance,—gentle counsel and affectionate
remonstrance,—mutual concessions and a habitual observance of the rights which
persons of maturer years are entitled to exercise, would, if every family were imbued
with these sentiments and principles, go very far to abolish, or to render rare, the
clandestine and irregular marriages that are so disgracefully rife on the Scottish Border"
(42).
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(104). Gretna Green is the "opportunit[y] to manifest to the world" that the narrator,
joining both fathers, condemns that "commencement."
Because of consent, the narrator punishes Lady Arabella and Theodore by
refusing to let them be happy. Moral and loving, they are not Gretna Green fiction's usual
foolish teenagers or an older man swindling a young heiress. Still, Lady Arabella's
brother, Lancelot Faulkner, beats and attempts to murder Theodore, and Lady Arabella's
father disowns and brings a curse upon her, causing her near death, which he celebrates.
To add insult to injury, the narrator makes the couple sense metafictional intent, as
Theodore relays: "seldom can any parties concerned in a clandestine marriage, and in
irregular nuptials, have been so heavily chastised as we ourselves" (64). Lady Arabella
confirms, "we have already encountered such trials as might well deter others from being
tempted to run in the face of parental authority" (102). As the novel progresses, they
become financially needy, which ruins Lady Arabella's health. Indeed, because she
violated the MA's unwritten gender code, she suffers more than Theodore: "'When a
daughter elopes to Gretna,' pursued Theodore, 'generally it is a wicked thing, and wicked
acts bear their own punishment with them" (291). When speaking of her father, Lady
Arabella echoes this chastisement: "I have left him once, and it brought me grief, and
misery, and unhappiness" (322). More precisely, the narrator's support of the status quo
"br[ings] grief, and misery, and unhappiness" unnecessarily to good characters.85
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The narrator also criticizes the novel's three other Gretna Green weddings.
With Hugh Shores and Lady Harriet Faulkner (Lady Arabella's sister), the
narrator continues this trend of penalizing moral individuals who are in love. Initially,
Lancelot attempts to murder Hugh and disowns Lady Harriet. Lord Faulkner reveals the
narrator's pattern by calling Gretna Green "that place which is the curse of home and
families; that place where marriage is only a legalised scorn, or at least becomes the first

97
Under the narrator's guidance, Lady Arabella grows to regret her Gretna Green
consent. Compared with Theodore, she feels more remorse because socially, the MA has
become gendered legislation: "If error has been, it attaches chiefly to me; if bitter regrets
are beginning thus early to arise, they ought most sharply to sting myself…I do not feel
as if I were yet your wife. I have begun to look back with a deeper and a deeper loathing
at the maimed nuptial rites" (64). Lady Arabella is Theodore's legal wife, though. After
her father publically snubs her, Lady Arabella cries to Theodore: "Oh! would that I had
never left my home; would that the rash and fatal step had never been taken, or I should
not at this day be heartbroken for the smile and the blessing of my only surviving
parent!" (116) Lady Arabella ignores that in aligning with her father who controlled her

step to contention, unhappiness, and despair!" (218) As such, Lady Harriet's elopement
conveniently enables the narrator to enhance Lady Arabella's punishment:
It seemed to crush Arabella to the very ground. The example she herself
had shown was not lost, then; the lesson of disobedience she had taught
was not forgotten; the seeds of neglect to a parent's wish had not died, but
had grown and borne fruit—how bitter she could easily guess,—and she
had been the primary cause: thus she mentally accused herself:
"Heaven pardon me! for I cannot forgive myself. Oh! why—why
did I leave his side?…
"filial piety should be paramount over all things." (247)
Later, the earl's friend, Sir Myles Beauchamp, criticizes the Faulkner weddings in Gretna
Green: "I abhor and detest the name—the place, and all and everything connected with it.
I know…the misery that place has inflicted" (327). The narrator finishes this Gretna
Green subplot with three deaths: Lady Harriet's return from Scotland causes her father's
death, cannibals mutilate Hugh, and the insane Lady Harriet dies at sea.
The narrator's punishment carries to bad Gretna Green marriages, too. Married in
Gretna Green, Lady Christopher Harcourt suffers years of spousal abuse before Sir
Christopher's murder. Also, after marrying in Gretna Green, William Pierce attempts to
commit bigamy, causing his wife Amelia's suicide. The narrator is pointed about the
latter union: "The end was so tragical—the cause so fearful,—namely, the elopement to
Gretna" (191). Lancelot witnesses William's insanity and muses about Gretna Green:
"'Surely that accursed place brings about its retribution'…more than ever Faulkner was
convinced that there was a fatality attached to all connexions formed under the specious
protection of Gretna Green" (419-420). Soon he witnesses William's confirming death.
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consent, she pains the man to whom she consented, so the narrator unravels the Montagu
marriage by its first thread. Indeed, Lady Arabella realizes that she partially blames
Theodore for luring her from her family and class:
she had married a man she had loved, and by that sacrifice had become
disinherited of all the prestige her birth cast around her: because he—poor,
unknown, of no rank or influence, had prevailed upon her to leave her
father, and her home, and her possessions, and fly clandestinely with
him;—because, for all this sacrifice she had made, the only return he could
make was to love—to cherish—to protect her. (165)
Thus, more threads unravel: "Let our fair readers consider this, and confess whether there
was not beginning to be something very fearful in this young and lovely woman being
compelled, for the peace of her own mind, to find reasons and arguments that she might
continue to love her husband!" (165) The narrator implies that female "readers" who
want to avoid this "fearful" scenario should pay heed and avoid Gretna Green.
At the zenith of displeasure about independent marital consent, the narrator ends
the Montagu marriage histrionically. Because Lady Arabella and Theodore cannot
successfully live with a citizenry angry at their consent violation, the narrator re-banishes
them from England, this time permanently and by ship. After a hurricane at sea in 1827,
the Montagu child and Lady Arabella die from a plague, with sharks eating their corpses.
Amidst starvation, dehydration, and mutiny, Theodore goes insane and commits suicide
by shark—all surprising material for a Victorian novel. According to the narrator, "the
elopement to Gretna…directly caused these last melancholy occurrences": "The
digression of one step from the path of rectitude, the cherishing of a rebellious thought
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against the authority of parents and the opinion of the world, create twenty other steps to
further the wrong till they end wretchedly or fatally…Oh! reader, Gretna Green stands
before you" (414). The narrator follows that histrionic warning with another about
consent in the final paragraph: "What more have we now to relate? The drama is ended—
the curtain has fallen—and the lately bustling stage is silent. All that remains for us in
order to complete the task, is to sum up the moral of our story in these words—'Beware
of Marriages following upon Elopement!'" (426) Fortunately for Reynolds, she lived long
enough to see An Act for amending the Law of Marriage in Scotland, also known as the
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1856 or Lord Brougham's Act, pass on July 29, 1856. Beginning
January 1, 1857, one fiancé(e) had to live in Scotland for three weeks prior to a wedding;
otherwise, the marriage would be illegal. Predictably, this law lessened Britons' Gretna
Green weddings throughout the rest of the Victorian period. However, Parliament did not
remove patriarchal consent control over minor weddings until the Guardianship of Infants
Act 1925.
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CHAPTER 5. WIVES AND MARITAL ABUSE: "NOTHING THAT SHE COULD
ALLEGE AGAINST HIM IN JUDICIOUS OR JUDICIAL EARS"

In the poem "Damages, Two Hundred Pounds" (1850), William Makepeace
Thackeray's narrator declares that an unnamed husband and wife "led a wretched life"
(204), but the reader discerns that the wife has "led a wretched life" because of her
husband's abuse.86 In just 60 lines the reader sees physical violence in this marriage: The
husband was known to "pull his lady's nose and make her lip to bleed… / [and] throw the
cover of a dish at his lady's head" and "seize his lady by the throat… / [and] fling a
teacup at his wife," resulting in instances when "the piping eye was black" (203-204).
More generally, the narrator reports, "he…abused her, beating her into a fit… / used his
lady dear— / Beat her, kicked her, caned her… / Flung her from him…wrung her neck,
and boxed her ear" (204-205). There is emotional abuse here, too: "he cursed her… /
never once, in ten months' space, / Sat with his wife or spoke her kindly" (204). However,
when the wife leaves with her lover's help, she is further legally and socially punished by
her husband's criminal conversation suit. Apparently a witness in the courtroom, the
narrator sarcastically reports: "Comes a British man and husband—asking of the law
relief, / For his wife was stolen from him—he'd have vengeance on the thief / Yes, his
wife, the blessed treasure with the which his life was crowned… / [He is] Asking damage
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This chapter uses the term "abuse" to cover all physical, emotional, and sexual marital
traumas that were legal and illegal in the nineteenth century.
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of the villain who seduced his lady dear" (202-203). Disgusted, the narrator knows that
this abusive husband is on the right side of the law: "If a British wife offends you, Britons,
you've a right to whop her… / You are welcome to neglect her: to the devil you may send
her: / You may strike her, curse her, abuse her; so declares our law renowned" (205). At
the end of the trial, the husband is awarded ₤200, allowing the narrator to show how the
deck was stacked against abused wives.
Scholars have only significantly attended to marital abuse in nineteenth-century
British fiction in the last decade. That literary scholarship by Kate Lawson and Lynn
Shakinovsky, Lisa Surridge, and Marlene Tromp87 relies upon the previous decade's
histories of marital abuse by Shani D'Cruze, Maeve E. Doggett, A. James Hammerton,
and Mary Lyndon Shanley.88 This chapter's attention to consent provides an additional
understanding of fiction about marital abuse. Specifically, this chapter explores women
like Thackeray's heroine allegedly consenting on their wedding days to coverture's abuse.
Essentially all types of abuse—physical, emotional, and sexual (or "the marital rape
exemption")—were legal throughout the century because of prior wifely "approval," so
regardless of the severity or length of trauma, wives could not easily revoke their
87

Lawson and Shakinovsky study fictional depictions of abused Victorian women's
bodies. Surridge assesses both the public and private, journalistic and fictional, angles of
nineteenth-century marital violence. Tromp explores how marital violence was portrayed
in and out of the sensation novel.
88
Of her myriad case studies of abused working-class women, D'Cruze's attention to
wives is of relevance here. Doggett principally reviews the male right to beat (plus
confine) wives throughout most of the nineteenth century. Hammerton argues that while
it is only partially true that England more widely valued civil behavior in marriage by the
early nineteenth century, it is true that as the century progressed, male behavior in
marriage was increasingly seen as a social issue in need of reform, although actual reform
never matched the fervor of the calls for it. Shanley examines how proto-feminists
worked for wives to gain control of their own bodies, particularly to end physical and
sexual abuse.
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"consent" to it. As this chapter argues, George Eliot (Mary Anne Evans) used her fiction
to illuminate this socio-legal outrage to her readers, who had not been spurred to action
by nonfiction writers. In so doing, Eliot helped pave the way for more explicit lateVictorian and Edwardian condemnations by George Egerton (Mary Chavelita Dunne
Bright) and John Galsworthy.
A socio-economic contradiction animated British people and fiction: Most of the
public, including politicians, activists, and journalists, asserted that marital abuse existed
almost exclusively in the lower classes, but the same degree of abuse was actually
prevalent in the middle and upper classes. Throughout the period, one subset of the
population—fiction writers—countered this myth, using their fiction to provide evidence
of the proliferation of "consensual" physical, emotional, and sexual abuse in middle- and
upper-class marriages. On the marital rape exemption in the upper classes specifically,
Eliot helped clear a path for Egerton and Galsworthy. Comparing the Victorian era to the
Victorian novel, then, a reader can see that perception did not match reality, or at least
realism. On female consent and marital abuse, the latter trumped the former.
After a review of coverture, marital abuse, and class, this chapter will assess
Eliot's fiction on wifely "consent" to abuse. Namely, following a brief historical review
of physical and emotional marital abuse, this chapter will evaluate Eliot's novella "Janet's
Repentance" from the collection Scenes of Clerical Life (1858), followed by a longer
historical review of the marital rape exemption and Eliot's commentary on it in her novel
Daniel Deronda (1876).89 Together, "Janet's Repentance" and Daniel Deronda do
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These two texts are paired because, in several ways, they are opposites in Eliot's
oeuvre: As her first and last fiction, the novella and novel were published anonymously
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necessary work: They expose "consensual" physical, emotional, and sexual abuse in
middle- and upper-class homes. Later, Egerton and Galsworthy took this argument and
ran with it, as will be shown in Egerton's short story "Virgin Soil" (from the 1894
collection Discords) and Galsworthy's two novels from The Forsyte Saga—The Man of
Property (1906) and In Chancery (1920).
Coverture, Marital Abuse, and Class
Nineteenth-century consent law relied upon an eighteenth-century notion of
coverture. With Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), professor, lawyer, and
judge William Blackstone laid out women's transformations from femes sole to femes
covert and created the unities theory that legally bound wives to their husband—but
never the other way around:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended into that of the
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every
thing…a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into covenant
with her: for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; and to
covenant with her, would be only to covenant with himself. (1: 430)90
Continuing into the nineteenth century, coverture made it nearly impossible for wives to
leave their marriages on grounds of abuse. "Cruelty" was necessary for a judicial

and in the midst of her celebrity, are set in the early versus late nineteenth century, and
are under-studied versus canonical in modern scholarship.
90
Seeing himself doing a favor for Englishwomen, Blackstone writes, "we may observe,
that even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her
protection and benefit. So great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England" (1:
433).
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separation or divorce, and the law only recognized wives' allegations as cruelty if their
long-term physical health were affected because of their husbands' repeatedly violent
physical attacks or because their husbands' non-physical stressors caused eventual
physical ailments. Anything less was deemed not cruel and, therefore, consensual.
In various nonfiction publications (usually legal or social commentaries), middleand upper-class Britons almost totally located marital violence in the lower classes.
Lawyer Randle Lewis refers to Blackstone in Reflections on the Causes of Unhappy
Marriages, and on Various Subjects Therewith Connected (1805): "A man (by the old
law) might give his wife moderate correction…The lower rank of people, however, still
claim and exert their ancient privilege; yet some of the men outstep all reasonable bounds;
and some women undeservedly and patiently endure it" (86-87). For Lewis, the lower
classes are not in sync with modernity, which decries domestic violence that is beyond
"reasonable." Even progressive Victorians viewed the problem of marital violence as a
lower-class issue. In The Subjection of Women (1869), philosopher and Member of
Parliament John Stuart Mill alleges that due to coverture, lower-class husbands are
"naturally" more abusive:
how many thousands are there among the lowest classes in every country,
who, without being in a legal sense malefactors in any other respect,
because in every other quarter their aggressions meet with resistance,
indulge the utmost habitual excesses of bodily violence towards the
unhappy wife, who alone, at least of grown persons, can neither repel nor
escape from their brutality; and towards whom the excess of dependence
inspires their mean and savage natures, not with a generous forbearance,
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and a point of honour to behave well to one whose lot in life is trusted
entirely to their kindness, but on the contrary with a notion that the law
has delivered her to them as their thing, to be used at their pleasure, and
that they are not expected to practise the consideration towards her which
is required from them towards everybody else. (40-41)
In "The Injustice of the English Law As It Bears on the Relationship of Husband and
Wife" (1868), Reverend Alfred Dewes also looks to Blackstone to enable his class
commentary: "The remark of Blackstone that the lower rank of the people still claim and
exert this ancient privilege [of the husband correcting his wife] is unmistakeably true. We
see, time after time, cases where a wife has suffered grievous bodily harm at the hands of
a ruffianly husband, who…has beaten her with the poker or the fire-shovel" (122-123). In
his 1877 essay asking "What Legislation is Necessary for the Repression of Crimes of
Violence?," lawyer Alexander Pulling singles out poor husbands of the North:
there is strongly felt the need of some special legislation for restraining
crimes of violence, especially in the case of men towards their
wives…among the inhabitants of [Liverpool] there is an amount of savage
brutality certainly not exceeded in any part of Her Majesty's
dominions…nowhere is the ill-usage of woman so systematic and so little
hindered by the supposed strong arm of the law; making the lot of a
married woman whose locality is the "kicking district" of Liverpool
simply a duration of suffering and subjection to injury and savage
treatment. (345)
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Echoing Mill, Pulling here articulates the widespread middle- and upper-class view that
abusive lower-class husbands were near the nineteenth-century notion of the savage.
Several middle- and upper-class feminist women also published their perceptions
of lower-class abuse. In Marriage, As It Was, As It Is, and As It Should Be: A Plea for
Reform (1878), Annie Besant speaks of husbands' rights to abuse their wives physically:
"the effect of the law is seen in the brutal treatment of wives among the rougher classes"
(14). That year, Frances Power Cobbe published what stands as probably the period's
most famous text on marital abuse, "Wife-Torture in England," in which she claims: "The
dangerous wife-beater belongs almost exclusively to the artisan and labouring classes.
Colliers, 'puddlers,' and weavers have long earned for themselves in this matter a bad
reputation, and among the long list of cases before me, I reckon shoemakers,
stonemasons, butchers, smiths, tailors, a printer, a clerk, a bird-catcher, and a large
number of labourers" ("Torture" 58). Cobbe also points to the North as problematic:
"There are also various degrees of wife-beating in the different localities…It is in the
centres of dense mercantile and manufacturing populations that this offence reaches its
climax" ("Torture" 59). Like Pulling, Cobbe uses "kicking districts" throughout to
describe these pockets of England. Finally, in "Maltreatment of Wives" (1893), Mabel
Sharman Crawford echoes her feminist antecedents: "for many years the published
records of magistrates' and coroners' courts have given full publicity to the cruel
treatment of wives that prevails amongst the lower ranks of the working class in the large
towns and industrial centres of the United Kingdom" (292). Crawford concludes, "A
question of such vital interest to the wives of working-men should not continue to be
ignored" (301), serving as a representative classist rallying cry of the women's movement.
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Conversely, several Victorians interested in the women's rights movement
asserted that marriages in the middle and upper classes were not as abusive. In "Outrages
on Women" (1856), civil servant and historian John William Kaye wrote with flourish:
"In all classes of society there are bad husbands. But in the upper classes men rarely lift
their hands against their wives…Men of education and refinement do not strike
women…They would not besmear a fair face with blood…They would not mar the
beauty of God's handiwork" (125). Cobbe also discriminatorily compares marriages
throughout the classes: "How does it come to pass that while the better sort of
Englishmen are thus exceptionally humane and considerate to women, the men of the
lower class of the same nation are proverbial for their unparalleled brutality, till wifebeating, wife-torture, and wife-murder have become the opprobrium of the land?"
("Torture" 56) Like Kaye, Cobbe briefly admits that slight marital violence occurs in
middle- and upper-class marriages, but she believes that those husbands cannot inflict
serious damage because they (hypocritically) follow a social code of honor:
Wife-beating exists in the upper and middle classes rather more, I fear,
than is generally recognized; but it rarely extends to anything beyond an
occasional blow or two of a not dangerous kind. In his apparently most
ungovernable rage, the gentleman or tradesman somehow manages to bear
in mind the disgrace he will incur if his outbreak be betrayed by his wife's
black eye or broken arm, and he regulates his cuffs or kicks accordingly.
("Torture" 58)
Similarly, Crawford turns to perceived differences in understanding of secular and
religious law, writing, "Whilst in the upper classes of society, the bride's vow of
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obedience…is regarded as a mere formula without more binding force than that which
'Your obedient servant,' in signature entails, that vow is looked upon by the rough as
giving a religious sanction to the use of physical force, if needful, in the assertion of his
inborn masculine marital right to be obeyed" (298). As Kaye, Cobbe, and Crawford
reveal, then, constructs of middle- and upper-class character required "appropriate,"
discreet behavior regarding marital abuse.
Contrary to this view of marital abuse as largely localized in the lower classes,
later studies by Elizabeth Foyster and Hammerton reveal that marital abuse existed to the
same degree in the middle and upper classes. Surridge expresses surprise that Victorians
saw abuse as an almost solely lower-class problem since abused socialite Caroline Norton
notoriously separated from her husband, resulting in a trial involving the prime minister
and her publications like A Letter to the Queen on Lord Chancellor Cranworth's
Marriage and Divorce Bill (108). Further, Hammerton shows that after the 1857
Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) partially driven by Norton, newspapers published
reports of divorce cases featuring middle- and upper-class marital abuse. Thus, most
middle- and upper-class nonfiction commentators did not reconcile their knowledge of
current events with their perception of lower-class marital abuse. This discrepancy
between what they recognized and what they should have recognized indicates willful
avoidance. Worse, their blind view enabled upper-class men, largely revered as lawabiding leaders of society, to go scot-free from their marital crimes. This chapter shows
instead that marital consent caused widespread emotional, physical, and sexual abuse
throughout all classes of society.
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Marital abuse is everywhere in Victorian literature, and novelists almost always
locate that violence in middle- and upper-class homes, portraying an epidemic of
"consensual" abuse. Charlotte Brontë's Jane Eyre: An Autobiography (Bertha Rochester)
and Shirley: A Tale (Agnes Helstone), Emily Brontë's Wuthering Heights (Isabella Linton
Heathcliff), Mona Caird's The Wing of Azrael (Marion Sedley), Charles Dickens's The
Personal History of David Copperfield (Clara Murdstone), Arthur Conan Doyle's The
Hound of the Baskervilles: Another Adventure of Sherlock Holmes (Laura Lyons),
George Gissing's The Odd Women (Monica Widdowson), Sarah Grand's The Beth Book
(Mrs. Caldwell and Elizabeth Caldwell Maclure), George Moore's A Mummer's Wife
(Richard Lennox), and Emma Robinson's Mauleverer's Divorce: A Story of Woman's
Wrongs (Sophia Luxmoor) all depict middle-class physical and emotional abuse.
Novelists showed even more physical and emotional abuse in upper-class marriages:
Anne Brontë (Helen Huntington in The Tenant of Wildfell Hall), Mona Caird (Viola
Dendraith in The Wing of Azrael), Wilkie Collins (Laura, Lady Glyde in The Woman in
White and Lydia Gwilt Waldron in Armadale), Charles Dickens (Estella Drummle in
Great Expectations), Arthur Conan Doyle (Beryl Baskerville in The Hound of the
Baskervilles), George Moore (Lucy Bentham in A Modern Lover), Caroline Norton (Lady
Clarice Dupré in Woman's Reward and Lady Eleanor Penrhyn in Stuart of Dunleath: A
Story of Modern Times), Margaret Oliphant (Rachel Mildmay in Salem Chapel), Ouida
(Vera, Princess Zouroff in Moths), William Makepeace Thackeray (Lady Rose Crawley
in Vanity Fair: A Novel Without a Hero), and Anthony Trollope (Emily Trevelyan in He
Knew He Was Right, Lady Laura Kennedy in Phineas Finn: The Irish Member and
Phineas Redux, and Lady Matilda Carbury and Madame Melmotte in The Way We Live
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Now). Progressive novelists assert a collective view: Contrary to the public's notion of
marital abuse localized in the lower classes, emotional, physical, and sexual marital abuse
exist in all classes, so they undertook to educate the public about consent and incite them
to improve their own lives and the nation.
Physical and Emotional Marital Abuse
As historians91 and literary scholars (Lawson and Shakinovsky, Surridge, and
Tromp)92 discussed, eighteenth-century precedent enabled nineteenth-century marital
abuse to be largely legal. In A New Abridgment of the Law (1736) lawyer Matthew Bacon
contradictorily declares of physical abuse, "The Husband hath by Law Power and
Dominion over his Wife…and may beat her, but not in a violent or cruel Manner" (1:
285). Physical abuse continued in this vein into the next century when extreme physical
abuse and threats of physical violence that could cause long-term damage were
recognized as "cruelty," but the key loophole was violence up to a point. If physical
violence would not cause major, long-term physical harm, then it was legal correction for
wives.93 Emotional abuse has been regarded as less damaging than physical abuse by
both nineteenth-century Britons and contemporary scholars, which is probably why, of
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See Jo Aitken, Carol Bauer and Lawrence Ritt, John M. Biggs, Anna Clark, D'Cruze,
Doggett, Foyster, Susan Hamilton, Hammerton, Shanley, and Nancy Tomes.
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Lawson and Shakinovsky assess marital abuse in Collins and Eliots' fiction. Surridge
assesses marital abuse in Anne Brontë, Collins, Eliot, and Trollopes' novels. Tromp
assesses marital abuse in Collins, Eliot, and Oliphants' novels.
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Throughout the century, one law was passed to provide options to physically abused
wives: The Matrimonial Causes Act 1878 declared that if husbands committed
aggravated assaults to harm their wives seriously, wives could receive judicial
separations and economic maintenance orders while husbands could serve half-year
sentences of hard labor.
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the latter camp, only historians Biggs and Hammerton have significantly attended to it.94
For much of the century, as long as emotional stress did not cause physical harm to wives,
it was not considered cruelty.95
Physical and, to a lesser degree, emotional marital abuse were part of discourse.
As previously stated, after the 1857 MCA granted greater access to divorce, the press
published almost daily cases of marital conflict. Members of the women's rights
movement discussed marital abuse, albeit generally as a reason for their main aim of
suffrage. However, some nonfiction writers, including Besant, Matilda M. Blake,
Crawford, Dewes, Mill, and Pulling, discussed physical marital abuse as a problem unto
itself. Further, Cobbe, Kaye, Norton, Harry Quilter, and William Thompson took
physical and emotional abuse as their joint focus, again irrespective of suffrage.
"Janet's Repentance" and Physical and Emotional Marital Abuse
In 1856 Eliot declared in a letter that she had signed activist Barbara Leigh Smith
Bodichon's petition for wives' rights "as a counteractive to wife-beating and other evils"
94

Through a historical survey of cases, Biggs traces the law's development of cruelty
from violence to threats and effects on physical health. After examining cases of middleclass marital abuse, Hammerton also shows how the law gradually considered emotional
abuse legal cruelty.
95
That view changed with the judicial separation case Kelly v. Kelly in 1869. Nearly 30
years into their marriage, Rev. James Kelly continually insulted his wife Frances and kept
her locked indoors, eventually causing physical ailments. The presiding judge ruled that
emotional abuse affecting physical health was cruelty and then echoed Mill: "Without
disparaging the just and paramount authority of a husband, it may be safely asserted that
a wife is not a domestic slave, to be driven at all cost, short of personal violence, into
compliance with her husband's demands" ("Kelly" 2: 31).
Thus, in the final years of the period, many more physically and/or emotionally
abused wives were covered by the 1895 Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act,
which altered marital desertion law. If wives had been faithful and alleged cruelty, they
could flee their homes and, for the first time, not face desertion charges and
corresponding loss of court protection. Instead, they would be granted judicial
separations and economic maintenance orders from their husbands.
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(Letters 2: 225). Soon after, "counteracti[ng…those] evils," Eliot started producing
fiction with women's statuses and rights as a foremost concern. Only Eliot considered
consent and marital abuse together, specifically with "Janet's Repentance." Of all
nineteenth-century British fiction, "Janet's Repentance" (set in 1833 or earlier and
serialized throughout 1857) was the first sustained, overt depiction of physical and
emotional marital abuse, and as the novelist most known for realism, Eliot's depictions of
marital abuse are among the most authentic of the century. Further, Eliot depicts middleclass abuse96 when Janet Raynor escapes a governess position by marrying up to
alcoholic lawyer Robert Dempster; then throughout their marriage, his physical and
emotional abuse drives her to drink.97 By showing an abused yet "consenting" middleclass wife who "can't think of her husband coming home without trembling" (S.C.L. 191),
Eliot broke new ground in fiction.
To date, scholars have not attended to the novella in great detail. Most interest lies
in Eliot's treatments of religion and alcoholism, but a few critics, including Lawson and
Shakinovsky, Leah A. Kind, Mark Mossman, and Surridge have been interested in
marital abuse.98 In particular, Surridge correctly observes, "Eliot suggests that middle-
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The narrator wants to present middle-class trauma to middle-class readers: "I represent
to you the humble experience of an ordinary fellow-mortal. I wish to stir your sympathy
with commonplace troubles—to win your tears for real sorrow: sorrow such as may live
next door to you—such as walks neither in rags nor in velvet, but in very ordinary decent
apparel" (S.C.L. 50).
97
The realist Eliot enhanced her depiction of middle-class marital abuse by modeling
Robert and Janet after the abusive lawyer James Williams Buchanan and his wife Nancy
Wallington Buchanan, whom Eliot had known in Nuneaton. In fact, Eliot indicates in an
1857 letter that she pulled back in her depiction: "The real Dempster was far more
disgusting than mine; the real Janet alas! had a far sadder end than mine" (Letters 347).
98
Lawson and Shakinovsky argue that unlike other novelists, Eliot writes her short story
to determine why marital abuse occurs. Kind believes that to portray in Victorian
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class violence is not unknown but simply not admitted" (109). However, Surridge argues
that Eliot "depict[s] wife abuse as a women's and community issue rather than a legal,
domestic, or man's issue" (112). This chapter asserts that in "Janet's Repentance" marital
abuse is a legal issue because it is a consent issue: When she married, Janet legally
"consented" to potential physical and emotional abuse. Indeed, Eliot's narrator reports
that Robert "often abused his wife beyond what was reasonable" (S.C.L. 308), which is a
key to understanding the text and its society. Eliot criticizes the socio-legal view that
some physical and emotional marital abuse was acceptable because wives had
"consented" to it on their wedding days—but only until that abuse interfered with their
long-term physical health, when it became unreasonable. Eliot saw the ridiculousness of
the caveat that too much marital abuse invalidated wives' prior "consent" to it, so
throughout "Janet's Repentance," she shows all marital abuse to be nonconsensual and
therefore impermissible.
The middle-class Robert physically abuses his wife to a degree previously unseen
in nineteenth-century British literature. In a representative scene of violence, the reader
hears: "'I'll beat you into your senses again'…The blow falls—another—and another…'O
Robert! pity! pity!'" (S.C.L. 199) Yet the reader learns, "He had no pity on her tender
flesh; he could strike the soft neck he had once asked to kiss" (S.C.L. 240). Physical
abuse occurs so frequently that community members know what happens behind closed
doors, leading even a Dempster servant, who also endures "poor work" for a low "price,"
England a beautiful, educated, middle-class wife as an alcoholic, Eliot made Janet the
victim of marital abuse so that religious readers, especially of the temperance movement,
would possibly excuse rather than condemn her. Mossman believes that partially due to
its conservative male narrator, Eliot's story undermines her intention for it. Surridge
attends to how Janet survives marital abuse through her community's healing influences.
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to swear: "I wouldn't stan' bein' mauled as she is by no husband, not if he was the biggest
lord i' the land. It's poor work bein' a wife at that price" (S.C.L. 266). Mouthing the
willful avoidance of the public, another villager cavalierly characterizes Robert and
Janet's final fight as "merely an exaggeration of scenes that must often have happened
before" (S.C.L. 273). That scene startles:
"If you don't come, I'll kill you…"
she saw the tall massive figure, and the heavy face, now fierce with
drunken rage…
"So you think you'll defy me, do you? We'll see how long that will
last. Get up, madam; out of bed this instant!"
In the close presence of the dreadful man—of this huge crushing
force, armed with savage will—poor Janet's desperate defiance all forsook
her, and her terrors came back. Trembling she got up, and stood helpless
in her night-dress before her husband.
He seized her with his heavy grasp by the shoulder, and pushed her
before him.
"I'll cool your hot spirit for you! I'll teach you to brave me!"
Slowly he pushed her along before him, down stairs…What was he
going to do to her? She thought every moment he was going to dash her
before him on the ground. (S.C.L. 245)
Then Robert completes this physically abusive scene by turning his wife outside on a
freezing night.

115
Not surprisingly, Robert couples physical abuse with its emotional counterpart.
He frequently hurls epithets at Janet like "Curse you! you creeping idiot!" and "you pale
staring fool!" (S.C.L. 198-199) The following scene is representative of his combined
abuse:
The morning light brought no gladness to her: it seemed only to throw its
glare on what had happened in the dim candle-light—on the cruel man
seated immovable in drunken obstinacy by the dead fire and dying lights
in the dining-room, rating her in harsh tones, reiterating old reproaches—
or on a hideous blank of something unremembered, something that must
have made that dark bruise on her shoulder, which aches as she dresses
herself. (S.C.L. 238)
Janet's life is one long cycle of abuse—physical in the night, emotional in the day,
physical in the day, emotional in the night.
Janet's response here is typical of her reactions throughout the novella. In the
early days of her marriage, Janet was quiet and resolute, "beginning her initiation into
sorrow, wounded, resenting, yet still hoping and forgiving—the poor bruised woman"
(S.C.L. 246). Now years married, her coping mechanism is still to "bear it all proudly to
the world, but proudly towards him too; her woman's weakness might shriek a cry for
pity under a heavy blow, but voluntarily she would do nothing to mollify him, unless he
first relented" (S.C.L. 240). Robert's abuse renders Janet nearly mute throughout the
novella, perhaps partly due to her knowledge that she legally "consented" to this pain.
The narrator sarcastically poses one of the novella's key questions to the reader: "Do you
wonder how it was that things had come to this pass—what offence Janet had committed
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in the early years of marriage to rouse the brutal hatred of this man?" (S.C.L. 238) To
generate the reader's sympathy, the narrator answers about consent and coverture: "do not
believe that it was anything either present or wanting in poor Janet that formed the
motive of her husband's cruelty. Cruelty, like every other vice, requires no motive outside
itself—it only requires opportunity…an unloving, tyrannous, brutal man needs no motive
to prompt his cruelty; he needs only the perpetual presence of a woman he can call his
own" (S.C.L. 239). As a result, Janet cries to her mother about her wedding day, correct
that she did not know that she was "consenting" to abuse and that she essentially has no
way out: "How could I know what would come? Why didn't you tell me, mother?—why
did you let me marry?…there's no help for me—no hope" (S.C.L. 242). Thus, near the
end of "Janet's Repentance" when Robert is on his deathbed, he can safely rave to Janet:
"you mean to have your revenge on me, do you?…I've got the law on my side" (S.C.L.
276). In the midst of his delirium, this physically and emotionally abusive middle-class
lawyer knows what he is talking about.
The Marital Rape Exemption
The century's sexual marital abuse has been less studied and theorized from
historians99 and one literary critic, Surridge.100 Relying upon coverture theory, lawyer,
judge, and Member of Parliament Matthew Hale created more eighteenth-century
precedent for nineteenth-century law by establishing the marital rape exemption in The
History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736): "the husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
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See Biggs, Joanna Bourke, Gail Savage, Jocelynne E. Scutt, and Shanley.
Surridge assesses sexual marital abuse in Caird's novel.
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contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract" (1: 629). For Hale, then, female consent is the crucial enabler: Wives bind
themselves fully to their husbands and all that they may (sexually) do in the present and
future, and wives can never change that decision. Because Hale saw marital rape as a
legal oxymoron, the nineteenth century never recognized sexual abuse as cruelty to
enable a judicial separation or divorce.101
Victorians almost entirely avoided the marital rape exemption in discourse,
usually save for references in obscure nonfiction, and of them, one text stands in support.
In "The Degradation of Woman" (1896) professor and scientist St. George Jackson
Mivart condemns: "the fixed idea which possesses some young wives, that to submit
themselves to those conjugal relations, when not prompted so to do by their own feelings,
is for them A DEGRADATION!…the ladies who are the victims of these mistaken ideas
as to degradation [are wrong]" (251). Because wedding-day consent legally covers
marital sex, resistance is generally futile, so like Henleigh Mallinger Grandcourt will
soon be shown arguing in Daniel Deronda, Mivart chastises "the sentiment and judgment
which have led some wives thus to revolt against what are usually considered the just
claims upon them of the position they have voluntarily assumed" (252). Like the
101

However, wives could sue about a handful of sexual marital practices. Men could not
force women into marriages with the intent of raping them under the guise of
consummation because the Hale doctrine mandated that wives could not have had all
necessary information about their impending marriages to enter meaningfully into those
contracts. Husband could not set up their wives to be raped by other men because Britons
did not want to see wives sunk to the level of prostitutes or see men attacking property.
Sodomy was a punishable offense because heteronormative law condemned that
perceived homosexual act between any two partners. Finally, husbands could not
knowingly transmit venereal disease to their wives since that implied that husbands had
both engaged prostitutes and affected their wives' long-term physical health. Compared
with the century's total marriages, court cases involving these offenses were rare.
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unnamed mother of Florence ("Flo") in "Virgin Soil," Mivart believes that the nation's
"consensual" marital rapes must persist, in part, for men's sexual health: "the main end of
marriage renders submission to intimate conjugal relations an obvious duty on the part of
the woman. It is plainly, also, but justice to the husband, who otherwise may incur too
serious a disadvantage" (256). In that, Mivart counters Flo and willfully ignores this
policy's tragic disadvantages for other rape victims.
The anti-marital rape exemption faction was stronger, although activists limited
their commentary because sexual marital abuse was viewed as an unspeakable issue that
would garner too much controversy for the women's rights movement. Indeed, it was
such a taboo that the first nonfiction author to tackle it did so anonymously. In Remarks
Upon the Law of Marriage and Divorce; Suggested by the Hon. Mrs. Norton's Letter to
the Queen (1855), a writer warns of a recently released felon tracking his wife in hiding:
"One fatal evening, as the shades of night are descending, a well known diabolical
countenance is seen at the window of her peaceful cottage inflamed with drink, and lust,
and cruelty. The monster comes to claim his marital rights over her earnings and her
person—he comes in the name of English Law, and who shall resist or gainsay him?"
(Remarks 23) With this extreme scenario, the first author issues the first text to do just
that.
Mill's The Subjection of Women (1869) is the most famous nonfiction text to
condemn the marital rape exemption. Mill has been lauded for this fiery passage:
Above all, a female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right,
and is considered under a moral obligation, to refuse to her master the last
familiarity. Not so the wife: however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately
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be chained to—though she may know that he hates her, though it may be
his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may feel it impossible not
to loathe him—he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation
of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function
contrary to her inclinations. (37)102
On consent, Mill distinctly parts from Mivart. While the latter supports "consenting"
wives who "conform to the moral law" and thereby "attain to a higher moral elevation"
(256), Mill counters that wives have "a moral obligation" to attempt to refuse their rapisthusbands.
By terming marital rape "an animal function," Mill resembles his peer, Professor
Francis William Newman, in his text that is otherwise on "Remedies for the Great Social
Evil," or prostitution. Newman entered the fray the same year and compares sexually
abused wives with animals: "A married man is bound sternly to act the celibate during
long months, and in some cases totally, through the weak health of his wife. (Not but that
102

Susan Hamilton is insightful on the rhetorical comparison between white wives in
England and black female slaves, often in America:
the particular strength of the analogy of the female black slave is its ability
to voice a feminist critique of sexual intimacy between men and women.
As Karen Sanchez-Eppler has argued, the metaphoric link forged by
nineteenth-century feminists between the figure of the bound and silent
slave and the white woman argued for their shared position as property, as
bodies that could be bought, sold, and owned. Within this symbolic
economy, the figure of the identifiably female black slave further
designates what is at issue. Enslaved women's sexual vulnerability
becomes a sign of what is understood but largely unarticulated in feminist
communities: the inability of the free white woman to own her own body
in marriage…The double power of the figure of the enslaved black woman
in nineteenth-century English feminist discourse—to speak the "truth" of
English women's status as property and to embody English feminists'
anxiety about women's physical and sexual vulnerability—makes the trope
dangerously necessary. (452-453)
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even here our law most cruelly treats a wife, who is stript of that self-defence against a
brutal sensual husband, which every female dog and cat retains and exercises.)" (3: 274).
During the Darwinian century interested in hierarchical biological classification and
taxonomy, Newman places humans below dogs and cats in the animal kingdom. Further,
Newman criticizes the gender values inherent in the Angel in the House concept, which
dictates that even in situations of violence and danger, women should remain passive and
sweet rather than engage in self-defense.
Later in the century, female activists began speaking out against the marital rape
exemption. In 1878 Annie Besant published Marriage, As It Was, As It Is, and As It
Should Be: A Plea for Reform, and following the prior references to slaves and animals,
Besant compares raped wives with prostitutes, with the former again in the worse
position:
A married woman loses control over her own body; it belongs to her
owner, not to herself; no force, no violence, on the husband's part in
conjugal relations is regarded as possible by the law; she may be suffering,
ill, it matters not; force or constraint is recognised by the law as rape, in all
cases save that of marriage…the consent given in marriage is held to cover
the life, and if—as sometimes occurs—a miscarriage or premature
confinement be brought on by the husband's selfish passions, no offence is
committed in the eye of the law…The English marriage law sweeps away
all the tenderness, all the grace, all the generosity of love, and transforms
conjugal affection into a hard and brutal legal right. (13-14)
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Besant shows herself to be ahead of her time in condemning Hale's notion of marital
consent as lifelong permission for sex and terming husbands engaging in the marital rape
exemption as categorically loveless.
Two years later, throughout The Criminal Code in its Relation to Women: A
Paper Read Before the Dialectical Society, March 3rd 1880, Elizabeth Clarke
Wolstenholme Elmy also targeted the marital rape exemption. After citing legal
language—"Rape is the act of a man, not under the age of 14 years, having carnal
knowledge of a woman, who is not his wife, without her consent"—Wolstenholme Elmy
fights the law:
I submit that rape, being a violation of a primary natural right, is, and
ought to be by law declared to be, wholly independent of any legal or
other artificially created relationship between the parties, and that it would
be a gross immorality to enact…that any such act by a husband, however
base and cruel it may be, is justified by the matrimonial consent of the
wife once given and never to be retracted. (9)
Like Besant, Wolstenholme Elmy condemns the notion of ineradicable female consent as
the legal loophole for marital rape, and like Mill, she counters the pro-marital rape faction
on morality: "To prevent this degradation of our law, and the inevitable consequent
degradation of morals, I ask the help of every man who respects his wife, of every
woman who loves her husband, of all, men and women alike, who believe that the
marriage union, above all other human relationships, should rest upon free, spontaneous,
and equal mutual affection" (10). In writing this, Wolstenholme Elmy answered the
earlier, anonymous author's call for action, daring to speak to women about sex and rape
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and calling on them, in turn, to become activists about this issue. However, that
grassroots movement was just a dream in late-Victorian England.
Finally, with "Is It Degradation?: A Reply to Professor Mivart" (1896), professor
and writer Grant Allen provided the century's most sustained feminist rebuke of the
marital rape exemption. Like Mill and Wolstenholme Elmy, Allen criticizes using warped
morality to support rape: "If, then, our women no longer desire sexual union with their
husbands, the remedy is certainly not to coerce them, morally or physically" (343).
Following Besant, Wolstenholme Elmy, and Flo, Allen hits the nail on the head about
England's marital consent and contract law:
no appreciable fraction of the women of England will accept Dr. Mivart's
view upon this delicate question…The law respects the sanctity of the
woman's body, admits the necessity of the woman's free choice, in every
case, except that of marriage. In that one case, the law compels the woman
to make a hard-and-fast contract for life beforehand, with an untried man,
and then forces her to abide by it, once made, no matter what opinion she
may afterwards form of her half unknown partner. The act which is legally
punishable with the severest penalties in ordinary cases, is made perfectly
legal, and is even regarded by Dr. Mivart as morally right, on the strength
of a contract which may have been entered into at an early age by a young
girl practically almost ignorant of its real meaning…I hope the women of
England will come forward through some of their accredited mouthpieces
to say so plainly. (347-348)
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While Allen, like Wolstenholme Elmy, was doomed to learn that women (besides the
fictional Flo) would not speak out en masse about this issue, two female voices from
fiction had heeded this call by the century's end.
Daniel Deronda and the Marital Rape Exemption
Although the women's rights movement—and, by extension, the public—did not
visibly tackle the marital rape exemption, a novelist was in a unique position to speak
about this taboo issue in a metaphorical and thereby acceptable way. Eliot took advantage
of this leeway with Daniel Deronda, nineteenth-century British fiction's first sustained
depiction of the marital rape exemption. In the novel (set from 1864-1866 and serialized
throughout 1876) Gwendolen Harleth's family loses their money, and rather than work as
a governess, Gwendolen marries up with Grandcourt, an older, landed aristocrat, heir to a
baronetcy, and perpetrator of upper-class sexual marital abuse. While most Daniel
Deronda scholarship has been interested in Eliot's treatment of Judaism, Susan David
Bernstein, Andrew Dowling, Robert McCarron, and Judith Mitchell provided sustained
pieces on marital abuse in the novel, each culminating in contradictions about sexual
violence.103 This chapter argues that by having Gwendolen "consent" on her wedding day
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Bernstein classifies the "sexual encounters between Grandcourt and Gwendolen as
acts of violence whereby the wife is forced to submit to the husband's desire for a
perfectly calculated possession" (118). Yet in the next sentence Bernstein calls this
"something perilously akin to rape" (118). Her words belie her; "sexual…violence" with
"force" is rape.
Dowling writes: "what Grandcourt's silencing of Gwendolen veils is a condition
of sexual brutality…Gwendolen's enforced silence presumably demands that she submit
to her hated husband's caresses without objection" (334). However, Dowling ultimately
backs off, believing, "Grandcourt delights in psychological rather than physical torture"
(333).
McCarron notices: "the physical, sexual element in Grandcourt's domination is
perhaps of even greater significance. The more important scenes, one is inevitably led to
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to sexual abuse, Eliot used Daniel Deronda to expose marital rape as a legal oxymoron.
Although Ann Cvetkovich criticizes "Daniel Deronda's failure to propose a political
solution to Gwendolen's problem" of a painful marriage (161), Eliot weaves a political
solution throughout: Sexually abused wives should be able to leave their homes legally
and permanently.
The narrator introduces this issue with a consent scene. In a moment that will
haunt the rest of the novel, Grandcourt point-blank asks Gwendolen, "You consent to
become my wife?" (D.D. 256) The narrator reports, "'Yes' came as gravely from
Gwendolen's lips as if she had been answering to her name in a court of justice" (D.D.
257). Unfortunately, Gwendolen's legal "yes" provides "consent" to behavior that she
does not know and cannot foresee.
Unable to write overtly about the marital rape exemption in 1876, the narrator
uses diamonds as a metaphor in Gwendolen's "consensual" wedding night. Gwendolen
receives the Grandcourt family jewels and a scathing letter from Lydia Glasher,
Grandcourt's former mistress and mother of his illegitimate children:

speculate, occur between the chapters, in those bedroom confrontations that Eliot could
not directly depict" (78). Yet McCarron switches his view—"it is unlikely that Eliot is
suggesting that Grandcourt is overtly violent with his wife intheir [sic] sexual
relations"—and names Gwendolen as the problem because she has "neurotic fears of
sexual contact" (79). Worse, McCarron replicates Victorian thought: "Grandcourt has
realized Gwendolen's sexual fears, and, simply demanding his marital rights, enjoys her
unspoken revulsion and his own vastly enhanced mastery" (79). "Simply
demanding…marital rights" is not simple; it is sexual assault.
Speaking of the wedding night, Mitchell "infer[s] that Gwendolen will accept
Grandcourt's conjugal demands 'passively,' because she has no choice; but we can also be
sure that she will loathe them" (143). Despite this, Mitchell describes Gwendolen as
"frigid" throughout, and her argument becomes illogical: "The blame for the Grandcourts'
marital fiasco is equally apportioned, even though it is Gwendolen rather than Grandcourt
who is the victim in the overall scenario" (147).
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Gwendolen's eyes were spell-bound in reading the horrible words of the
letter over and over again as a doom of penance; but suddenly a new
spasm of terror made her lean forward…the casket fell on the floor and the
diamonds rolled out. She took no notice, but fell back in her chair again
helpless. She could not see the reflections of herself then: they were like
so many women petrified white; but coming near herself you might have
seen the tremor in her lips and hands. She sat so for a long while, knowing
little more than that she was feeling ill…
Truly here were poisoned gems, and the poison had entered into
this poor young creature…
Grandcourt entered…The sight of him brought a new nervous
shock, and Gwendolen screamed again and again with hysterical
violence…He saw her pallid, shrieking as it seemed with terror, the jewels
scattered around her on the floor. (D.D. 302-303)
This scene is sexual and violent: "doom of penance," "entered," "helpless," "horrible,"
"hysterical violence," "ill," "nervous shock," "pallid," "petrified," "poison," "poor,"
"screamed," "shrieking," "spasm of terror," and "tremor." The narrator's metaphor is
telling, too. As "the diamonds roll out" and the "jewels scatter," the narrator calls to mind
the trope of the sacred jewel of (lost) virginity. The narrator also invokes consent here.
Mrs. Glasher will not sympathize with Gwendolen because "You took him with your
eyes open" (D.D. 302), her code for Gwendolen's wedding-day consent. Yet Mrs. Glasher
is incorrect: Gwendolen did not know what she was getting into. A sheltered virgin,
Gwendolen probably had no conception of sex prior to her wedding, so she could not
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provide informed sexual consent. Additionally, Gwendolen misread her husband as a
decent man who would let her have her way; she did not realize that she was consenting
to spend every night with an abuser. Unlike Mrs. Glasher, though, the narrator
sympathetically uses Gwendolen's reflection "like so many women petrified white" to
expand her discussion from one bride to all wives who unknowingly consent to spend
their lives with rapists.
The narrator includes a second diamonds scene to underscore this metaphor. The
Grandcourts prepare for a party, with the husband commanding his wife to wear the
family jewels:
"What you think has nothing to do with it…I wish you to wear the
diamonds."
"Pray excuse me; I like these emeralds," said Gwendolen,
frightened in spite of her preparation…
"Oblige me by telling me your reason for not wearing the
diamonds when I desire it," said Grandcourt. His eyes were still fixed
upon her, and she felt her own eyes narrowing under them as if to shut out
an entering pain.
Of what use was the rebellion within her? She could say nothing
that would not hurt her worse than submission…She fancied that his eyes
showed a delight in torturing her. How could she be defiant?…
she opened the jewel-case with a shivering sensation…"What else
is there for me to do?…"
"You want some one to fasten them," he said, coming toward her.
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She did not answer, but simply stood still, leaving him to take out
the ornaments and fasten them as he would…
"What makes you so cold?" said Grandcourt, when he had fastened
the last ear-ring. (D.D. 365-366)
As before, the narrator includes sexual and violent language: "delight in torturing,"
"desire," "entering pain," "frightened," "hurt," "shivering sensation," and "submission."
Because Gwendolen provided her consent to coverture, her view of this sexual violence
does not matter, so Grandcourt can legally state that his "wish" is her command. To add
insult to injury, as Grandcourt touches and controls Gwendolen's body, he delights in
asking his sexually reticent wife why she is unresponsive. Tragically, marriage continues
like this for Gwendolen day after day and night after night.
Grandcourt knows that sexual marital abuse is legal and boasts accordingly.
Understanding legal theory, Grandcourt appreciates that if he were hauled into a grand
court, he could point to Gwendolen's consent: "Grandcourt might have pleaded that he
was perfectly justified in taking care that his wife should fulfil the obligations she had
accepted. Their marriage was a contract…he had won her by the rank and luxuries he had
to give her, and these she had got: he had fulfilled his side of the contract" (D.D. 573).
Thus, the scot-free Grandcourt treats Gwendolen accordingly, "using her as he liked"
(D.D. 511). In fact, not content with "just" conducting sexual abuse, Grandcourt rubs its
legality in Gwendolen's face: "he wanted to feel more securely that she was his to do as
he liked with, and to make her feel it also" (D.D. 572). At one point, he tells his victim:
"You are my wife. And you will either fill your place properly—to the world and to me—
or you will go to the devil" (D.D. 384). This is not an either/or threat: In filling her place
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as a rape victim, Gwendolen is already with a devil. She understands that her current state
boils down to her consent: "Gwendolen, we know, was thoroughly aware of the
situation…[involving] the domain of the husband to whom she felt that she had sold
herself, and had been paid the strict price" (D.D. 573). Resultantly unable to go to the
courts because "She had absolutely nothing that she could allege against him in judicious
or judicial ears" (D.D. 515), Gwendolen can only remain passive.
The narrator writes most daringly about marital rape as the Grandcourt marriage
nears its end. In a rebellious scene for 1876, Gwendolen is shown at night in her
husband's bed aboard his yacht: "Inarticulate prayers, no more definite than a cry, often
swept out from her into the vast silence, unbroken except by her husband's
breathing…these best moments of inward crying and clinging for rescue would come to
her, and she would lie with wide-open eyes in which the rising tears seemed a blessing"
(D.D. 577). Gwendolen sees only one saving grace on this trip, with a reference to
"consenting to…injury": "Some unhappy wives are soothed by the possibility that they
may become mothers; but Gwendolen felt that to desire a child for herself would have
been a consenting to the completion of the injury…She was reduced to dread lest she
should become a mother" (D.D. 576). Mercifully, the narrator does not make Gwendolen
bear Grandcourt's child, who would have been conceived by rape, but instead drowns
Grandcourt to release her heroine from "consensual" upper-class sexual marital abuse.
"Virgin Soil," The Man of Property, In Chancery, and the Marital Rape Exemption
Eliot helped pave the way for more explicit fictional treatments at the end of the
Victorian period of upper-class "consent" to sexual marital abuse. By 1894, against the
backdrop of increasing public debates about unhappy marriages, Egerton became the
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Victorian woman to state bluntly what Eliot could not. Egerton's collection Discords has
been generally overlooked by scholars, and her short story "Virgin Soil" has not been the
subject of in-depth critical treatment, despite its brazen subject: Flo, who naively at 17
married up to the rich Philip, notifies her mother at 22 that she has left him after five
years of sexual assault. Yet her mother retorts, "men are different…you can't refuse a
husband, you might cause him to commit sin" (155). To hammer home the depth of her
disgust, Flo speaks of her marital bedroom in a sexually blunt passage: "I loathe him,
shiver at the touch of his lips, his breath, his hands…my whole body revolts at his
touch…when he has turned and gone to sleep, I have watched him with such growing
hatred that at times the temptation to kill him has been so strong that I have crept out of
bed and walked the cold passage in my bare feet until I was too benumbed to feel
anything" (160). Perhaps in a direct line to Eliot, Flo's confession echoes that of
Gwendolen, the sexually abused wife who also briefly contemplated mariticide. Moments
later, the narrator seems to hearken to Gwendolen again when Flo's mother suggests, "if
you had had a child," before Flo cuts her off: "Of his—that indeed would have been the
last straw—no, mother" (160). Like Gwendolen, Flo's ultimate horror is bearing a child
conceived in rape.
Then the narrator expands to larger condemnations of the marital rape exemption.
Echoing Besant here and subsequently, Flo tells her mother that for wives, "love…is
turned into a duty they submit to with distaste instead of a favour granted to a husband"
(155), and she echoes Gwendolen when she says that in sexually abusing her throughout
their marriage, Philip "avails himself of the latitude permitted him by the laws of society"
(156). Also like Gwendolen, Flo sees sexually abusive marriages as "prostitution," and
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she does not maintain hope for socio-legal change: "it must be so, as long as marriage is
based on such unequal terms, as long as man demands from a wife as a right, what he
must sue from a mistress as a favour; until marriage becomes for many women a legal
prostitution, a nightly degradation, a hateful yoke under which they age, mere bearers of
children conceived in a sense of duty, not love" (155). Like in Daniel Deronda, the
narrator sees this national epidemic stemming from consent as Flo regrets her "insane
obedience" to sexual coverture: "'What have these years been?…one long submittal to the
desires of a man…He has stood on his rights; but do you think, if I had known, that I
would have given such insane obedience, from a mistaken sense of duty, as would lead to
this? I have my rights too, and my duty to myself" (159). Despite the efforts of fiction
writers Eliot and Egerton, though, abused wives like Gwendolen and Flo did not get those
sexual rights during the remainder of the Victorian period.
Thus, Galsworthy, who began his career a Victorian, continued to criticize
explicitly upper-class sexual marital abuse five years after Queen Victoria's death, when
more Britons tackled England's marital problems. Galsworthy, who had married Ada
Nemesis Pearson Cooper Galsworthy after her allegedly abusive marriage with his cousin
Major Arthur Galsworthy, chose marital abuse as a central theme for The Man of
Property (set from 1886-1887) and In Chancery (set from 1899-1901). Galsworthy
focuses on Irene Heron, an orphaned, penniless 20-year-old professor's daughter who
marries up with nouveau riche lawyer and landowner Soames Forsyte. After Irene begins
falling in love with architect Philip Bosinney, Soames, appropriately nicknamed "the man
of property," attempts to control his possession with marital rape. The Forsyte Saga has
been fairly overlooked by scholars. However, Helen Goodman, published after the
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writing of this chapter, also dissects marital rape in The Man of Property. While
Goodman correctly notes, "Galsworthy’s later date enabled him to lay bare what had
been implied in earlier fiction" (61), she is principally concerned with madness in the
novel and believes that Galsworthy included marital rape in response to Trollope's He
Knew He Was Right (1869). Specifically, Goodman asserts that Soames's rape of Irene
stems from his Louis Trevelyan-like monomania. This chapter, though, presents Soames
as sane and Galsworthy following Eliot and Egerton. Indeed, since Eliot's fiction,
Galsworthy's novels show a gradual change in British attitudes about the marital rape
exemption: The wife in question is more assertive, the husband less certain, and the
author more explicit. Nevertheless, change was slow and sexual marital abuse still
allowed in and out of fiction. Similarly, Angharad Saunders, also published after the
writing of this chapter, tackles marital rape in The Man of Property. While Saunders
primarily argues that Galsworthy constructed the abusive Forsyte home as a middle
ground—neither negative nor positive from a gender standpoint—the critic adds: "[The
Man of Property's] focus was not on the unequal status of women; rather, it was on the
inequality of social institutions, which conspired to impede and hold in place regressive
social relationships. Thus, the critical attitude of the novel lay in the way it challenged the
man-made laws and institutions of society" (228-229). Taking a slightly different
approach, this chapter illustrates that Galsworthy combined both foci on "the unequal
status of women" and "man-made laws" by attacking the marital rape exemption.
Well into a loveless marriage in The Man of Property, Irene locks Soames out of
their bedroom for weeks, and he responds by exercising his conjugal right to rape her
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"consensually." In 1906 the narrator could not present the assault but could show the
perpetrator's reaction the next morning:
He was strangely haunted by the recollection of her face, from before
which, to soothe her, he had tried to pull her hands—of her terrible
smothered sobbing, the like of which he had never heard, and still seemed
to hear; and he was still haunted by the odd, intolerable feeling of remorse
and shame he had felt, as he stood looking at her by the flame of the single
candle, before silently slinking away.
And somehow, now that he had acted like this, he was surprised at
himself…
One thought comforted him: No one would know—it was not the
sort of thing that she would speak about…
those nightmare-like doubts began to assume less extravagant
importance at the back of his mind. The incident was really not of great
moment; women made a fuss about it in books; but in the cool judgment
of right-thinking men, of men of the world, of such as he recollected often
received praise in the Divorce Court, he had but done his best to sustain
the sanctity of marriage, to prevent her from abandoning her duty. (249251)
With his last comment, Soames counters Flo and echoes Mivart. However, unlike
Grandcourt and Philip, Soames is not such a callous husband that he is unaffected by
abuse, although he usually focuses on his alleged suffering at the hands of his wife—
rarely the other way around. Soames knows that fiction increasingly criticizes the marital
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rape exemption—"women made a fuss about it in books"—but fortunately for him, this
activism has not yet shifted policy. Because the socio-legal view states that Irene gave
her prior consent so that "she did belong to him" physically and "it was her duty, her duty
as a wife" to comply sexually, Soames reassures himself that her current traumatic
reaction must be because "she was evidently not quite right in her head!" (276) Since
sexual marital abuse is not legal cruelty, the narrator sarcastically reports through free
indirect discourse, John Bull and similar "right-thinking men…[who] often received
praise in the Divorce Court" would agree.
The narrator views sexual marital abuse as rape. The narrator shows this as
Soames commutes to work: "the smothered sobbing still haunted him, so he opened The
Times…He read of as many as eleven—a surprisingly high number—rapes…And still,
inseparable from his reading, was the memory of Irene's tear-stained face, and the sounds
from her broken heart" (251). Unable in 1906 to use the term "rape" during Soames's
attack on Irene, the narrator uses it while making Soames read about other rapes after his
own attack. Soames's rape—first described with Irene's "smothered sobbing" and then
with "the memory of Irene's tear-stained face, and the sounds from her broken heart"—
bookend Soames reading other rape reports. In fact, Soames's rape is "inseparable from
his reading" of the rapes. As Soames callously reads about rapes in England, the narrator
twists the knife in his own callous readers who are simultaneously reading about
Soames's marital rape. Soames ignorantly views 11 rapes as "a surprisingly high
number," but with sexual marital abuse legal and this perpetrator unwilling to add his
own assault to the list, the narrator shows that 11 does not begin to represent the actual
number of raped wives.
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Soames maintains 12 years later in In Chancery his warped but legal view of
"consent." To him, there was and is nothing wrong that he can do to Irene because on her
wedding day, she consented to all of his potential actions: "'Irene's my wife,' he thought,
'my legal wife. I have done nothing to put her away from me" (438). Due to Irene's
consent, Soames sees himself in the fin de siècle: "in a damnable position. Hers is what
she made for herself; mine what she made for me'" (434). He threatens resuming
cohabitation and sexual rights, and because of her prior consent, Irene can do little about
it. Like the felon depicted by the anonymous nonfiction writer, Soames surprises his wife
in her secret residence to declare: "let bygones be bygones. If I can, surely you might.
Let's begin again, as if nothing had been" (454). For Soames, reliant upon Hale, his
marital rape was nothing—a legal nonentity. As the owner of homes and land, Soames
wants to regain another possession, which offers an appealing sexual reentry that the
world would ignore: "Why should he be put to the shifts and the sordid disgraces and the
lurking defeats of the Divorce Court, when there she was like an empty house only
waiting to be retaken into use and possession by him who legally owned her? To one so
secretive as Soames the thought of re-entry into quiet possession of his own property with
nothing given away to the world was intensely alluring" (438-439). After Irene reminds
him that she did not consent the night of the rape and will not risk more assaults, Soames
cannot comprehend her trauma: "Was it possible that there could be such relentless
unforgiveness! Could that one act of violent possession be still alive within her? Did it
bar him thus utterly?" (455) Even 12 years into their separation, Irene, as Soames's lawful
possession, does not have this right to "bar him." Soames audaciously desires a son, who
would be the product of rape. For Irene, like Gwendolen and Flo, bearing that child
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would be the final horror, so she bluntly responds that she "would rather die" (455). Thus,
Eliot, Egerton, and Galsworthys' fiction depicts marital rape in increasingly blunt terms
but stops at producing characters conceived of those rapes.
After Soames gives up and divorces Irene, she marries his progressive cousin
Jolyon, Galsworthy's stand-in, a self-described feminist and the new century's voice on
consent and marital rape. In a letter to their son, Jolyon echoes Flo and Allen by speaking
about Irene's "consent" 15 years prior, answering Wolstenholme Elmy's call in the
process:
most girls are married ignorant of the sexual side of life. That's the crux. It
is this actual lack of experience…which makes all the difference and all
the trouble…in [some] cases, and your mother's was one, [consummation]
is a revelation of mistake, a destruction of such attraction as there was.
There is nothing more tragic in a woman's life than such a revelation,
growing daily, nightly clearer. Coarse-grained and unthinking people are
apt to laugh at such a mistake, and say, "What a fuss about nothing!"
Narrow and self-righteous people…are apt to condemn those who make
this tragic error, to condemn them for life to the dungeons they have made
for themselves. You know the expression: "She has made her bed, she
must lie on it!"…the world judges she was in error, he within his
rights…She was his property." (788-789)
These "Narrow and self-righteous people" are the Grandcourts of the world. To fight
them, Jolyon states the narrator's thesis: Virginal brides who give their consent to marital
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sex are ignorant of that to which they consent, yet England considers their consent
meaningful and forces them to remain, sometimes abused, in their beds.
By 1920, Galsworthy's audience was willing to censure at least some of the sociolegal causes of Victorian marital abuse. In particular, his readers were gradually coming
around on the marital rape exemption. Still this was to little avail. Beginning in the midnineteenth century, Eliot had dedicated her fiction to physically, emotionally, and
sexually abused wives in the middle and upper classes, which helped prompt more overt
efforts by Egerton in the fin de siècle and Galsworthy in the early twentieth century. In
particular, the three formed a dialogue about and force against consent and sexual marital
abuse. However, England did not completely pay heed to these authors and other activists
until the end of Galsworthy's century. Specifically, England waited until 1991 to overturn
its marital rape exemption.104
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In R. v. R., a wife separated from her husband and moved to her family's home. Her
husband then lied by phone that he would seek a divorce but broke into the house and
raped her. He initially pled guilty. The marital rape exemption was finally overturned,
though, because the wife's decision to separate from her husband was seen as a
revocation of marital consent, with her husband's lie and break-in additionally viewed as
devious sexual intents. The husband later appealed in the House of Lords and, sans irony,
the European Court of Human Rights but to no avail.
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CHAPTER 6. LITERARY CASE STUDY OF LADY LAURA KENNEDY'S
SEPARATION: ANTHONY TROLLOPE AND RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL
RIGHTS

For a Victorian wife, Anthony Trollope's heroine, Lady Laura Kennedy, née
Standish, speaks surprisingly forthrightly to her husband Robert Kennedy in the second
and fourth novels, Phineas Finn: The Irish Member (1869) and Phineas Redux (1873), of
Trollope's Palliser series.105 The couple's dialogue indicates Kennedy's disapproval of
Lady Laura's frankness about gender equality in marriage:
"There are moments, Robert, when even a married woman must be herself
rather than her husband's wife. It is so, though you cannot understand it."
"I certainly do not understand it."
"You cannot make a woman subject to you as a dog is so." (P.F. 2:
20)
This chapter examines Lady Laura's attempt to retract her marital consent through
desertion, which provokes Kennedy to contemplate filing for restitution of conjugal rights.
A successful restitution suit forced a deserting spouse to reenter the home, regardless of
extenuating circumstances, and has only been studied by a handful of historians: Olive
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In his Autobiography Trollope considers Phineas Finn and Phineas Redux "one novel"
(Autobiography 265).
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Anderson, John M. Biggs, Maeve E. Doggett, and Mary Lyndon Shanley.106 The Phineas
novels have been studied less, with restitution entirely ignored in them. This chapter,
though, argues that Trollope decries that Lady Laura must "re-consent" to her unhappy
marriage. In Phineas Redux she grieves: "it can't be right that a woman should pretend to
love a man whom she loathes. I couldn't live with him" (P.R. 139). Through Lady Laura,
Trollope shows that rights—specifically conjugal rights—are precisely the problem in
nineteenth-century England.
Restitution of Conjugal Rights
Eighteenth-century precedent enabled nineteenth-century suits for restitution of
conjugal rights. In A New Abridgment of the Law (1736) lawyer Matthew Bacon reports:
"The Husband hath by Law Power and Dominion over his Wife, and may keep her by
Force within the Bounds of Duty…he has by Law a Right to the Custody of her, and may,
if he think fit, confine her" (285). Professor, lawyer, and judge William Blackstone also
speaks of this power in Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765): "the courts of law
will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross
misbehaviour" (433). Yet in practice, zealous husbands did not necessarily need to wait
for or prove misbehavior from their wives.
As a result, scores of British spouses filed for restitution throughout almost all of
the nineteenth century. Wives filed most restitution suits for financial support, usually
after their husbands had absconded from their homes and left their families without
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Anderson presents a thorough history of restitution. Biggs reports most importantly on
legal cruelty as a female defense against restitution suits. Doggett looks at restitution in
the context of physical marital abuse. Shanley assesses how proto-feminists ended
restitution and enabled wives to control their own bodies.
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viable breadwinners.107 Yet in the smaller number of cases when husbands filed for
restitution, the situation could be tragic in a different way. If husbands had legally abused
their wives physically, emotionally, and/or sexually and wives fled because they lacked
other options, husbands could turn to the courts to sue for restitution. While restitution of
conjugal rights did not signify sexual services per se, it did require a spouse's permanent
presence in the home, and since abusive husbands owned their wives' bodies via
coverture, their suits would almost certainly indicate their determination to continue
abuse. Also, in restitution cases throughout most of the century, courts did not accept
claims of abuse as defenses of marital desertion. If a restitution suit were granted, abused
wives had two options throughout most of the century: obey decrees to return to their
husbands' homes or sit in jail indefinitely, termed "attachment."108 Just as wives
"consented" to abuse in the first place, then, they usually had to "consent" to its renewal,
whether sooner or later. Further, the press reported enthusiastically about restitution suits,
adding public humiliation to spousal abuse.
Few British feminists criticized restitution. In 1854 Barbara Leigh Smith
Bodichon released A Brief Summary, in Plain Language, of the Most Important Laws of
England Concerning Women, Together with a Few Observations Thereon, in which she
briefly condemns physical ownership: "a married woman's body belongs to her husband;
she is in his custody, and he can enforce his right by a writ of habeas corpus" (10). By
1878, activist Annie Besant used Marriage, As It Was, As It Is, and As It Should Be: A
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British wives filed about 70% of restitution cases throughout the early- and middlenineteenth century and a little over 85% toward the end of the Victorian period.
108
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1884 provided spouses with immediate judicial
separations—not jail time—if they deserted and were subject to restitution suits.
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Plea for Reform to speak more forcefully about restitution. She was appalled by "those
odious suits for 'restitution of conjugal rights' which occasionally disgrace our courts"
(48-49). Assessing the overall legal status of Victorian wives, Besant likens them to
inmates: "Coming to the second 'right,' of 'personal liberty,' we find that a married
woman has no such right…a husband may legally act as his wife's gaoler" (14), and "the
husband has the right of…imprisoning her" (19). Then in frankly sexual language Besant
calls it like she sees it: "It is difficult to understand how any man or woman, endued with
the most rudimentary sense of decency, can bring such a suit, and, after having succeeded,
can enforce the decision…the enforcement on an unwilling man or woman of conjugal
rights is…legalised rape" (49). This was tragically true for scores of abused Victorian
wives hauled back into their husbands' homes after successful restitution suits.
Phineas Finn, Phineas Redux, and Restitution of Conjugal Rights
As both a son and later a father of lawyers and as a Liberal candidate himself for
the House of Commons, Trollope was familiar with the law and gender discrimination.
The Woman Question was particularly pressing for him in his writings. In Phineas Finn
(set from 1863-1867 and serialized from 1867-1868) Lady Laura, the 25-year-old
daughter of an earl and cabinet minister, ignores her love for her best friend and politician,
Phineas Finn, and lovelessly marries Kennedy, 43, to do political good via his position as
an aristocrat and cabinet minister. Immediately, Kennedy abusively controls her.
Following Lady Laura's desertion, Kennedy ponders a suit for restitution to return her to
his home, which causes her to flee England and its consent laws. This restitution plot
continues unresolved into Phineas Redux (set from 1869-1871 and serialized from 18731874). All along, Lady Laura mouths some of Trollope's views about gender and marital
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oppression, perhaps not coincidentally leading the author to name her "the best character
in Phineas Finn and its sequel Phineas Redux" (Autobiography 265). Besides some
treatments of politics and Ireland, not much scholarship exists on the Phineas novels,
with even less paid to the Kennedy union. In contrast to appropriate assessments of the
marriage by Ramona L. Denton, Christoph Lindner, and Deborah Denenholz Morse,109
John Halperin, Jane Nardin, Robert M. Polhemus, and Priscilla L. Walton see Lady Laura
as responsible for her marital discord and suffering.110 Yet this chapter points out that
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According to Denton, Trollope wrote the Phineas novels to assert that when women
marry for reasons other than love, they will be punished with unhappiness. Lindner
reveals that while Trollope criticizes the commodification of women in the marriage
market, the novelist cannot prevent the social difficulties endured by women who resist
their commodified status. Morse argues that although Lady Laura married for money and
power, Trollope views her as "more sinned against than sinning" (50), and her marital
trauma, which stems partly from her deceased mother, her patriarchal father, and the
simultaneously socially reflective and controlling law, provokes the novelist to advocate
for equal marriages.
110
Ignoring that Kennedy's possessiveness becomes obsession, Halperin believes that
Lady Laura works for Phineas's career "to the point of driving her husband insane with
jealousy" (105). Further, the critic sounds Victorian when asserting, "she ought to be a
mother and have a family" (105), though Lady Laura loathes the potential father of her
children.
Nardin ignores Kennedy's abuse by asserting, "Laura's love for Phineas was
indeed the reason why her marriage disintegrated" (54). Then Nardin, like Kennedy,
asserts that Lady Laura should endure the marriage because of her unretractable "vows"
of consent:
If Laura pretends to love Kennedy, she will be guilty of dishonesty, and if
she leaves him, she will violate her marriage vows. Common morality
directs people who find themselves in such situations to choose the lesser
evil, since some moral principle must be violated whatever they decide to
do.
In this case, it seems clear that Laura ought to confine the evil
consequences of her own mistake, as far as possible, to herself. She should
stay with Kennedy, whatever the cost to her own feelings. For if she seeks
relief by leaving her husband, she will bring suffering and scandal upon
him…
Confronted with a choice between two wrongs, Laura simply takes
the course that is least unpleasant for herself. She claims that her motive is
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with his sustained discussion in Phineas Finn and Phineas Redux, Trollope was the only
Victorian novelist to plot restitution and, in doing so, the only to criticize the husbands
who employed it.
In Phineas Finn Robert controls Lady Laura's daily life to the point of abuse.
Because "Lady Laura was a possession in the hands of Mr. Kennedy" (P.F. 1: 299), the
narrator declares that Kennedy maintains "tyranny" (P.F. 1: 208) and "masterdom" as "an
autocrat in his own house" (P.F. 1: 302) so that he "made her feel that her lord and master
was—her lord and master" (P.F. 1: 208). While all British wives were legal possessions
in the 1860s, Kennedy particularly isolates Lady Laura at his country house in Scotland,
so she sighs to Phineas: "A woman is wretched if she does not love her husband, but I
fancy that a man gets on very well without any such feeling. She cannot domineer over
you. She cannot expect you to pluck yourself out of your own soil, and begin a new
growth altogether in accordance with the laws of her own. It was that which Mr. Kennedy
did" (P.F. 2: 291). Indeed, this Scottish house becomes a jail: "I see nobody there, and
the house is like a prison…everything would be stiff, and cold, and uncomfortable" (P.F.
an unwillingness to violate common morality's prohibition against lying.
Yet she is quite willing to violate the rule that forbids one to break a freely
given promise. (54)
Here contemporary criticism replicates Victorian rhetoric by blaming the victim.
Polhemus does not rebuke Laura, but he sees the "sexis[t]" novelist doing so:
there is a male lack of sympathy for her, beginning with Trollope himself, that reeks of
institutionalized sexism…She breaks the prime commandment of Victorian erotic faith
by marrying a man she does not love and loving a man she does not marry…Her being
and history express the ruthless prejudice that a wife finally must be seen to love, honor,
and obey" (213). In claiming Trollope's condemnation, Polhemus ignores the author's
inclusion of Kennedy's abuse and Laura's refusal to "obey" his threat of restitution, which
generates "sympathy" and justification for Laura's love of Phineas.
Walton also avoids abuse and restitution and sees Lady Laura as responsible for
her marital breakdown: "Laura loves Phineas, and it is her love that proves to be her
downfall" (60). Again, a modern scholar sounds antiquated by reproaching the victim.
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2: 164). At one point, Lady Laura admits of her jailer, "I know that I am [afraid of him]"
(P.F. 1: 306). With that, the narrator reveals that Kennedy takes Victorian marital control
to the extreme.
Because of Lady Laura's wedding-day consent, the law does not view Kennedy's
treatment as cruelty. After one dispute, Kennedy reminds his wife of his rights:
"if there be a difference of opinion between you and me as to any question
of social intercourse, it will be better that you should consent to adopt my
opinion."
"You have the law on your side…"
"As far as I understand the position of a man and wife in this
country, there is no other way." (P.F. 2: 113-114)
As such, Lady Laura almost prays that Kennedy would abuse her to the detriment of her
long-term physical health—"Beating might often be a mercy" (P.F. 2: 158)—so that she
could qualify for a judicial separation or divorce. Referring to her wedding-day consent,
Lady Laura thinks, "this [is] the life which she had procured for herself by marrying Mr.
Kennedy" (P.F. 1: 212), though she tries to keep this self-accusation at bay, only
exploring in her dreams "what might have been her happiness had she kept herself free
from those terrible bonds in which she was now held a prisoner" (P.F. 2: 156-157). The
abused but "not abused" wife desperately cries of her legal situation: "There is nothing to
be done…I have before me no escape, no hope, no prospect of relief, no place of
consolation" (P.F. 2: 168). Phineas, too, realizes that in the eyes of their contemporaries,
responsibility for this abuse legally falls back on Lady Laura, so he can only shrug: "that,
however, was now past remedy, and she must simply endure the mode of life which she
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had prepared for herself…Lady Laura must bear it, as it was borne by many other
married women" (P.F. 1: 342). Here, then, the narrator begins using Phineas Finn's
abused wife to extend this consent argument to all similarly situated British wives.
Lady Laura's consent infects her with misery. She succinctly declares: "It is all
sorrow. There is nothing but sorrow" (P.F. 2: 243). She carries this sorrow alone since
"To be simply miserable, as I am, is nothing to the world" (P.F. 2: 156). Lady Laura's
fading looks and premature aging worsen in proportion to her misery throughout the
novel, culminating with her flirtation with drowning:
The dark cloud created by the entire truth was upon her, making
everything black and wretched around her. She had asked herself a
question or two, and had discovered that she had no love for her husband,
that the kind of life which he intended to exact from her was insupportable
to her, and that she had blundered and fallen…she would be deserted by
everyone, except of course by her husband; and then—Then she would
throw herself on some early morning in to the lake, for life would be
insupportable. (P.F. 1: 309)
Because of consent law, suicide seems to be Lady Laura's only feasible way to exit this
marriage.
Yet Lady Laura ultimately chooses desertion to stop "consensual" marital abuse.
While recognizing that she will scandalize society, Lady Laura admits, "It is very bad,—
but not so bad, I think, as the life I am now leading…How is it possible that a woman
should live with such a man?" (P.F. 2: 243-244) She moves to a different location in
England, and the narrator appropriately writes that because Lady Laura was under gender
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and marital "persecution from her husband" (P.F. 2: 289) and government, she now seeks
"asylum" (P.F. 2: 245) with her father. With this, the narrator successfully gets the reader
to support Lady Laura's illegal effort to escape legal abuse.
The narrator then has Kennedy enter the unpleasant territory of restitution of
conjugal rights. Bluntly, Kennedy contemplates a suit because: "it must be so. The laws
of God require it, and the laws of man permit it" (P.F. 2: 281). The narrator scornfully
indicates that for the abusive and thereby "weak" Kennedy, restitution of conjugal rights
boils down to a power issue: "He had that great desire to enjoy his full rights, so strong in
the minds of weak, ambitious men, and he had told himself that a wife's obedience was
one of those rights which he could not abandon without injury to his self-esteem" (P.F. 2:
114). Further, Kennedy reveals himself as proudly self-righteous about restitution:
he would have no alternative but to seek redress at law. "I have done
nothing to my wife," said he, "of which I need be ashamed. It will be sad,
no doubt, to have all our affairs bandied about in court, and made the
subject of comment in newspapers, but a man must go through that, or
worse than that, in the vindication of his rights, and for the performance of
his duty to his Maker." That very day Mr. Kennedy went to his lawyer,
and desired that steps might be taken for the restitution to him of his
conjugal rights. (P.F. 2: 285)111
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In its 1869 review of Phineas Finn, The Spectator: A Weekly Review of Politics,
Literature, Theology, and Art criticizes Kennedy's abuse and restitution and then cheekily
commends Trollope for injuring the husband in (unrelated but retributive) street violence:
"Mr. Kennedy, with his terrible unconscious tyrannies, and his 'suit for restitution of
conjugal rights' after his wife had deserted him, is as wonderful a picture as Mr. Trollope
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Thus, the narrator shames this absurd Victorian rationale behind an absurd Victorian law.
In siding against Kennedy, the narrator sides with Lady Laura, sympathetically
presenting her reaction to restitution. Lady Laura, legally like an animal corralled at its
owner's will, fights the good fight alone: "Whether there be law in the land to protect me
or whether there be none, I will never live with him…Is a woman like a head of cattle,
that she can be fastened in her crib by force? I will never live with him though all the
judges of the land should decide that I must do so" (P.F. 2: 303). Given her earlier
suicidal thoughts, she believes that a successful restitution suit would result in her death,
so she must revoke her "vow" of consent to save her life: "'It can never be,' said Lady
Laura, shuddering;—'never, never, never!…not even for the sake of my vow, will I
endeavour to live with him. His presence would kill me!'" (P.F. 2: 285) With her limited
options, Lady Laura instead chooses social death as "a woman banished out of England"
(P.F. 2: 293). Revealing her plan to avoid British consent by fleeing to Dresden, she
laments to Phineas, "I am crushed and quelled by my position…I am a nobody,—or
worse than nobody" (P.F. 2: 347). Indeed, as a Victorian wife, Lady Laura is a nobody—
a feme covert under the law—and as an abused Victorian wife and the subject of a suit for
restitution, she is even more defenseless. With the outraged and saddened Lady Laura
escaping her consent and anticipating separation from family, friends, and the English
way of life, the narrator provides the most progressive commentary yet about restitution.
Two years later in Phineas Redux Kennedy has become obsessed about Lady
Laura's consent. He is prone to asking anyone and everyone rhetorical questions about

has yet drawn. It was a great idea, in itself, to conceive an attempt made to garotte such a
man as this" ("Phineas Finn" 357).
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Lady Laura's "vows" of consent, such as, "Is it false to say that she is my wife, and
cannot desert me, as she has done, without breaking her vows, and disregarding the laws
both of God and man? Am I false when I say that I gave her no cause?" (P.R. 166)
"Duty," Kennedy's code for consent, is a running theme: "Whatever may be her feelings,
or mine, her duty demands her presence here" (P.R. 68). Kennedy has simultaneously
become obsessed about restitution, legally correct in criticizing his wife as "a renegade
from the law" (P.R. 167). He frequently blasts foreign extradition rules that keep him
from enjoying English rights: "Were the laws of Europe sufficiently explicit and
intelligible I should force her to return to my house,—because she sins while she remains
away, and I should sin were I to omit to use any means which the law might place in my
hands for the due control of my own wife" (P.R. 68). Additionally, the self-pitying
Kennedy claims that Lady Laura is killing him, failing to recognize that he started and
exacerbates his fanaticism about her "vow" of consent: "In spite of her wickedness, her
cruelty, her misconduct, which had brought him,—as he now said,—to the verge of the
grave, he would still give her shelter and room for repentance. He recognized his vows,
though she did not…he was sufficiently his own master…to maintain his claim upon his
wife's person. Let her return to him first of all!" (P.R. 369) Because this is all that
Kennedy spends Phineas Redux thinking about and working toward, he dwindles to such
a one-dimensional character that he only acts as the novel's proponent of restitution.
Indeed, Kennedy's obsession becomes madness, which he admits to Phineas: "You find
me a much altered man…It is trouble of the mind,—not of the body, Mr Finn. It is her
doing…When I married a wife, she became bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh. Can
I lose my bones and my flesh,—knowing that they are not with God but still subject
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elsewhere to the snares of the devil, and live as though I were a sound man?" (P.R. 72) In
their next conversation about consent and restitution the insane Kennedy gets so agitated
that he shoots at Phineas. To underscore where his loyalties lie, the narrator then punishes
the dangerous husband by weakening him socially, politically, and economically, from
which he never recovers.
By publishing a treatise about restitution in the People's Banner, Kennedy riles up
the British press about consent, so they become complicit in exerting England's
restitution pressure on a lone wife. Kennedy admits to writing so "that public opinion, if
loudly expressed, would have an effect both upon her and upon her father" (P.R. 161).
Editor Quintus Slide tells Phineas that he has taken Kennedy's restitution campaign as his
own morality crusade, so the narrator dooms Slide as one of the novel's principal villains,
garnering more sympathy for Lady Laura in the process:
The morale of our aristocracy,—what you call the Upper Ten,—would be
at a low ebb indeed if the public press didn't act as their guardians…We
go in for morals and purity of life, and we mean to do our duty by the
public without fear or favour…Purity of morals, Finn;—punishment for
the guilty;—defence for the innocent;—support for the weak;—safety for
the oppressed;—and a rod of iron for the oppressors! (P.R. 161)
Slide's morality is warped: He suggests that wives devoid of rights are "the
guilty…oppressors" in need of "punishment" and "a rod of iron," while abusive husbands
seeking to enforce wives' consent to conjugal rights are the "innocent," "weak," and
"oppressed" in need of "defence," "support," and "safety." In an unexpected turn for a
newspaper editor, Slide even offers to bury this salacious campaign if Phineas convinces
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Lady Laura to re-embrace her consent: "Morals! Morals! We shall be able to say that
we've done our best to promote domestic virtue and secure forgiveness for an erring
wife…virtue will be its own reward" (P.R. 163-164). By attempting to regain "morals"
and "domestic virtue" for Kennedy, Slide does not acknowledge that his pressure on and
invasion of privacy against Lady Laura may be immoral. Even near the end of Phineas
Redux, Slide stalwartly stands by Kennedy and against Lady Laura on consent and
restitution, libelously writing to British readers that the husband "had been driven to
madness by wrongs inflicted on him in his dearest and nearest family relations" (P.R.
309). Blasted for months by powerful male voices in Scotland and England and socially
restricted from speaking in her own defense, Lady Laura cannot win this war of consent
rhetoric in the court of public opinion.
As a result, at the end of Phineas Redux, consent and restitution have permanently
ruined the heroine. The expatriate has lost her social position: "In place of the seclusion
of Dresden, there would be the seclusion of Portman Square or of Saulsby. Who would
care to have me at their houses, or to come to mine?…I am as much lost to the people
who did know me in London as though I had been buried for a century" (P.R. 85). For her
comparative safety in Dresden, Lady Laura has paid an emotional price. She is
particularly burdened with guilt about her father's voluntarily exile: "I and my father live
here a sad, sombre, solitary life together…all this has come upon him because of me…we
vanished…I and my poor father became as it were outcasts" (P.R. 49-50). This stress
shows. The reader is frequently reminded that Lady Laura, having lost her youth and
beauty, is "worn out, withered, an old woman before her time" (P.R. 360). Reviewing
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their two-year banishment, Lady Laura looks bleakly at her future, according to the
narrator:
It is a very sad thing for any human being to have to say to himself,—with
an earnest belief in his own assertion,—that all the joy of this world is
over for him; and is the sadder because such conviction is apt to exclude
the hope of other joy. This woman had said so to herself very often during
the last two years, and had certainly been sincere. What was there in store
for her? She was banished from the society of all those she
liked…Nothing in life had any taste for her. All of the joys of the world
were over,—and had been lost by her own fault. (P.R. 499)
Lady Laura consistently self-flagellates like this because she lost those "joys" by
consenting to marry a man who she should have recognized as potentially abusive:
"though she had felt him to be a tyrant and herself to be a thrall; though the sermons, and
the lessons, and the doctor had each, severally, seemed to her, to be horrible cruelties; yet
she had known through it all that the fault had been hers, and not his. He only did that
which she should have expected when she married him" (P.R. 499). Countering this selfcriticism, though, the narrator uses the Phineas novels to argue that since Lady Laura did
not anticipate the abuse to which she "consented," her consent should be rendered null
and void. The narrator's position is twofold: that his non-consenting heroine should never
live in Kennedy's abusive home again or put her life on hold to avoid his attempt to
reinstate her to that home. Even after Kennedy mercifully dies, freeing Lady Laura in the
process, still "for her was left nothing but [life's] dregs" (P.R. 501). She has nowhere to
go and nothing to do but spend the remainder of her life in a new exile—this time in the

151
British countryside—with her declining father. Just 32, Lady Laura sighs, "I suppose that
everything is over for me,—as though I were an old woman, going down into the grave,
but at my time of life I find it hard to believe that it must be so" (P.R. 549-550). In the
tragic penultimate paragraph of Phineas Redux, the narrator reports that "poor Lady
Laura" still lives "the life of a recluse" (P.R. 569), never receiving peace or closure.
After using Lady Laura in Phineas Finn to represent unhappy wives, the narrator
maintains that strategy in Phineas Redux. Lady Laura's friend, Lady Violet Chiltern,
poignantly echoes the narrator: "Poor Laura, indeed! When one sees such a shipwreck it
makes a woman doubt whether she ought to marry at all" (P.R. 28). The narrator here
advises female readers to think long and hard before proffering their marital consent.
Once given, it was nearly impossible to retract, regardless of the condition of marital
homes. The narrator completes this argument by the close of the novel. He asserts that
"consenting" wives who had been subject to abuse and restitution cases were caught
between a rock and a hard place—tortured if they remained in their homes but outcast if
they fled them. Tragically, this remained the case until the twilight of the Victorian
period when England ended restitution of conjugal rights in 1891.112
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The 1891 case of Regina ("The Queen") v. Jackson, also known as "the Clitheroe
Case" because of Clitheroe parties Edmund and Emily Jackson, effectively ended the
practice of restitution of conjugal rights. After Emily Hall Jackson deserted the home,
Edmund Jackson filed an 1889 restitution suit, which failed to obtain his intended
purpose. Thus, in 1891 he took the law into his own hands. As his wife left a church
service, Mr. Jackson and two other men kidnapped and returned her to his home,
roughing her up in the process, and forbade access to her family, friends, and lawyer for
days. The case went to trial for assault.
In general, judges Lord Halsbury and Lord Esher were progressive.
Uncharacteristic in legal writing, they both admit to outrage, which Halsbury
exemplifies: "I confess to regarding with something like indignation the statement of the
facts of this case, and the absence of a due sense of the delicacy and respect due to a wife
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whom the husband has sworn to cherish and protect" ("The Queen v. Jackson" 681).
Reflecting on differing interpretations of past and present English law, Halsbury and
Esher also echo Bodichon and Besant's language, which Esher demonstrates: "It was said
that by the law of England the husband has the custody of his wife. What must be meant
by 'custody' in that proposition so used to us? It must mean the same sort of custody as a
gaoler has of a prisoner…it is not and never was the law of England that the husband has
such a right of seizing and imprisoning the wife" ("The Queen v. Jackson" 682-684).
While both judges side with Mrs. Jackson, they include a conservative caveat, elucidated
by Halsbury:
I do not mean to lay it down as the law that there may not be some acts,
acts of proximate approach to some misconduct, which might give the
husband some right of physical interference with the wife's freedom—for
instance, if the wife were on the staircase about to join some person with
whom she intended to elope, I could understand that there might be to
some extent a right to restrain the wife…I can understand that some
authority on the part of the husband of such a nature and so limited might
well be justified according to any system of reasonable law. ("The Queen
v. Jackson" 679-680)
While the judges struck down restitution, Mrs. Jackson, lacking grounds for divorce, had
to remain married. Even worse, restitution of conjugal rights was not officially taken off
the books in England until the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act in 1970.
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CHAPTER 7. FEMES SOLE AND DIVORCE: "IF YOU DON'T WANT TO LIVE
WITH HIM ANY MORE YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO LEAVE HIM"

After feminist and novelist Mona Caird published her provocative essay
"Marriage" in the Westminster Review in 1888, the editor of the Daily Telegraph solicited
public reactions and received 27,000 letters. Later that year, he published a selection in Is
Marriage a Failure?, which includes a pitiful communication signed by "A Working
Woman" desperate for a divorce:
I regret to say we had not been wedded a month when he threw off the
cloak, and, to my horror, I discovered that he was a drunkard…A brokenhearted, forsaken wife, I resolved to leave him. We have lived apart now
for the last ten years, but I am still his wife, just as much as I was when we
were first married. I know he is living in adultery with another woman, but
a divorce I cannot get because I have not the means. I am like a bird
beating her wings against the bars of the cage, and there is no
escape…There are hundreds of our poor unfortunate sisters who are
dragging out a lonely, miserable existence, because they have not the
means to do otherwise. If there was a divorce law within the reach of the
poor, there are many who would avail themselves of it. As it is, life is not
worth living. (Quilter 36-37)
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The unknown writer did not have the means for two reasons: Her husband had not
committed two necessary offences, and most working-class wages could not cover
divorce cases. Tragically, as historians of nineteenth-century British divorce have
recounted, this story by "A Working Woman" was common.113
To add to that scholarship, this chapter assesses divorce through the lens of
consent. After the 1857 passage of An Act to amend the Law relating to Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes in England (called the Matrimonial Causes Act, or MCA), women
received their first significant opportunity to retract the perceived most important consent
of their lives—their marital consent. Granted, because husbands could file for adultery
alone but wives had to file for adultery plus another offense, most women could not get
divorces. For those who did, retraction provided liberty but at a price: They usually
suffered social stigma, separation from family and friends, and/or financial strain.
However, divorce provided femes sole with freedom to remarry, work, and travel, so
women had to weigh its consequences against its benefits.
For the most part, women who retracted were stigmatized in and out of literature,
so fictional depictions reflect the anxieties and problems of the real world. In the decades
leading up to 1857, nineteenth-century novels discussed retraction sparingly, utilizing
England's divorce law dating to the Reformation. This chapter assesses post-1857 novels
whose main, nineteenth-century British female characters initially consent in marriage

113

See Olive Anderson, Stuart Anderson, John D. Baird, Elizabeth Foyster, Colin S.
Gibson, A. James Hammerton, Lee Holcombe, Allen Horstman, Barbara Leckie, O. R.
McGregor, Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Roderick Phillips, Mary Poovey, Rebecca Probert,
Gail L. Savage, Mary Lyndon Shanley, Dorothy M. Stetson, Lawrence Stone, Ian Ward,
Sybil Wolfram, and Margaret K. Woodhouse.

155
before retracting and divorcing with the MCA.114 This switch occurs midway through the
novel so that the reader views the benefits and disadvantages of the women's statuses as
wives and then divorcées.115 This chapter, then, has three foci: East Lynne (1861), one of
England's first sensation novels, by Ellen Price Wood as "Mrs. Henry Wood"; A
Mummer's Wife (1884), England's only naturalist novel, by George Moore; and Jude the
Obscure (1895), a high realist novel by Thomas Hardy.116 Anne Humpherys produced the
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Because they do not rely upon the MCA, this chapter cannot assess John Lang's The
Ex-Wife (written in 1856 but published in 1858) and Emma Robinson's Mauleverer's
Divorce: A Story of Woman's Wrongs (set in the 1840s but published in 1858).
115
This chapter also cannot assess women in five other novels. In The Law of Divorce
(1861) the anonymous Graduate of Oxford only presents his heroine as a divorcée. Ouida
(Maria Louise Ramé) writes her heroine's divorce in the final pages of Moths (1880). In
The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) Oscar Wilde presents the wife once, and then her
divorce occurs near the novel's close. In A Choice of Evils (1894) by Mrs. Alexander
(Annie French Hector), the reader does not get to know the novel's divorcée, an
insignificant character. In In the Year of Jubilee (1894) George Gissing only presents the
woman in question, a secondary character, as a divorcée.
116
Although briefly correspondents, Moore and Hardy loathed one another. Moore fired
the first shots. In his semi-autobiographical Confessions of a Young Man (1888), he
complains, "'Far from the Madding Crowd' [sic] discovered the fact to me that Mr. Hardy
was but one of George Eliot's miscarriages" (Confessions 211). In "Half a Dozen Pictures
in the Academy" (1893) Moore classifies Tess of the d'Urbervilles: A Pure Woman as
"bundles of little anecdotes ununited by a philosophic idea, and therefore (to me) void of
artistic interest" ("Half" 73).
In 1922, Hardy dictated letters to his second wife, Florence Emily Dugdale Hardy,
to clarify a plot point: "This is inaccurate…G. Moore's 'Confessions' [sic] originated the
untruth" (Letters 6: 155).
Moore told a correspondent in a 1923 letter, "Mr. Hardy's novels were merely
melodramatic stories, ill-constructed and ill-written" (Parnassus 645). In his semiautobiographical Conversations in Ebury Street (1924), Moore asserts of prose in history,
"Mr. Hardy has written the worst" (Conversations 118). Then he cleverly imagines
Hardy's afterlife:
he may be saved from invidious familiarity when he advances to meet our
God, for never having known him on earth he may, when he steps from
Charon's boat, ask the God to point out his (Mr. Hardy's) seat to him; or it
may be that he will seek his seat himself, and not finding it next to
Shakespeare or Aeschylus, he will return and complain to Apollo, who
will ask: Who is this one? A messenger will answer: This is Hardy, the
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only studies of Victorian novels featuring divorce via the MCA, particularly bringing to
attention some obscure texts.117 While Humpherys contends, "Not until the 1880s…did

author of Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure. And the author
of these absurd works, the God will reply, would place himself next to
Aeschylus and Shakespeare! The messenger will answer: he has listened
long to the quackers that beset the shallows of mortality. All the same, let
him be hurled into the hollows. (Conversations 127)
Later in Conversations, Moore reads A Group of Noble Dames on the advice of a literary
critic: "as it appeared to me even stranger in style and composition than the novels, I
wrote to ask if he was putting a joke upon me" (Conversations 128).
Hardy's friend John Middleton Murry reacted with a 1924 essay criticizing Moore,
which Hardy praised in a letter:
we have been much interested in your brilliant little chapter in The
Adelphi about Mr George Moore…this attack is obviously personal. And I
know hardly anything of his writings, for one makes, half unconsciously, a
mental list of writers that are negligible…
I doubt if he was worth such good powder & shot as you give him!
I have occasionally wondered why the English press is so afraid of
Mr Moore. It speaks of him always with bated breath, when I should have
thought him to be the most tempting sport among present day detractors
for robust critics. Somebody once called him a putrid literary
hermaphrodite, which I thought funny. (Letters 6: 242-243)
Hardy followed with another 1924 letter to Murry knocking "that ludicrous blackguard
G.M." (Letters 6: 246). Then on the day he died in 1928, Hardy dictated to Florence
"Epitaph for George Moore," his last poem on his deathbed: "On one who thought no
other could write such English as himself / 'No mortal man beneath the sky / Can write
such English as can I / They say it holds no thought my own / What then, such beauty
(perfection) is not known.' / Heap dustbins on him: / They'll not meet / The apex of his
self conceit" ("Epitaph" 954).
Moore got the last laugh. A 1928 interview, "Mr. George Moore's Lamentations,"
reported: "Thomas Hardy, he said, could not write two lines of correct English together,"
and "he had no insight into human nature" ("Lamentations" 3).
117
In "Breaking Apart: The Early Victorian Divorce Novel," Humpherys provides a
survey of nineteenth-century divorce novels, including East Lynne, and asserts that
divorce helped convert fiction from traditional marriage plots to unconventional
modernism and postmodernism. In "Divorce and the New Woman" Humpherys writes
that most New Women novelists did not let characters divorce because in addition to the
novelists' interests in changing marriage, social stigma, and remarriage, divorce caused
open endings in fiction. Mainly interested in post-divorce repartnering in "The Three of
Them: The Scene of 'Divorce' in Nineteenth-Century English Fiction," Humpherys
contends (with assessments of East Lynne and Jude the Obscure) that late-Victorian
activist novelists did not write further about divorce both because they were more
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divorced characters figure in significant ways in the novel" ("Breaking" 42), this chapter
claims that in 1861 East Lynne started a new kind of divorce fiction that ran until the
twilight of the Victorian period—and beyond.
East Lynne, A Mummer's Wife, and Jude the Obscure utilize the same trend:
Wives commit adultery, and their husbands divorce them. Thus, these novels only present
women retracting marital consent by consenting to other men; wives do not retract and
live single. Due to the MCA's sexual double standard, these novels also do not present
wives retracting consent and divorcing their husbands after the latter's adultery and
second offenses. Perhaps that narrative was too difficult to submit. Would the middleclass reading public have welcomed husbands engaging in adultery plus, say, bestiality?
In a word, no. Thus, fiction exposes the near impossibility for women to obtain divorces
on their terms.
Genre played a role in these novels' depictions of divorcées. Specifically, the
early sensation novel (East Lynne) had to buffer the remaining genres, and then the
naturalist novel (A Mummer's Wife) had to present a divorcée to enable her later
consideration in high realism (Jude the Obscure). With the MCA, divorce became a
sensation, partially because of the fear that women would retract consent throughout
England. This sensational current event, then, was only fit for the new sensation novel,
which enjoyed its heyday in the 1860s. Sensation was the expected genre to howl about
social topics, particularly perceived dangerous ones. Critics trashed the genre for its
artistic and didactic failures, so with little to lose, a sensation novelist could tackle a

concerned about marriage reform and because they did not want to encourage remarriage
after divorce.
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divorcée. The naturalist author continued paving the way. Naturalism aimed to construct
environments with almost scientific-level research and then observe how characters
behaved in those environments. Because authors showed characters behaving undesirably
in undesirable environments, naturalism was also associated with repulsive topics,
making a divorcée a good fit. Then after going through the fire for decades with her
sensational and naturalist precedents, a divorcée finally entered the high realist novel, the
most serious fiction of and source of pride for the nation.
Ideology also played a role in these depictions of divorcées. Reflecting the
century accurately, the three novels portray negative outcomes after wives transition to
divorcées, but the novels differ in their views of those outcomes. The sensation novelist
treats her divorcée conservatively. The public saw consent retraction as an affront to
morality, so Wood handles her with melodrama and hysteria, punishing her physically,
emotionally, sexually, socially, and economically. Plus, the sensation author twists the
knife by placing her divorcée near her ex-husband to show how her life would improve
with re-consent. In contrast, the naturalist author tries to lack bias, presenting his
narrative as objectively as possible. Moore neutrally depicts a wife retracting consent and
then reuniting with her ex-husband—as simple as that. After these two ideological
experiments, the high realist novelist wrote progressively about his divorcée. Hardy
advocates consent retraction because the wife in question should not be married to her
husband, and after her divorce, Hardy argues against her re-consent to correct her
perceived error. Treating female consent progressively, high realism pushed the envelope
to attend to this social problem of Victorian England.
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These novels particularly evolve on class ideology. Almost all Britons criticized
the sexual mores of the upper classes, so the first novel exposes an aristocratic wife—
Lady Isabel Mary Carlyle, née Vane, the daughter of an earl initially worth £60,000 per
year—retracting consent by cheating on her middle-class husband. After a middle-class
author attacked upper-class licentiousness and applauded middle-class morality, fictional
divorcées did not come from the middle class for decades. When they did arrive, Kate
Ede and Susanna "Sue" Florence Mary Phillotson, née Bridehead, failed to represent
middle-class morality. Kate falls from shopkeeper's wife to actor's paramour to actress to
prostitute, and Sue sinks from artist and teacher to stonemason's assistant and festival
booth supervisor. Throughout the Victorian period, these novels remained ideologically
unified in showcasing middle-class morality to their legion of middle-class readers.
Finally, timing played a role in these depictions of divorcées. After the 1857
MCA, retracting consent was too new of an idea for anything but sensation to handle in
the 1860s. The naturalist novelist's treatment in the 1880s indicates more Britons
acclimating to the idea of divorce. The high realist author finally depicted a divorcée in
the 1890s but in part because four decades had passed since the MCA, three since her
sensational depiction, and one since her naturalist depiction. Thus Hardy, the high realist
novelist, stood on safer ground since divorce had become more of a reality in society and
literature. It also helped that Hardy tackled divorce midway through the 1890s. Moralists
had already thrown up their hands about artistic vices in what they perceived as the most
inappropriately hedonistic decade of the Victorian period. As a result, compared with the
public sphere and prior fiction, the late-Victorian high realist divorce novel provided a
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more welcoming space for women to retract consent. Jude the Obscure shows retraction
as the new normal that would take England into the twentieth century.
Finally, genre, ideology, and timing worked contrary to success. Wood's early,
conservative sensational novel created a windfall for her career and the publishing
industry. Most of the public ignored Moore and his middle, neutral naturalist text.
Notoriously, Hardy's later, progressive high realist novel ended his novel-writing career.
This chapter will recount the history of nineteenth-century divorce and rare
nonfictional views of post-1857 divorcées. More importantly, the chapter will turn to the
thoughts of fiction writers, assessing sensation as conservative in East Lynne, naturalism
as neutral in A Mummer's Wife, and high realism as progressive in Jude the Obscure.
Ultimately, this chapter reveals that a novelist printed a divorcée successfully if writing
conservatively in an appropriate genre at an appropriate time—or better yet, all three, as
those factors often went hand in hand.
Divorce
In the first half of the nineteenth century ecclesiastical courts heard divorce cases.
Most were a mensa et thoro ("divorce from bed and board"), which provided an
economic separation and allowed wives to become femes sole but did not enable parties
to remarry or wives to control their finances or get custody of children. Divorce a vinculo
matrimonii ("divorce from the bonds of marriage") required three steps. First, suing
spouses, almost always husbands, had to obtain a mensa et thoro in ecclesiastical court,
and then they had to win criminal conversation (commonly called crim. con.) suits
against their wives' lovers in civil court, where the women could not testify on their own
behalf. Finally and most notoriously, spouses had to get an Act of Parliament, requiring
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cases to be investigated and heard again. This process cost hundreds to thousands of
pounds and took months to years. Once proven, a vinculo matrimonii could make
children illegitimate, and husbands could end mothers' custody of and access to children.
Husbands could keep their ex-wives' money, just doling out alimony. From 1800-1857
Parliament granted 200 such divorces, four of which women had instigated.
Parliament passed the MCA in August 1857 to abolish divorces a mensa et thoro
and establish a secular divorce court for parties to go straight through a civil, not
ecclesiastical, route.118 Divorce became easier, cheaper, and faster, costing about £50119
and no longer requiring a three-part process. Husbands could no longer automatically
receive custody of children, and wives could ask that their finances and property be kept
from deserting husbands. Ex-spouses could not testify for or against each other in legal
cases for the remainder of their lives.
Parliament had plenty to say about adultery. Notoriously, they kept a sexual
double standard. Husbands had to prove wives' adultery, but wives had to prove
aggravated adultery—adultery plus bestiality, bigamy, cruelty (initially physical abuse
but expanded to emotional abuse with physical effects from Kelly v. Kelly [1869]),
desertion (of a two-year minimum), incest, rape (of someone other than wives because of
the marital rape exemption), or sodomy. Husbands could sue for court costs and damages
from their wives' lovers, but wives could not do the reverse against their husbands'
mistresses. The MCA prohibited collusion, connivance, and condonation between
spouses on any issue, including adultery. Thus, the court denied divorce cases if suing
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The MCA did not apply to Jews and Quakers.
Still, the working class filed less than 20% of the divorce cases in 1871, for example.
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parties colluded about, connived about, or condoned some aspect of adultery, and the
court could deny cases if suing parties committed adultery in addition to alleging their
spouses' adultery. If judges learned that suing spouses had reentered their homes,
contacted their spouses, etc., they could throw out suits, and the adulterer(s) would
remain married. Spouses deemed the adulterous and therefore guilty party almost always
lost custody of children and usually had to pay all court costs. Adulterous wives could not
receive alimony, while innocent wives usually received one-third of their ex-husbands'
income throughout the latter's lives. Finally, the MCA essentially abolished crim. con.120
The MCA went into effect on January 1, 1858, and the Court for Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes (called the Divorce Court) began sitting in London. Divorce-centric
publications like The Divorce Court Reporter sprang up in the capital, a boon for
England's publishing industry.121 However, London caused difficulty for rural and
Northern Britons, who faced journeys that kept scores from filing. In another geographic
problem, the MCA failed to normalize divorce law between England and Scotland, so
headaches continued back and forth across the border.
Divorcées became femes sole, incentivizing wives to file approximately 100 of the
250 divorce suits in the MCA's first year, which shocked England.122 However, women
did not bring forth more suits because they had to prove aggravated adultery, possessed
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From this point, few husbands pursued this vengeance after their divorce cases.
In an 1858 letter to the Lord Chancellor Queen Victoria asked "whether no steps can
be taken to prevent the present publicity of the proceedings before the new Divorce
Court" because "None of the worst French novels from which careful parents would try
to protect their children can be as bad as what is daily brought and laid upon the
breakfast-table of every educated family in England, and its effect must be most
pernicious to the public morals of the country" (482).
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At that time, England had 6,000,000 spouses.
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little money for court and travel costs, and faced social stigma and separation from family
and friends. Throughout the rest of the Victorian period, women held steady as the
petitioners of about 40% of awarded divorce cases. Particularly in newspapers and other
nonfiction, Victorians shuddered when imagining how high that figure could go if wives
could file for only adultery and suffer no social, familial, or economic repercussions.
As a result, divorce remained an opportunity rarely put into practice. Throughout
the period, Victorians filed an average of low but increasing numbers throughout fiveyear increments: 204 (1859-1863), 233 (1864-1868), 289 (1869-1873), 433 (1874-1878),
482 (1879-1883), 529 (1884-1888), 529 (1889-1894), and 624 (1894-1898). In the 1890s
the Divorce Court granted an average of just two divorces per 1,000 marriages, the
second lowest divorce rate in Europe, and in 1900 only 550 filed to usher in the twentieth
century as singletons. By Queen Victoria's death a year later, ending the 64-year-old
Victorian period, she had refused to receive one divorced person.
Divorce in Nonfiction
After the MCA, two activists argued in nonfiction for wives to retract consent,
with philosopher and Member of Parliament John Stuart Mill leading the charge in The
Subjection of Women (1869). Using characteristically smart rhetoric, Mill provokes his
readers to question sacred cows like The Cult of Domesticity and the sanctity of marriage:
if a woman is denied any lot in life but that of being the personal bodyservant of a despot, and is dependent for everything upon the chance of
finding one who may be disposed to make a favourite of her instead of
merely a drudge, it is a very cruel aggravation of her fate that she should
be allowed to try this chance only once. The natural sequel and corollary
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from this state of things would be, that since her all in [sic] life depends
upon obtaining a good master, she should be allowed to change again and
again until she finds one. (38)
Mill, on the radical fringe, was the only Victorian to advocate in print for women
repeatedly retracting consent when women divorcing once shocked the average Briton.
Divorce lawyer George Henry Lewis was well equipped to advocate for women
retracting consent in "Marriage and Divorce" (1885). While Victorians often lacked
experience with the MCA's pitfalls but still argued for women to maintain consent, Lewis
draws on his cases to argue:
The English law empowers a man, however monstrous his conduct may
have been, however great his cruelty, desertion, or adultery, to turn his
wife out into the street and separate her from every intercourse with her
children, and leave her to starve in a workhouse if, in a moment of
weakness, she forgets her marriage vow…
If my reader think that these are imaginary instances of the
application of the Act of 1857, he has not had much experience of the
silent tragedies of many women's lives, nor has he an accurate knowledge
of the depths to which man's brutality can descend. (647-648)
Women often endured "silent tragedies" because unlike Lewis, Victorians did not focus
on this aspect of marital consent. Lewis advances his argument, asserting that equalizing
divorce would equalize marriage:
Every woman would have her remedy in her own hands instead of being
as she is to-day, the day she marries, simply the domestic "chattel" of her
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husband. Among the lower classes the effect would be not less salutary;
the woman who has at least been given the right to keep her earnings apart
from the rapacity of a bad and drunken husband, would be immeasurably
raised in men's respect when they felt that every act of conjugal infidelity,
every burst of drunken rage, every conviction for felony, gave the woman
the right to either a divorce, or a separation which lapse of time might
entitle her to convert into a divorce. (651)
Lewis was prescient that an equal divorce law would be a tool for social justice to help
equalize society, although he did not live to see this.
As previously mentioned, the Daily Telegraph published Is Marriage a Failure?,
and a small sample of Victorians from all walks of life expressed support for female
retraction. One writer, signed "A Matrimonial Failure," draws from personal experience
to argue that divorce law should include the grounds of alcoholism, mental challenge,
insanity, and criminality:
Have those happy folk who talk about the sanctity of the marriage tie any
idea of the sanctity attaching to the enforced and degrading
companionship of a man brutalised by drink or bestialised by incipient
softening of the brain? Think of a sensitive, refined, or even a decent
woman subjected to the horrors of such a matrimonial tie; and, if only a
hundredth part of her tortures were realised, I think that the most sensible
people would reluctantly own that divorce would be better for the woman,
and for her children too, than the continuance of the holy estate of
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matrimony under such circumstances…Alas! the sufferings of the failures
are very great. (Quilter 26-27)
For this writer, ignorance is bliss, and ignorance is pervasive throughout England,
cramping the consent of the tragically learned. Another writer, signed "A Lost Life,"
speaks from experience about compulsory marriage to ask that divorce law include the
grounds of desertion and asexuality or sexual aversion:
There are persons to whom one of your correspondents has referred as
"born celibates," and this is my case. I married at nineteen, for the reason
that many girls do—viz., because my parents wished me to marry, for I
had several younger sisters following close on my heels, and my father
was not very well off. I was not in love with anyone, and I never have
been, although I am now thirty-seven years of age. I never much liked, and
I certainly never admired men; but being at that age (nineteen) extremely
handsome, accomplished, and attractive, I had over thirty offers of
marriage, and on being urged to choose by my parents, I married the man I
liked best amongst those who loved me. I had not been married a week
before I discovered that I was quite unfit for marriage. I had insuperable
objections to it. In the years that have gone by I have heard of many
similar cases amongst girls. Surely in these civilised times escape should
be possible in such cases. (Quilter 177)
This is about as close a personal account of marital sexuality could come in 1880s
England.
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East Lynne and Divorce
Wood was an admired novelist with high sales, so she could risk depicting a
divorcée. As her son, Charles W. Wood, reports in his biography, Victorians could trust
his mother to treat the MCA appropriately—that is, conservatively: "In politics she took
no part, beyond being a strong Conservative. Inequality she recognised as a Divine law,
but her sympathies were far reaching. All social movements affecting the people or
country she followed with keenest interest" (234-235). East Lynne (set from the 1850s1860s and serialized from 1860-1861) begins with West Lynne lawyer Archibald Carlyle,
27, buying the East Lynne estate from an earl. A year later, Lady Isabel, the earl's 19year-old orphaned, homeless, bankrupt, and abused daughter, lovelessly marries Carlyle.
Beaten down by her sister-in-law for years, Lady Isabel develops jealousy of neighbor
Barbara Hare and rashly retracts her marital consent to flee to the Continent with
aristocrat Captain Francis Levison, approximately 30-31. Carlyle subsequently files for
divorce with the MCA.
Despite its unparalleled popularity during the Victorian period, critics have
largely overlooked East Lynne until recently. Of the scholarship that exists, most attends
to aspects of domestic fiction and sensationalism, and about ten treatments focus on Lady
Isabel, generally viewing her as an aristocrat, wife, mother, and governess. Ian Ward
partially assesses East Lynne vis-à-vis divorce.123 Yet no critic has fully assessed Lady
Isabel as a divorcée, although the plot centers on this woman and her divorce from her
husband.
123

Specifically, Ward considers the novel in relation to divorce and the MCA—noting
that Carlyle is tellingly a lawyer—but is more concerned with Carlyle and Levison's
crim. con. case.
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The narrator is blunt on divorce in East Lynne—Lady Isabel should not retract her
marital consent, period. Consent retraction occurs in the chapter "Never to Be Redeemed"
(271) because for the narrator, once women retracted, they faced a lifelong loss of
respectability. The actual scene of retraction is too horrifying for the narrator to depict.
Instead, Lady Isabel secures her maid's promise to care for her children, three hours pass,
and Carlyle reads Lady Isabel's farewell note. Almost immediately, the narrator makes
Lady Isabel adopt the view that consent retraction is wrong and permanent:
Never had she experienced a moment's calm, or peace, or happiness, since
the fatal night of quitting her home…she had found herself plunged into
an abyss of horror…The very hour of her departure she awoke to what she
had done: the guilt, whose aspect had been shunned in the prospective,
assumed at once its true, frightful colour, the blackness of darkness…
The haunting skeleton of remorse had taken up his lodging within
her; a skeleton of living fire, that must prey upon her heartstrings for ever.
(283-284)
Thus, the narrator uses melodrama to expose the adulterous wife as wrong and penitent.
The narrator makes Lady Isabel a warning to middle-class female readers, who
should not want to be like her. The narrator uses hysterical rhetoric about
"wak[ing]…death":
Oh, reader, believe me! Lady—wife—mother! should you ever be tempted
to abandon your home, so will you awake. Whatever trials may be the lot
of your married life, though they may magnify themselves to your crushed
spirit as beyond the endurance of woman to bear, resolve to bear them; fall
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down upon your knees and pray to be enabled to bear them: pray for
patience; pray for strength to resist the demon that would urge you so to
escape; bear unto death, rather than forfeit your fair name and your good
conscience; for be assured that the alternative, if you rush on to it, will be
found far worse than death. (283)
For the narrator, divorce is social death, "far worse" than physical death, and more female
readers must convert to this view to decrease the spread of an epidemic resulting from the
MCA.
Ten months after Lady Isabel's flight, Carlyle wins his divorce suit, and Lady
Isabel's punishments begin in earnest. From this point in the novel until Lady Isabel's last
breath, "her whole life, after she left [her family], was one long scene of repentance"
(578). Because she lost respectability, Lady Isabel is no longer an accepted aristocrat, so
even the new baronet Sir Francis, a murderer, womanizer, and spendthrift, will not
associate with her. Lady Isabel begs to marry for their unborn child's legitimacy, but Sir
Francis refuses because of her consent retraction: "it is an awful sacrifice for a man in my
position to marry a divorced woman…I am the representative now of an ancient and
respected baronetcy, and, to make you my wife would so offend all my family" (292).
Lady Isabel and Sir Francis end their loveless affair, and the former becomes physically
weak, poor, and alone in a foreign country with an infant, the second Francis Levison.
The narrator likens Lady Isabel's new pain with that of Jesus: "What a cross was hers to
take up! But she must do it; she would do it, by God's blessing—ah! had she got so far as
to ask that? She would take it up from henceforth daily and hourly, and bear it as she best
might: she had fully earned all its weight and its sharp pain, and must not shrink from her
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burden" (298). Thus, while the narrator concedes some sympathy for Lady Isabel's
martyrdom, the narrator also underscores Lady Isabel's sin by comparing her with the
allegedly sinless Jesus.
The narrator enhances Lady Isabel's punishments with a train accident, causing
the divorcée's disfigurement and her bastard's death. Servant Aphrodite "Afy" Hallijohn
sees this: "What an awful thing that railway accident must have been!…And quite a
judgment upon her, I should say" (334). Self-flagellating, the critically injured Lady
Isabel develops a death wish: "All who ever knew me will rejoice to hear that I am no
more. My death will be the only reparation I can offer, for the grief and shame my life
has brought on all who had the evil fortune to belong to me" (321). Following the
assertion that it is better to be dead than nonconsenting, the narrator "kills" Lady Isabel
and makes her take the new identity of Madame Jane Vine, with a facial scar; missing
teeth causing a lisp; grey hair; ugly clothes, bonnet, veil, and glasses; a limp; and a stoop.
The young, beautiful, rich earl's daughter has fallen indeed.
Lady Isabel's ultimate punishment is her longing for her former family after her
consent retraction and train accident made her socially and "physically" dead to them. In
particular, Lady Isabel misses her children from her marriage: "the longing had become
intense. It was indeed a very fever…of the worst kind, for it attacked both the mind and
body. Her pale lips were constantly parched: her throat had that malady…Oh! that she
could see her children but for one day, an hour! that she might press one kiss upon their
lips! Could she live without it?" (390) Thus, longing, more than a train crash, might kill
this divorcée, and the narrator exacerbates this by forcing Lady Isabel to hear Afy's
updates about the Carlyles and insults about herself. In rhetorically asking, "Did she not
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deserve more, ten thousand times more reproach than had met her ears now?" (396), the
narrator considers sadism.
Tackling the issue of re-consent, the narrator places Lady Isabel-cum-Madame
Vine as East Lynne's governess to interact with Carlyle.124 Only now, Lady Isabel falls in
love with Carlyle, enabling the remainder of the novel to provide more punishments. The
narrator writes that Lady Isabel: "sank down in an agony of tears and despair. Oh! to love
him as she did now! to yearn after his affection with this passionate, jealous longing, and
to know that they were separated for ever and for ever; that she was worse to him than
nothing! Softly, my lady! This is not bearing your cross" (474). Part of Lady Isabel's new
punishment, then, is being in love for the first time but having to suppress it "softly." In
fact, Lady Isabel begins a fantasy life about consenting to her ex-husband:
"'Reprehensible!' groans a moralist. Very. Everybody knows that…She, poor thing,
almost regarded Mr Carlyle as her husband. The bent of her thoughts was only too much
inclined to this. (That evil human heart again!) Many and many a time did she wake up
from a reverie, and strive to drive this mistaken view of things away from her, taking
shame to herself" (591). The narrator adds salt to the wound by letting Lady Isabel hear
that Carlyle loved her more during their marriage than he presently loves Barbara.
With this clever plotting, the narrator makes a divorcée submit to a wife in the
appropriate Victorian moral and class hierarchy. As governess, Lady Isabel is
melodramatic about the new Mrs. Carlyle: "She was Barbara Hare then, but now she was
Barbara Carlyle: and she, she, who had been Isabel Carlyle, was Isabel Vane again! Oh

124

Thus, Carlyle becomes the rare Victorian man who (inadvertently) welcomes his
adulterous ex-wife back into his home and family.
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woe! woe!" (404) In fact, Lady Isabel's situation is worse than Barbara's ever was:
"Terribly, indeed, were the positions reversed; most terribly was she feeling it. And by
whose act and will had the change been wrought? Barbara was now the honoured and
cherished wife, East Lynne's mistress. And what was she? Not even the welcomed guest
of an hour, as Barbara had been then: but an interloper; a criminal woman who had thrust
herself into the house" (432). Lady Isabel's position demands that she spend nearly every
day with the children who are now Barbara's, which requires more suppression of love.
The narrator forces Lady Isabel to hear her children call Barbara "Mamma" and disagree
if Lady Isabel ever loved them. Plus, the eldest daughter, Isabel Lucy, explains to Lady
Isabel why she now goes by "Lucy," never "Isabel." Only Lady Isabel witnesses this
family's intimate scenes, and she must appear detached while the narrator stirs within her
an impossible desire to re-consent and join them.
As further punishment, the narrator brings back Sir Francis to West Lynne. Lady
Isabel discovers that she was never special to Sir Francis because he has left numerous
women in his wake, including his wife and Afy. Then Lady Isabel learns that the
murderous Sir Francis is a renegade from the law just as Carlyle becomes a Member of
Parliament to enact law. The narrator employs puritanical language—"red stain" and
"retribution [for] woman"—to present Lady Isabel's great awakening: "For that man, with
the red stain upon his hand and soul, she had flung away Archibald Carlyle. If ever
retribution came home to woman, it came home in that hour to Lady Isabel" (497). The
divorcée is a sinner in the hands of an angry narrator.
Lady Isabel's son William takes to his deathbed, but because Lady Isabel retracted
consent, she lost her right to comfort him as a mother. In one of the novel's most
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heartbreaking scenes William wonders to Lady Isabel if his mother resides in Heaven or
Hell, and Lady Isabel lies: "'I knew her abroad…She said'—sobbing wildly—'that she
was parted from her children here. But she should meet them in heaven and be with them
for ever. William, darling! all the awful pain, and sadness, and guilt of this world, will be
washed out, and God will wipe our tears away'" (578). Lying to her dying child, Lady
Isabel is already in a hell. After Carlyle enters the sickroom, the narrator excruciatingly
blocks Lady Isabel, who has already suppressed so many words throughout the novel:
"Down on her knees, her face buried in the counterpane, a corner of it stuffed into her
mouth that it might help to stifle her agony, knelt Lady Isabel. The moment's excitement
was well nigh beyond her strength of endurance. Her own child; his child; they alone
around its death-bed, and she might not ask or receive from him a word of comfort, of
consolation!" (584) After Carlyle leaves to retrieve Barbara, Lady Isabel speaks again:
"Oh, William, darling! in this dying moment let me be to you as your
mother!…"
"Papa's gone for her."
"Not her! I—I—" Lady Isabel checked herself, and fell sobbing on
the bed. No; not even at that last hour when the world was closing on him,
dared she say, I am your mother. (586)
Because William dies in Lady Isabel's presence here, she could have slipped him the
most crucial news of his life without anyone ever knowing, but the narrator does not
allow this indulgence.
Soon Lady Isabel dies in the narrator's final punishment. In fact, Lady Isabel
perishes from her pipe dream of re-consenting: "The cross had been too heavy, and she
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was sinking under its weight. Can you wonder at it? It might have been different had she
yielded to its weight; striven to bear it in patience and in silence, after the manner she had
carved out for herself. But she did not. She rebelled against it: and it was costing her her
life" (562). On her deathbed Lady Isabel reveals her true identity to Carlyle and mouths
the narrator's themes to him: "Not an hour had I departed, when my repentance set in; and,
even then, I would have retracted and come back, but I did not know how. See what it has
done for me! Oh forgive, forgive me! My sin was great, but my punishment was greater.
It has been as one long scene of mortal agony" (614). Most of the novel was "one long
scene of mortal agony" for the reader, as well.
With this depiction of a divorcée, the sensation novelist tested the water for later
novelists. Wood's risk paid off as East Lynne became a runaway success, even frequently
appearing on girls' recommended reading lists. In England it sold out after two months
and then went through 36 editions in about 20 years. With British copies numbering
somewhere over 500,000 or even over 1,000,000, East Lynne was Wood's most
financially successful venture and the best-selling novel of the Victorian period.125
A Mummer's Wife and Divorce
In 1878 Moore met Émile Zola, who became his literary mentor, leading to visits
and correspondence. Upon reading Zola's advocacy for naturalism, Moore announced in
Confessions of a Young Man (1888) that he had converted to this "new art based upon
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East Lynne was also adapted as a drama. London hosted the first performance in 1864,
and then multiple London theaters staged it simultaneously. Eventually, around 15
versions existed, so Wood's son reported: "It has been dramatised and played so often
that, had the author received a small royalty from every representation, it was long since
estimated that it would have returned to her no less a sum than a quarter of a million
sterling; but she never received anything" (249).
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science, in opposition to the art of the old world that was based on imagination, an art
that should explain all things and embrace modern life in its entirety" (Confessions 95).
Writing an 1885 preface for Zola's novel, Moore championed late-nineteenth-century
naturalists:
it is my firm opinion that if fiction is to exist at all, the right to speak as he
pleases on politics, morals, and religion must be granted to the writer, and
that he on his side must take cognizance of other readers than sentimental
young girls, who require to be provided with harmless occupation until
something fresh turns up in the matrimonial market. Therefore the great
literary battle of our day is not to be fought for either realism or
romanticism, but for freedom of speech; and until that battle be gained I,
for one, will continue fearlessly. ("Preface" xvii)
Naturally, Moore chose to employ naturalism for A Mummer's Wife. Concerned with
presenting factory and acting lifestyles accurately in the novel, he visited Hanley and
toured with actors to learn their habits and lingo before writing to Zola, "if I succeed, as I
expect, in digging a dagger into the heart of the sentimental school, I shall have hopes of
bringing about a change in the literature of my country—of being in fact Zola's offshoot
in England" (Hone 101).
After reading romantic novels and poetry126 in A Mummer's Wife (set from 18821886), Kate, approximately 20, lovelessly marries Hanley shop-owner and landlord
Ralph Ede in an arrangement orchestrated by their mothers. Years later as Kate nurses the
ungrateful Ralph, Richard "Dick" Lennox, approximately 30, takes lodgings while on
126

Among them, Kate read and saved Wood's Lord Oakburn's Daughters (1864).
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tour with his comic opera company, and Kate elopes to tour with him,127 provoking
Ralph's divorce suit with the MCA. A Mummer's Wife deserves critical attention beyond
around the ten articles or chapters mainly interested in gender and naturalism—with just
a few treatments of Kate, largely as an actress and product of her environment. No critic
yet has assessed A Mummer's Wife as a divorce novel or Kate as a divorcée, despite
Moore's groundbreaking treatment of the topic. Specifically, in A Mummer's Wife Moore
acknowledges pros and cons about divorce vis-à-vis consent.
The narrator tries to stay as neutral as possible on marital consent, showing the
benefits and consequences of Kate's experiences with Dick and Ralph, respectively. The
narrator allows Kate to vacillate, first nervously pondering a future with Dick:
Beyond the awful circle of the hills all was as vague to her as beyond the
sea-banks is to the oyster. And not only was she going away into this
unknown region, without hope of ever being able to return again, but she
was going there to roam she did not know whither—adrift, and as helpless
as a tame bird freed and delivered to the enmities of an unknown land.
(M.W. 155)
On the other hand, after Kate's dig at her marital consent to Ralph—"My mother and his
made up the marriage, and I don't know why I consented" (M.W. 158)— Kate tells Dick
about her routine with Ralph: "I never knew what happiness was till I saw you; I never
had any amusement, I never had any love, it was nothing but drudgery from morning to
night. Better be dead than continue such an existence" (M.W. 158). After Dick, the
127

Surveying his first novels, including A Mummer's Wife, Moore claimed with
characteristic bombast in 1922, "I invented adultery, which didn't exist in the English
novel till I began writing" (Hone 373).
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novel's voice of reason, says matter-of-factly, "If you don't want to live with him any
more you have a right to leave him" (M.W. 162), Kate elopes to join his acting troupe.
Actress Lucy Leslie asks the novel's rhetorical question about marital consent: "what can
a woman do if she's unhappy at home but to leave home?" (M.W. 170) The reader can
picture the narrator shrugging nonchalantly in response.
The narrator traces Kate's bad behavior to her environment, not her divorce. As a
middle-class shopkeeper and landlady, Kate must adopt new views and behaviors to
survive in an artistic environment: "She was the tame sparrow, born and reared in
captivity, who, finding the door of its cage open, spread its tiny wings and was striving to
fly with the swallows" (M.W. 170). To blend in with the company's women, Kate goes on
the stage128 and also begins drinking, causing physical and psychological changes:
The broad, simple lines on which her views of life and things had formerly
been based, had become twisted, broken, and confused; her tastes were
now more complex and her desires more febrile. Even her principles of
honesty had become shaken…The middle-class woman, in a word, has
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A fellow actress, Dolly Goddard, torments Kate about her consent retraction:
Not a night passed that this girl did not refer to the divorce cases she had
read of in the papers, or pretended to have heard of. Her natural sharp wit
enabled her to do this with considerable acidity. "Never heard such a thing
in my life, girls," she would begin. "They talk of us, but what we do is
child's play compared with the doings of respectable people. A baker's
wife in this blessed town has just run away with the editor of a newspaper,
leaving her six little children, one of them being a baby no more than a
month old, behind her."
"What will the husband do?"
"Get a divorce." (Chorus—"He'll get a divorce, of course, of
course, of course…")
Kate could only bite her lips and pretend not to understand. (M.W.
224-225)
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disappeared, and the Bohemian taken her place…the closest scrutiny
might have failed to find a clue wherewith to trace her back to her origin.
(M.W. 228)
During this transition, the narrator marries Kate and Dick after the Ede divorce in a more
compassionate move than in East Lynne.
Kate's environment—not consent retraction—condemns her. She and Dick
become impoverished and indebted, and as an alcoholic, Kate thinks and behaves
irrationally. Because Kate takes medically prescribed brandy, she neglects her threeweek-old infant (also named Kate) until the baby's death, and Kate physically and
emotionally abuses Dick. These tragedies occur not because the narrator wants to chasten
Kate but because she has acclimated poorly to her difficult surroundings: "it will be
understood how little fitted she was to effect the psychological and even physical changes
that her new life demanded. She was the woman that nature turns out of her workshop by
the million, all of whom are capable of fulfilling the duties of life, provided the
conditions in which they are placed, that have produced them, remain unaltered" (M.W.
350). Since Kate is not responsible for her actions—"Bohemianism had done" this (M.W.
350)—the narrator does not judge her: "Not a whit worse was she than others of her kind"
(M.W. 350). The narrator simply reports that Kate loses her looks and health, attempts
murder repeatedly, and commits herself to an asylum, with Dick separating from her.
As Kate is on a London street years after her elopement, the narrator remains
neutral when the divorcée runs into Ralph, to whom she could re-consent. As Kate and
Ralph talk like old friends throughout the night, they experience highs and lows. For
example, Ralph's remarriage hurts his ex-wife: "'What, Miss Hender your wife?' said
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Kate with an intonation of voice that was full of pain. A dagger thrust suddenly through
her side as she went up the staircase could not have wounded her more cruelly than the
news that the woman who had been her assistant now owned the house that had once
been hers, was now the wife of the man who had been her husband" (M.W. 384).
Conversely, Kate's acting pleases her ex-husband: "Ralph looked bewildered, like a man
blinded for a moment by a sudden flash of lightning. He could not at once realize that this
woman, who had been his wife, who had washed and scrubbed in his little home in
Hanley, was now one of those luminous women who, in clear skirts and pink stockings,
wander, singing beautiful songs, amid illimitable forests or unscalable mountains" (M.W.
385). The narrator continues to neutralize the scene when the characters apologize for
their marital mistakes, and neither cares much when they do not meet the next day as
planned. After police lock up and fine Kate and then prostitutes initiate her into their
profession, Kate provides a final neutral comment—"Dick, she declared had been very
good to her. Ralph, too, had been kind, and she was determined that the two men should
not quarrel for her" (M.W. 392)—before dying.
A Mummer's Wife sold out in six weeks, but Mudie's Select Library and W. H.
Smith banned the novel, in part because of Moore's treatment of divorce. Indignant in
Literature at Nurse, or Circulating Morals (1885), Moore attacked Charles Edward
Mudie and defended naturalism:
I hate you; and I love and am proud of my hate of you. It is the best thing
about me. I hate you because you dare question the sacred right of the
artist to obey the impulses of his temperament; I hate you because you are
the great purveyor of the worthless, the false and the commonplace; I hate
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you because you are a fetter about the ankles of those who would press
forward towards the truth; I hate you because you feel not the spirit of
scientific inquiry that is bearing our age along; I hate you because you
pander to the intellectual sloth of to-day; I hate you because you would
mould all ideas to fit the narrow limits in which your own turn; I hate you
because you impede the free development of our literature. (Literature 1617)
Despite this "fetter about [his] ankles," Moore brought out a revised eighth edition of A
Mummer's Wife in 1885 and made about £150 from the novel. On the whole, though, the
public ignored the text, and Moore abandoned naturalism later in the decade.129 130
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In 1917 and 1918 letters Moore praised A Mummer's Wife as "my best novel"
(Parnassus 344, 362).
130
After A Mummer's Wife, Moore criticized the publicity of divorce cases in his poem
"A Farewell to 1886" (1887). In Confessions (1888) he condemned "hypocritical"
accounts of divorce in and out of fiction:
write no word that could offend the chaste mind of the young girl who has
spent her morning reading the Colin Campbell divorce case; so says the
age we live in. The penny paper that may be bought everywhere, that is
allowed to lie on every table, prints seven or eight columns of filth, for no
reason except that the public likes to read filth; the poet and novelist must
emasculate and destroy their work. (Confessions 165)
Then the MCA came home to Moore Hall. Augustus Moore divorced his first wife in
1888, and his brother George disapproved, due to the scandal. The latter again criticized
public divorce cases in "The Legal Laundry" (1890):
I want to prevent the publication of these infamous reports, but whether
this is done by the simple abolition of divorce, or by the establishment of
divorce according to Roman law, or by the mere decision that henceforth
divorce cases shall be heard in camera, I care hardly a jot; so important, so
essential do I deem the suppression of these reports that all other
considerations are outweighed by this one desire. ("Laundry" 184)
In Vain Fortune (1891) Moore's main character, a playwright, enjoys the revival of his
play, named Divorce and featuring a divorcée. In a 1903 letter to a correspondent,
generally called Gabrielle von Hoenstadt, Moore flirted, "That you divorced your
husband or was divorced by him surrounds you with attractions to which I am still

181
Jude the Obscure and Divorce
Hardy had opportunities to learn about and contemplate divorce, although he
could never use the MCA to end his unhappy marriage with his first wife, Emma Lavinia
Gifford Hardy. Serving as a Dorset magistrate from 1884-1919, Hardy began a friendship
with divorce lawyer Lewis before starting Jude the Obscure, and during its composition,
Hardy's friend, Francis Henry Jeune, started work as president of the Probate, Divorce,
and Admiralty Division of the High Court. The autobiographical The Life and Work of
Thomas Hardy refers to
the humorous stories connected with the Divorce Court that the genial
judge sometimes had told [Hardy] when they were walking in the woods
of Arlington Manor in the summer holidays; among them the tale of that
worthy couple who wished to be divorced but disliked the idea of such an
unpleasant person as a co-respondent being concerned in it, and so hit
upon the plan of doing without him. The husband, saying he was going to
Liverpool for a day or two, got a private detective to watch his house; but,
instead of leaving, stayed in London, and at the dead of night went to his
own house in disguise, and gave a signal. His wife came down in her

susceptible" (Correspondence 22). In Avowals (1919) Moore notes that a spouse cannot
obtain a divorce in the case of insanity and argues, "the divorce laws ought to be
amended" (Avowals 67). During a 1922 social visit, Moore committed a faux pas on the
divorce topic: "The ladies talked of their daughters, broken marriages, and the difficulties
of divorce. GM suddenly entered the conversation, saying that a woman might well
hesitate in suing for a divorce for fear that her own affairs would be brought to light by
the opposing counsel" (Frazier 430). Finally, Moore wrote an unpublished short story,
"Christina Harford and her Divorce," as he reported in a letter probably from 1929:
"There is no scene in court, no evidence is given, merely a statement that after the case
Christina finds herself a castaway" (Cunard 175).
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dressing-gown and let him in softly, letting him out again before it was
light. When the husband enquired of the detective he was informed that
there was ample evidence; and the divorce was duly obtained. (Life 348)
While writing Jude the Obscure, Hardy attended the prominent 1886 Crawford-Dilke
divorce case and read and quoted John Milton's The Doctrine & Discipline of Divorce:
Restor'd to the Good of Both Sexes, From the Bondage of Canon Law, and Other
Mistakes, to the True Meaning of Scripture in the Law and Gospel Compar'd (1643).
Besides developing a friendship with a divorcée, Rosamund Tomson, Hardy recounts in
his autobiography an insightful 1893 social visit: "The Duchess of Manchester called
while I was [at Lady Londonderry's], and Lady Jeune. All four of us started talking of the
marriage-laws, a conversation which they started, not I; also of the difficulties of
separation, of terminable marriages where there are children, and of the nervous strain of
living with a man when you know he can throw you over at any moment" (Life 273). In
the postscript Hardy remembers loading his manuscript with a radical rhetorical argument:
"My opinion at that time, if I remember rightly, was what it is now, that a marriage
should be dissolvable as soon as it becomes a cruelty to either of the parties—being then
essentially and morally no marriage—and it seemed a good foundation for the fable of a
tragedy" (Life 7).
In Jude the Obscure (set from 1860-1870 and serialized from 1894-1895) Hardy
wrote sympathetically in high realism about a divorcée.131 The novel depicts stonemason
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Hardy had Marie-Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé's 1886 snippet in his notebook: "Since
[realism] does not recoil before ugliness & miseries it must render them supportable by a
perpetual overflow of pity. Realism becomes odious when it ceases to be charitable"
(Notebooks 220-221).
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Jude Fawley, 19, tricked into a loveless marriage by Arabella Donn, a pig farmer's
daughter and barmaid. She soon separates from him, and as one of Hardy's Wessex
novels, Jude the Obscure begins moving across that fictional county when Jude relocates
to Christminster, meeting his cousin Sue, a 27-year-old artist and teacher, and reuniting
with Richard Phillotson, his 45-year-old former teacher. Simultaneously losing her
reputation from associating with Jude and becoming piqued by his marriage, Sue (like
Lady Isabel and Kate) lovelessly marries Phillotson. Arabella becomes a bigamist and
requests and receives a divorce from Jude to marry her husband legally. Meanwhile, Sue
leaves Phillotson to live with Jude, provoking Phillotson's divorce suit with the MCA.
Thus, in a one-time occurrence for nineteenth-century British literature, Hardy went hog
wild by divorcing the novel's four main characters, including its two main female
characters. Hardy reported in an 1895 letter during the novel's publication, "Curiously
enough, I am more interested in the Sue story than in any I have written" (Letters 2: 84),
and later that year, he told a correspondent: "I am glad you like Sue. So do I" (Letters 2:
98). In his next 1895 letter, he confessed, "Sue is a type of woman which has always had
an attraction for me—but the difficulty of drawing the type has kept me from attempting
it till now" (Letters 2: 99). In a letter at the end of 1895, Hardy also revealed: "I have
been intending for years to draw Sue, & it is extraordinary that a type of woman,
comparatively common & getting commoner, should have escaped fiction so long"
(Letters 2: 102). Thus Hardy even surprised himself by becoming the first Victorian to
write a divorcée so progressively.
Critics have written heavily on Jude the Obscure, mainly on education, setting,
tragedy, and social and literary changes, especially involving gender and family. Many
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treatments exist of Sue, usually dealing with her as an (a)sexual creature, mother, New
Woman, and wife.132 More narrowly, Karley Adney, Amanda Claybaugh, William A.
Davis, Jr., and Melanie Williams have written fully on divorce.133 The latter makes two
references to consent: "Sue's 'consent' to the second marriage contract with Phillotson,
clearly questionable on legal and ethical grounds, thus remains on record as perfectly
valid" (181), and "Jude's comment that she was 'out of her senses' and 'creed drunk'
suggests a state of mind capable of negativing her contractual consent" (182). This
chapter builds from Williams' brief allusions to consent to consider retracted consent
throughout the novel.
The narrator breaks new ground in fiction by showing consent retraction as
necessary. Sue's argument about retraction converts her husband: "Domestic laws should
be made according to temperaments…If people are at all peculiar in character they have
to suffer from the very rules that produce comfort in others!…What is the use of thinking
of laws and ordinances…if they make you miserable when you know you
are…committing no sin?…We made the compact, and surely we can cancel it" (J.O. 176).
Unlike Lady Isabel but resembling Kate, Sue's premeditation ensures that she does not
132

Critics have mostly refrained from individual attention to the second divorcée,
Arabella, though a few have defended her.
133
Adney argues that Hardy liked Milton's views from The Doctrine & Discipline of
Divorce, so he allows his beloved Sue to espouse them. Claybaugh asserts that Jude the
Obscure does not advocate for marital law reform since characters acquire divorces
easily, and those divorces do not affect their futures much. In "Reading Failure In(to)
Jude the Obscure: Hardy's Sue Bridehead and Lady Jeune's 'New Woman' Essays, 18851900," Davis, Jr. posits that Lady Jeune's anti-New Woman publications influenced Jude
the Obscure, causing Hardy's conflict between supporting and criticizing Sue. In Thomas
Hardy and the Law: Legal Presences in Hardy's Life and Fiction, Davis, Jr. argues that to
advocate for reform, Hardy modeled his characters' navigations of divorces on corporeal
Victorians' experiences. Williams shows discrepancies between the novel's marriages,
divorces, and remarriages and contemporary law and case law.
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make a rash and almost instantly regrettable decision to retract. After platonically living
with Jude, Sue visits Phillotson, and he decides to give her a divorce,134 framed as a
"kindness to her" (J.O. 200).135 The divorce goes through six months later.136 However,
scandalized by free love and divorce, community members—not the narrator—put tragic
events in motion: Sue and Jude sink in class and become nomads, wandering from
freestone job to freestone job until operating a stall of baked goods. Then Jude "Little
Father Time" Fawley kills his half-brother and –sister, leading to Sue's miscarriage. Like
those of Lady Isabel and Kate, then, Sue's affair and the child conceived from it both die.
Although sympathetic, the high realist narrator could not present the outcomes of
Victorian consent retraction unrealistically.
In Jude the Obscure a divorcée should maintain her consent retraction rather than
conform to morals by remarrying her ex-husband. Sue's decision to return to Phillotson137
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In her short story "A Little Gray Glove" in her collection Keynotes (1893), George
Egerton (Mary Chavelita Dunne Bright) describes a successful divorce case in which the
husband named his innocent wife and male friend as adulterers. Hardy read Keynotes
while writing Jude the Obscure and then corresponded with Egerton about Sue after
publication.
135
Early in the novel, Arabella retracts consent from Jude, and the narrator constructs
divorce as compassion. Arabella asks Jude to initiate divorce proceedings "in kindness to
her" so that she can legitimize her bigamous union, and Jude complies because he
"do[es]n't want to injure her in any way" (J.O. 189). This is also a kindness to himself,
although Davis, Jr. shows that this would have violated the MCA and caused an inability
to divorce.
136
Interestingly, Williams implies that per the MCA, Phillotson would lose his suit after
condoning his wife's adultery. Davis, Jr. also fascinatingly shows that since Sue connives
to suggest nonexistent adultery (her cohabitation with Jude) and precedent (Jude's divorce
suit) to Phillotson, the Phillotson divorce case should be denied.
137
Hardy's notebook contains Havelock Ellis's 1890 quotation about Henrik Ibsen: "A
woman, married: former lover returns, she wants to fly with him. Husband at length
consents to allow her to choose as she will. Then at once she feels able to decide against
the lover. The moral is that without freedom of choice there can be no real emancipation
or development" (Notebooks 2: 15).
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stems from religious zealotry, so as the atheistic Hardy denigrates her reasoning, he
denigrates her decision. Sue's religious kick manifests in ludicrous talk, first validating
marital possession even as Parliament chips away at coverture: "I am Richard's…I belong
to him, or to nobody" (J.O. 272). In a taboo, the zealous Sue approves and justifies her
children's murders-suicide: "I see marriage differently now. My babies have been taken
from me to show me this! Arabella's child killing mine was a judgment—the right slaying
the wrong'" (J.O. 275). Then Sue speaks more about what should be unspeakable: "My
children—are dead—and it is right that they should be! I am glad—almost. They were
sin-begotten. They were sacrificed to teach me how to live!—their death was the first
stage of my purification. That's why they have not died in vain!" (J.O. 285) Unlike Lady
Isabel, who longed to remarry Carlyle, and Kate, who was relatively unaffected by her
reunion with Ralph, Sue illogically remarries Phillotson. Further, her husband tastelessly
accepts the reunion not from love but possible career improvement. After the Phillotson
wedding, Jude challenges re-consent: "We've both remarried out of our senses. I was
made drunk to do it. You were the same. I was gin-drunk; you were creed-drunk. Either
form of intoxication takes away the nobler vision" (J.O. 307). For Jude and the narrator,
unethical re-consent makes a bad situation worse.138
Also for Jude and the narrator, lovelessly re-consenting becomes an
uncomfortable sexual ministration. Jude bluntly, presciently warns Sue that her marriage
"will be a fanatic prostitution" (J.O. 283). As a struggling newlywed like "A Lost Life,"
138

The narrator also condemns Arabella's re-consent. The widow wants Jude back and
ignores the MCA to claim, "He's more mine than [Sue's]…What right has she to him"
(J.O. 248-249). Conniving with her father to use alcohol, kidnapping, and thievery,
Arabella tricks Jude into a nonconsensual wedding, though these ex-spouses should never
see each other again.
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Sue acknowledges her struggle by admitting, "I have nearly brought my body into
complete subjection" (J.O. 306). Mrs. Edlin, a neighbor, declares to Sue: "I don't think
you ought to force your nature. No woman ought to be expected to" (J.O. 311). Yet Sue
irrationally persists: "I am going to make my conscience right on my duty to Richard—by
doing a penance—the ultimate thing…To reverse it will be terrible—but…I've screwed
my weak soul up to treating him more courteously—and it must be now—at once—
before I break down!…It is my duty. I will drink my cup to the dregs!" (J.O. 310-311)
Venturing into the bedroom of this grossly remarried couple, the narrator becomes the
most overt on re-consenting to marriage and sex:
"Now I supplicate you, Richard, to whom I belong, and whom I wish to
honour and obey, as I vowed, to let me in…"
He put his arm round her to lift her up. Sue started back.
"What's the matter?" he asked, speaking for the first time sternly.
"You shrink from me again?—just as formerly!"
"No, Richard—I—I—was not thinking—"
"You wish to come in here?…"
"Yes. It is my duty!"
He led her through the doorway, and lifting her bodily, kissed her.
A quick look of aversion passed over her face, but clenching her teeth she
uttered no cry. (J.O. 311-313)
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Amidst the pathetic fallacy of wind and rain, this is the reader's last sight of Sue, who will
grimly endure her life, whereas Lady Isabel and Kate died.139 When Jude finds out about
the Phillotson consummation, he likens it to slavery: "the ultimate horror has come—her
giving herself like this to what she loathes, in her enslavement to forms!" (J.O. 315) Soon
Jude dies, confirming the novel's epigraph on the (divorce) law: "The letter killeth" (J.O.
9).
Because of the novel's content, England turned on Hardy almost as a complete
body. Hardy's wife traveled to London to try to stop the novel's publication, and his
autobiography records, "The Reviews begin to howl at Jude" (Life 287). Due to Hardy's
position as one of the living Greats, his publisher sold 20,000 copies in the first three to
four months, but readers and critics scorched the novel. Some people in Hardy's life
refused to speak with him anymore, Margaret Oliphant denounced him as a member of
"The Anti-Marriage League" (1896), and W. H. Smith removed Jude the Obscure from
its shelves at a bishop's request. As a result, Hardy famously stopped writing novels
forever, and Jude the Obscure remained a sore subject for the rest of Hardy's life.140 141
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In an 1895 letter Hardy revealed his view of Sue's re-consenting, writing, "Her going
back to her first husband was in a sort of terror at life—which took away her better
judgment" (Letters 8: 41).
140
Only in the twentieth century could Hardy correspond about being a Victorian
whipping boy. In a 1907 letter Hardy referred to Phillotson allowing Sue to live with
Jude: "this is the critical & cardinal event in 'Jude the Obscure' which…was so abused by
the press for writing it that I have never written another novel" (Letters 3: 249). In a 1923
letter he remembered when "the newspapers were howling me down & suggesting that I
should have two years' hard for writing the story" (Letters 6: 227).
141
After Jude the Obscure, Hardy revealed additional thoughts about divorce. In a 1908
letter he casts divorce as a potential benefit of suffrage: "as the probable break-up of the
present marriage-system…I do not myself consider that this would be necessarily a bad
thing (I should not have written 'Jude the Obscure' if I did)" (Letters 3: 360). Hardy
speaks similarly about suffrage in a 1909 letter: "The result will be that all superstitious
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Thus, of these three novels on consent retraction, the high realist author took a
risk in depicting a divorcée progressively and failed, at least in public opinion. By 1895,
Victorians still did not want divorce to be anything but a sensation, both in and out of
fiction. Retracting consent through divorce could not yet be deemed real and thereby
acceptable—neither for corporeal women increasing on the sidewalks of England nor
heroines infiltrating the pages of high realism. Nevertheless, this chapter reveals a
growing acceptance of consent retraction at least in terms of the number of fictional
depictions. Novels featuring divorcées began building right after the MCA and continued
to the fin de siècle, and the movement could not be stopped.
While composing his novel, Hardy advised an aspiring novelist in an 1893 letter:
"I have already jotted down a few notes for the next long story [Jude the Obscure]…If
you mean to make the world listen to you, you must say now what they will all be
thinking & saying five & twenty years hence: & if you do that you must offend your
conventional friends" (Letters 2: 32-33). Hardy was almost right on the money. Twentyeight years after he published Jude the Obscure and offended his conservative country,
England embraced the notion of consent retraction enough to make it more possible for
wives. Specifically, in 1923 Parliament passed a new Matrimonial Causes Act to remove
institutions will be knocked down or rationalized—theologies, marriage…" (Letters 4: 21)
Hardy is philosophical in a 1911 letter: "I have thought for many years: that marriage
should not thwart nature, & that when it does thwart nature it is no real marriage, & the
legal contract should therefore be as speedily cancelled as possible. Half the misery of
human life would I think disappear if this were made easy" (Letters 4: 177). Responding
to a magazine series asking "How Shall We Solve the Divorce Problem?," Hardy
submitted "Laws the Cause of Misery," in which he asserts, "a marriage should be
dissolvable at the wish of either party, if that party prove it to be a cruelty to him or her"
("Laws" 683). Finally, in 1922 he looked back on the time of Jude the Obscure and
dictated a letter to his wife Florence: "he has always had, of course, objection to the
permanency of distinctly bad and cruel unions" (Letters 6: 156).
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the sexual double standard about adultery in divorce law. Fourteen years later, Parliament
passed another Matrimonial Causes Act to enable divorce suits on non-adulterous
grounds.
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